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INTRODUCTION 
1. Poet and Philosopher 
In this dissertation I have brought together the work 
of Sophocles and Aristotle with a view to examining a variety 
of topics in the area of moral philosophy and moral psychol-
ogy. This is the primary work of the thesis. The second 
purpose of the dissertation, which is a corollary of the 
first, is to demonstrate the importance of using both litera-
ture and philosophy in the education of the moral agent. The 
reason that I have chosen Sophocles and Aristotle for the work 
of this dissertation is that they both share the same fun-
damental conception of human nature and human purpose. They 
understand a human being to be a complex of reason, emotion 
and desire that are not intrinsically opposed to each other 
but are capable of being integrated into a harmonious whole. 1 
1Interest in the relationship of the emotions to reason 
appears to be something that pre-occupied much of Greek 
culture, especially fifth century Athenian culture. Thus, 
Socrates was especially careful to affirm the dominance of 
reason over the passions in the Protagoras. In Republic IV.13 
Plato demonstrates an intimate and profound understanding of 
the way in which the passions can be in opposition to the 
dictates of reason in his story about Leontius, son of Aglaion 
who gave in to his desire to gaze upon the bodies of criminals 
being handled by an executioner. Plato, however, goes on to 
show that although the passions are capable of opposing reason 
they are equally capable, through moral education, of being 
brought in line with the dictates of reason. Euripides, 
2 
This excellent integration of the various elements of the 
human psyche is a major part of successful moral education and 
is the fertile ground out of which excellent choice springs. 
The integration of ourselves into psychological wholeness and 
the development of the various virtues of character are 
constitutive of human purpose, which is, as Aristotle put it, 
eudaimonia or flourishing. This will be constituted by a life 
that is rich in virtuous activity which is performed both for 
and with others. In this way we see that friends are an 
important part of the moral life as both the occasion of our 
exercise of the virtues and as promoters of virtuous activity. 
Thus, both the poet and philosopher share a fundamentally 
similar conception of what it means to be human and the 
specific purpose that is ours, as human beings, to realize. 
They understand that the development of the virtues (including 
friendship, which is a virtue) and the integration of the 
various elements of the psyche are a necessary part of 
fulfilling our nature and that this kind of realization of our 
characteristically, portrays the emotions and reason in 
irreconcilable opposition to each other which, inevitably, 
leads to disaster. In this regard, we have only to think of 
Phaedra's passionate love for Hippolytus or Medea's all-
consuming hatred for Jason that impels her, in opposition to 
what she knows is right, to slaughter her children. Sopho-
cles, more in line with the Platonic and Aristotelian tradi-
tion, views reason and passion as not intrinsically opposed 
but capable of being integrated into a harmonious whole. We 
can see this in the figure of Neoptolemus in the Philoctetes 
as well as the figures of Theseus and Oedipus himself in 
Oedipus at Colonus. The latter, in fact, achieves a kind of 
immortality through finally bringing about a reconciliation 
of the formerly warring elements with himself. See Blundell, 
Helping Friends, p. 272. 
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nature is constitutive of human flourishing. 
This conception of the moral person is rich and fully 
appreciates the complexity of both the rational and emotional 
aspects of being human. Implicit in this conception of the 
moral person is also an appreciation of the messiness of moral 
action and, perhaps more importantly, the precariousness of 
achieving moral virtue and living the good life. We can see 
this in the way that this conception of the moral life takes 
into account the full spectrum of the elements of the human 
psyche and understands that these parts must come to form a 
well-integrated whole if we are to realize our nature. This 
is an enterprise that is fraught with risks because these 
elements are viewed, at least potentially, as in opposition 
to each other and it is the delicate business of moral 
education to bring them into a harmonious whole. But this, 
as the philosopher and the tragedian see it, is the only path 
to authentic human agency and the practice of virtue. This 
integration may, of course, not be realized and the individual 
may come to live a frustrated rather than a fulfilled life. 
Implicit in this conception of the moral agent is also the 
recognition of the need for a good teacher who can instruct 
us in the ways of virtue and flourishing. In this conception 
of the human person and human purpose there is a profound 
appreciation of the crucial role that others play in our 
growth in the moral life. In their sense of the centrality 
of the role of a good teacher and good friends both the 
4 
tragedian and the philosopher realize the fundamentally social 
character of our growth toward virtue or vice. 
The anthropology which Sophocles and Aristotle fundamen-
tally share and the conception of human life to which it gives 
rise seems to me to be superior to certain of the dominant 
modes of ethical thought in existence today. According to the 
Kantian conception of morality, everything which we have 
enumerated above (the role of the emotions, teacher, friends, 
etc.) would be irrelevant to a proper study of ethics. This 
is so for Kant inasmuch as he holds that we do not need any 
kind of anthropology or understanding of human purposes in 
order to do ethics. Experience is, in fact, irrelevant 
according to Kant's view since we need only concern ourselves 
with the autonomy of the willing subject in fulfilling the 
moral law. Kant would be equally suspicious of the charac-
terization of moral philosophy as concerned with the messiness 
and contingeny of everyday existence. Again, for Kant, 
experience is immaterial to the proper study of ethics 
inasmuch as ethics should not be concerned at all with how 
people actually act but with how they ought to act. 
The conception of morality which Sophocles and Aristotle 
espouse seems to me to be superior to the dominant voices in 
ethical thought today because of their emphasis upon the 
practical nature of ethics. In many ways, this comes down to 
being centrally preoccupied with the issue of character. The 
tragedian and the philosopher both have a sense that ethics 
5 
is not about finding out what rule or rules one should follow2 
but about what sort of person one should become. It is the 
task of ethics, as they see it, not to construct a theory of 
the good but actually to become good. Thus ethics is under-
stood to be a much more dramatic enterprise in which we are 
concerned with the making or breaking of lives and not simply 
with arriving at a correct formulation of some abstract rule 
such as the moral law or the principle of utility. 
Their anthropology is preferable because they take into 
account all aspects of the person, the rational, emotional and 
desiderative and understand that these elements of the human 
psyche must be brought into some kind of harmonious whole if 
we are to bring our nature to its realization. They do not 
ignore important aspects of human experience with respect to 
moral decision-making such as Kant does in his repudiation of 
the role of the emotions. Again, their conception of the 
human person involves the need for others (as teachers or 
friends) in order for the specifically human purpose to be 
fulfilled. This social aspect of the moral life seems to me 
to be much closer to reality than, for example, Kant's preoc-
cupation with the autonomy of the will and its relation to 
duty. 
It is because of their richer anthropology and sense of 
human purpose as well as their appreciation of the complexity 
2This is characteristic of utilitarianism also which is 
preoccupied, primarily, with the attempt to enunciate the most 
successful form of the principle of utility. 
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and messiness of moral decision-making that I have suggested 
that Sophocles and Aristotle are preferable to the dominant 
modes of moral thinking today. This fuller anthropology, I 
would like to suggest, implies the need for appealing to both 
literature as well as philosophy in our analysis of the moral 
agent. 3 We need to appeal to literature for its ability to 
present moral complexity through the depiction of full-bodied, 
thinking and feeling characters who are in a situation in 
which a decision must be made. In general, literature will 
be relevant for its concreteness and its ability to assist us 
in becoming effective moral agents by helping us to appreciate 
the important role that the emotions play in excellent moral 
agency. It does this, of course, by eliciting our own 
emotional response to the characters and situations that are 
depicted in the drama. But if we are to take our cue from the 
moral anthropology which Sophocles and Aristotle hold, we 
shall need more than simply an emotionally charged 
presentation of particulars in order to understand the nature 
of the moral agent and the moral life. We shall also need the 
unifying and explanatory force that it is the peculiar part 
of a logos to provide. It is for this that we have turned to 
Aristotle. In this way then, it is a secondary aim of this 
3on the central importance of literary works in moral 
philosophy see, Martha C. Nussbaum, "Consequences and Charac-
ter in Sophocles' Philoctetes," Philosophy and Literature, 1 
(1976-77), 25-29; Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of 
Goodness (Cambridge, New York, Cambridge University Press, 
1986). 
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dissertation to show that we need the accounts of both 
literature and philosophy in order properly to understand the 
nature of the moral agent and the moral life. Thus, it will 
be my aim to show that literature is needed for its emotional 
power and its ability to present forcefully the phenomena of 
human moral experience while philosophy is needed for its 
explanatory power in bringing the diversity of the phenomena 
into some unified whole. 
This bringing together of philosophy and literature is 
advantageous to the education of the moral agent in many 
respects. First, the use of literature will be of great 
benefit to a popular audience precisely because of its 
concreteness and its emotional power. An individual uninit-
iated or uninterested in the subtleties of strictly philo-
sophic discourse may still be drawn into an understanding of 
the various moral issues under consideration because of 
literature's immediacy and emotional evocativeness. Secondly, 
even those who are well-versed in the various schools of 
ethical thought will be benefited by this convocation of 
philosophy and literature for seeing the important way in 
which they can be played off of each other. For example, it 
will be of value for such an audience to perceive the various 
strengths that are peculiar to each media and to come to 
understand that both philosophy and literature shed a 
different light on our understanding of the moral agent and 
the moral life. While the use of literary technique is not 
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directly relevant to the professional activity of the moral 
philosopher (e.g., writing a book about moral philosophy) it 
may still be useful for him as a moral person. Let us turn, 
then, to a discussion of the major themes of this dissertation 
in order to present a synoptic overview of the entire work. 
2. Nature and Virtue 
In the first chapter we see the tragedian and the 
philosopher's penchant for the concrete over the abstract in 
their concern to determine the relationship of human nature 
to virtue. Again, they are not concerned with constructing 
a sound moral theory after the manner of modern moral philo-
sophy but with discerning the kind of being that a human being 
is and what this might reveal with respect to the development 
of the virtues. They show their appreciation of the 
complexity of human nature and their willingness to include 
all of the phenomena in the way that they recognize the entire 
person in his rational, desiderative and emotional aspects. 
They view the human person as a complex web of all of the 
above elements that must be brought into some kind of 
harmonious organization if virtue is to be achieved and 
flourishing is to be made possible. According to Sophocles 
and Aristotle this integration is not given to us by nature 
but requires an educator who will assist in the moral 
formation of the individual. In this way we see that the 
ancients fully appreciated the concrete character of ethics, 
the complex nature of a human being, the involved process of 
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moral formation and the social aspect of morality. I shall 
argue that this ancient anthropology is superior to more 
recent developments in the Kantian tradition in all of these 
ways. Modern moral philosophy after Kant is overly committed 
to the abstract rather than the concrete in its pre-occupation 
with the formulation of rules instead of the proper formation 
of character. In its single focus upon the role of reason it 
does not show an appreciation of all aspects of the human 
psyche in the formation of the moral person. This is 
particularly evident in its ignoring of the role that the 
emotions play. Finally, moral philosophy in. the Kantian 
tradition does not recognize the social character of morality 
and the vital role that others, particularly teachers, play 
in an individual's growth into moral personhood. I begin our 
discussion of Sophocles' and Aristotle's position by showing 
how they took up their stance in opposition to the archaic 
tradition that preceded them. 
According to the archaic tradition (whose primary 
spokesman is the poet, Pindar) 4 one's nature is determinative 
of the quality of one's character. In short, noble sons are 
presumed to be born from noble fathers and the base or wicked 
from the wicked. Sophocles' position is particularly 
noteworthy in this regard because he is writing as a poet and 
4 I have chosen to employ Pindar as representative of the 
archaic tradition because he, more than anyone else, most 
starkly contrasts the efficacy and sufficiency of nature for 
virtue with the uselessness and inefficacy of education. See 
below chapter 1, footnote 1. 
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the poets ( including Homer) were those who traditionally 
espoused this view. It is my contention that, in this play, 
Sophocles offers a direct challenge to the archaic notion that 
nature is a sufficient guarantee of virtue. Sophocles 
accomplishes this by portraying the sudden and rather 
unexpected downfall of Neoptolemus, the son of the noble 
Achilles, through both the young man's over-confident reliance 
upon his inherited nobility to keep him on the path of virtue 
and, more significantly, the pernicious influence of a wicked 
teacher. The centrality of education in the moral formation 
of Neoptolemus is emphasized in the articles of Peter Rose and 
Mary Whitlock Blundell. 5 Through the depiction of 
Neoptolemus' fall into the practice of villainy under the 
deleterious influence of Odysseus, Sophocles argues, in 
dramatic form, for the insufficiency of nature to achieve 
virtue. We are shown that although Neoptolemus' noble nature 
is a good starting point for the development of the virtues 
this will not, by itself, be sufficient to attain virtue. 
Neoptolemus is in need of the sort of teacher who will not 
undermine him but will affirm his sense of justice and help 
him live up to it. In this way, Sophocles points to the 
crucial role of the educator in the development of the 
virtues. My position with regard to the character of 
5see Peter Rose, "Sophocles' Philoctetes and the Teach-
ings of the Sophists," Harvard Studies in Classical Philology. 
80 (1976), 81-83, 89; Mary Whitlock Blundell, "The Phusis of 
Neoptolemus in Sophocles' Philoctetes," Greece and Rome, 35 
( 1988), 140-142. 
11 
Neoptolemus is in marked contrast to the position of two 
recent commentators on the play, namely, Albin Lesky and 
Gregory McNamee. 6 According to both Lesky and McNamee the 
figure of Neoptolemus does not undergo any real change in the 
course of the drama but simply resumes the nature (phusis) 
which he had renounced at the beginning of the play. Lesky, 
in particular, emphasizes the relatively primitive conception 
of human personality which existed in the pre-sophistic (i.e. 
pre-Euripidean) presentation of human personality on the Attic 
stage. He contends that we ought to resist the temptation to 
attribute any significant change to the character of Neop-
tolemus at the close of the play inasmuch as writers such as 
Aeschylus and Sophocles understood human nature, fundamen-
tally, as changeless and fixed. I argue that this position 
simply does not do justice to both the psychological com-
plexity of Neoptolemus in his anguished deliberations as to 
what to do nor the crucial moral guidance that Philoctetes 
gives in the drama. It is my contention that the tragedian 
is showing us that nobility of nature is no guarantee of the 
attainment of virtue and that, without the presence of some 
kind of moral example, even noble natures are liable to 
permanent corruption. 
While the tragedian makes his point through the medium 
of dramatic portrayal, Aristotle discusses the issue of the 
6Albin Lesky, Greek Tragedy trans. by H. A. Frankfort 
(London, New York, Harper and Row, 1978); Philoktetes trans. 
by Gregory McNamee (Port Townsend, Copper Canyon, 1986). 
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relationship of nature and virtue through a more conceptual 
framework. The philosopher, too, holds that untutored nature 
is insufficient to achieve virtue. According to Aristotle, 
we neither grow into possession of the virtues by some sort 
of natural process (like a tadpole becoming a frog) nor is the 
engendering of the virtues contrary to our nature. But we 
are, by nature, capable of receiving and engendering them in 
ourselves through the process of habituation. In this way, 
Aristotle indicates that he, like Sophocles, views our 
relationship to the virtues as a certain potentiality that is 
realized through practice or habituation. Thus, in this 
chapter, I maintain that the philosopher and the tragedian 
share a fundamentally similar anthropology in their view that 
nature is insufficient for virtue and requires the augmenta-
tion of moral education. This view is presented through the 
emotionally charged and concrete medium of Sophocles' art as 
well as argued for through the medium of philosophic discourse 
in Aristotle. 
3.· Moral Exemplar and Moral Standard 
In chapter two I develop further the theme, touched upon 
in the previous chapter, of the importance of a role model in 
moral education. I also address the broader question of the 
ultimate standard of value for Sophocles and Aristotle. Once 
again we can see the emphasis upon the concrete in the ancient 
conception of ethics in several ways. First, we note that the 
recognition for the need of a teacher stems directly from the 
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understanding that human nature is insufficient to achieve 
virtue. This is based upon an empirical judgment. Secondly, 
the remedy that is sought is not in terms of formulating some 
kind of abstract principle which ought to be followed (as in 
modern moral philosophy) but is in terms of a particular 
individual from the society who is well-equipped to instruct 
the student and inculcate the habits of virtue in him. Of 
course the appeal to a concrete individual as a standard of 
action would be, for a Kantian, utterly wrongheaded. Again, 
for Kant, experience is immaterial to the doing of ethics and 
no number of excellent moral exemplars could ever add up to 
the exceptionless rigor demanded by the moral law. But, in 
the ancient conception of the moral agent, such exceptionless 
rigor is unrealistic and out of touch with the contingent 
character of moral action. Thirdly, we can see here an 
implicit affirmation and recognition of the inherently social 
character of the formation of the moral agent. Again, it is 
my contention that Sophocles and Aristotle share the same 
fundamental moral anthropology and that this conception of the 
moral agent is superior to more modern developments. In the 
spirit of this anthropology that takes into account the whole 
person we see that Sophocles presents his position on the 
moral agent through the concrete and more emotionally oriented 
medium of poetry while Aristotle furnishes a more rational 
account of the phenomena which are presented by the poet. 
The tragedian dramatically portrays the central place 
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of the role model by showing both the devastating consequences 
that a poor role model can have and the critical role that a 
good moral example can play. Sophocles shows us the depths 
to which the influence of a bad teacher can reach in Neop-
tolemus' lying tale that he tells to Philoctetes as well as 
his final commentary on the tale. I argue that the gross 
fiction that he tells in which he has lost his fatherly 
inheritance to Odysseus actually reflects his own condition 
of having betrayed his moral identity. Sophocles further 
signifies that the young man is in a truly perilous state when 
Neoptolemus, in Odyssean fashion, attributes responsibility 
for his own wrongdoing to someone else. The tragedian 
demonstrates the central importance of the role model by 
showing us how Philoctetes awakens in Neoptolemus the sense 
of shame which he claimed he had thrown off under Odysseus' 
influence and the way in which the broken hero helps Neop-
tolemus to honor and live up to his original moral principles. 
Aristotle does not furnish us with a dramatic instance 
of a particular, educational relationship as does Sophocles. 
This is more the part of a poet. He does, however, show 
himself to be in sympathy with the tragedian when he argues 
for the central importance of the educator and the lawmaker 
in the moral formation of individuals and the citizen body. 
The philosopher, thus, makes programmatic what is presented 
as a particular relationship by the tragedian. It is the work 
of the educator and the lawmaker, he affirms, to instill 
15 
within the people of the polis certain excellences of charac-
ter that will result in both individual flourishing and the 
common good of the state. 
In addition, I have argued that Sophocles and Aristotle 
both share a fundamental sense that the ultimate standard by 
which things in the human realm are to be measured and 
assessed is divine. While they are in agreement in their 
appeal to the divine, their emphases differ somewhat. 
Sophocles appears to stress human ignorance and the inadequacy 
of human action and appeals to the divine as a response to the 
tragic impasse to which the characters in the play have come 
in the course of the drama. 7 Aristotle's God, on the other 
hand, serves more as the ultimate horizon in terms of which 
human beings are exhorted to model themselves. This "modeling 
ourselves" after the divine is accomplished, according to 
Aristotle, through contemplative activity {such as, for 
example, the practice of philosophy) in which the divine 
element in human nature is recognized and allowed to flour-
ish. 8 In this way it can be seen that both tragedian and 
philosopher appeal to the divine as the final standard by 
which the human realm is to be understood but each has a 
7For this interpretation of the theophany of Heracles see 
Mary Whitlock Blundell, Helping Friends and Harming Enemies 
{Cambridge, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1989); 
Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? {Notre 
Dame, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 1988); Karl 
Reinhardt, Sophocles {New York, Harper and Row, 1979). 
8see J. A. Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of 
Aristotle, 2 {Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1892), pp. 442-444. 
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somewhat different conception of how the divine and the human 
are related. This appeal to the di vine as the ultimate 
standard was widely shared in ancient culture. We see it 
operative in the work of the lyric poets, the tragedians and 
the philosophers. It seems to me that the significance of 
this appeal is that, for the ancients, the human good or any 
system of goods is not self-validating or self-authenticating 
but requires an appeal to the divine as the source or well-
spring of their goodness. In this way they implicitly 
recognized that we, as human beings, do not create our own 
nature but rather bring into realization some purpose that is 
peculiarly ours to attain. In this way we can also see that 
the ancients attempted to secure the objectivity of values. 
For, once again, human nature and human purpose is not seen 
as something that is of our own making but is something that 
we express well or poorly. Thus, we see that the good which 
Philoctetes and Neoptolemus seek, reconciliation, friendship 
and heroic valor, is unattainable on the strictly human plane 
and can only be achieved through the intervention of Heracles. 
Similarly, Aristotle's analysis of the human good throughout 
much of the Nicomachean Ethics can only find its completion 
in contemplative activity of the divine. The role of the 
divine in the ancient conception of the moral agent tends to 
17 
be de-emphasized in much modern moral philosophy. 9 
4. The Emotions and Moral Education 
In chapter three I argue that Sophocles and Aristotle 
are in basic sympathy with each other in both their conception 
of the nature of the emotions and the role which the emotions 
play in living the moral life. Interest in the emotions and 
their relationship to the moral agent is indicative of 
precisely this fuller, more robust anthropology which I have 
been talking about. Modern moral philosophy either ignores 
the role of the emotions in the moral formation of the 
individual or, as is the case in the Kantian tradition, is 
positively hostile to them. The ancient anthropology which 
Aristotle and Sophocles espouse takes full account of the 
entire person and sees that the affective side of the human 
psyche has a crucial role to play in the process of moral 
education. As we have stated before this ancient anthropology 
takes into account both the affective and the rational sides 
of the human psyche. It is appropriate, then, that the 
tragedian present the emotional and more immediate aspects of 
9The fact of Aristotle's appeal to the divine as a final 
standard which supersedes even the exemplarity of the phroni-
mos has often been played down in recent literature. In her 
recent study The Fragility of Goodness, pp. 373-377, Martha 
Nussbaum argues that Aristotle's discussion of the divine in 
EN Xis absolutely irreconcilable with his analysis of the 
human good and human flourishing in the bulk of the Nicomach-
ean Ethics. She even goes so far as to suggest that EN X.6-
8, where Aristotle makes his most explicit appeals to the 
divine as the ultimate horizon of human striving, may have 
been a spurious insert by someone else. 
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this anthropology and that the philosopher furnish us with an 
explanatory logos of the phenomena that are presented by the 
dramatist. 
The tragedian and the philosopher, I contend, hold that 
the emotions are not irrational drives or impulses, but are 
cognitive in nature. As such, they are capable of signifying 
something about the general moral contours of a given situa-
tion and directing the individual to an appropriate or 
virtuous response. In this way, the emotions furnish a 
certain orientation or impetus to the good. Once again we 
shall see that both the poet and the philosopher make inter-
esting and necessary contributions that enrich our understand-
ing of the topic under consideration. 
The tragedian presents, dramatically, the position on 
the emotions for which I am arguing through the figure of 
Neoptolemus. ,o The poet shows us that Neoptolemus' experiences 
of the emotions of shame, compassion and deep distress force 
him to reconsider the justice of the course of action that he 
has chosen under pressure from the son of Laertes. The 
experience of these powerful emotions furnishes a certain 
orientation to the good for Neoptolemus in which he realizes 
that he is committing an injustice against Philoctetes and is, 
10a1undell, "The Phusis of Neoptolemus," 140, discusses 
the importance that the emotions play in Neoptolemus' moral 
education but does not show, as is my concern in this chapter, 
how this reveals the tragedian's cognitive conception of the 
nature of the emotions and how the emotions are capable of 
orienting an individual to the good. 
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in turn, doing violence to his very moral identity. 
Aristotle provides us with a philosophical analysis in 
which he demonstrates the precise connection between the 
emotions and cognition in Book II of his Rhetoric. He 
furnishes the logos for which Sophocles presents the dramatic 
instance. According to the Stagirite, it is the perception 
of a certain state of affairs which is the efficient cause 
(that on account of which) of emotional response. 11 This 
analysis accounts for the connection between the emotions and 
cognition in terms of efficient causality. Aristotle's 
insight also helps us to see how the emotions can orient us 
to the good in such feelings as compassion, where a sym-
pathetic response is evoked on account of the perception of 
another's undeserved suffering, or in a feeling such as 
righteous indignation (nemesis), where pain is felt on account 
of another's undeserved good fortune. 
I argue that Aristotle furnishes us with two additional, 
excellent examples of the way in which the emotions can 
provide a certain impetus or orientation to the good in 
Politics II and Nicomachean Ethics VIII. 12 In the first 
example from Politics II, Aristotle shows us that the emotions 
11 My reading of Aristotle on the emotions is largely 
indebted to the work of w. W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on 
Emotion (New York, Harper and Row, 1975) and William M. A. 
Grimaldie, s.J., Aristotle, Rhetoric II A Commentary (New 
York, Fordham University Press, 1988). 
12see Harold Baillie, "Learning the Emotions," The New 
Scholasticism, 62 {1988), 224-226. I am largely indebted to 
Baillie's article for this discussion. 
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cannot be ignored or suppressed in the way that they must be 
if Plato's communism of wives and children is to be realized 
in kallipolis. Aristotle argues, here, that the emotions have 
a prior claim to that of the unity of the state and actually 
delineate the proper bounds of what can reasonably be proposed 
by practical intelligence. 
warns, then the works of 
If the emotions are ignored, he 
practical intelligence will be 
vitiated. Thus, the Stagirite maintains that Plato's kal-
lipolis will be rife with the very civil unrest that was 
supposed to be eliminated through the political measure of 
shared wives and children. From this example we can see that 
Aristotle views the emotions as furnishing a certain negative 
or limiting function on the proposals of reason. In our 
second example we see that Aristotle understands the emotions 
as capable of providing initial positive direction too. In 
Nicomachean Ethics VIII Aristotle affirms that the emotional, 
"pre-ethical" bond that exists between a mother and her child 
ought to serve as the paradigm for what the ethical relation-
ship of friendship should be like. He asserts that friendship 
is, above all, characterized by a willingness to give love 
rather than to receive it and that this willingness to give 
love without expecting any return is most excellently illu-
strated in the emotional tie that mothers demonstrate toward 
their children. 
In this way I maintain that both tragedian and philo-
sopher are in fundamental agreement with respect to their 
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conception of the human person. They both see the emotions 
as playing a crucial part in the formation of the moral agent. 
aut they each express themselves through their own medium in 
a way that sheds a new and different light on the issue. 
5. Choice and Responsibility: Odysseus 
In chapter four I explore the issue of choice and 
responsibility by way of an analysis of the language and 
actions of the figure of Odysseus. In the ancient conception 
of ethics we are primarily concerned with the sort of person 
one should become, not, as in modern moral philosophy, with 
the explication of rules. In the spirit of this more concrete 
and dramatic approach to ethics, it is perfectly in keeping 
to explore different kinds of human agents as they act in 
concrete situations. This is important and relevant not only 
with respect to the issue of concreteness but also with 
respect to the role that we have seen the moral exemplar plays 
in ancient moral anthropology. For a Kantian the appeal to 
various examples for instruction would be of no use inasmuch 
as they cannot illuminate us with respect to what we ought to 
do. In accordance with this more ancient anthropology, the 
ancients held that an indi victual can be beneficially in-
structed through the witnessing of good and (as here) bad 
examples. In the case of Odysseus we are presented with an 
inauthentic human agent in action. Odysseus will, thus, 
function for us as a kind of anti-type. It is through 
witnessing the figure of Odysseus that we shall see how vice 
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produces enmity and frustrates the possibility of friendship 
among the three characters. Second, it will be seen how 
Odysseus' deleterious influence is exercised upon Neoptolemus 
when the son of Laertes teaches the young man in the ways of 
injustice. Third, we shall note that Odysseus' settled state 
of vice distorts his ability to deliberate well as we witness 
him attempting to achieve ignoble ends through ignoble means. 
Finally, it will be seen, both through the language that he 
employs and through various other means that Odysseus is 
incapable of claiming responsibility for his actions and 
making an authentic choice. 
An examination of Odysseus' language in the play reveals 
that, when expressing necessity, Odysseus consistently prefers 
the Greek dei over chre. The former signifies the sort of 
necessity that external circumstances impose upon one without 
there being any contribution (e.g. deliberation, choice) on 
the part of the agent. The latter, on the other hand, 
signifies the sort of internal or subjective necessity that 
an agent experiences in choosing a particular course of action 
over another. 13 Odysseus' preference of dei over chre, I 
argue, indicates his attempt to shun moral responsibility and 
to attribute responsibility for his own actions to some force 
or set of circumstances to which he must simply submit. 
Through this linguistic feature of the son of Laertes' 
13For this strategic linguistic distinction and its 
function in the play see, Seth Benardete, "Chre and Dei in 
Plato and Others," Glotta, 43 (1965), 297-298. 
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language I submit that the tragedian is signifying Odysseus' 
ignoble attempts at subterfuge and moral irresponsibility. 
I maintain, furthermore, that Sophocles' view of the 
character of Odysseus is that of a panourgos, namely, the sort 
of person who is willing to do or say anything in order to 
. h' 1 14 achieve is own goa s. 
number of different ways. 
The tragedian indicates this in a 
Philoctetes, with whom the trage-
dian is in basic sympathy, characterizes Odysseus as a 
panourgos on several occasions. In this way Sophocles 
identifies Odysseus with panourgia and demonstrates that he 
is aware of the etymological meaning of the term in his drama. 
Sophocles shows us that Odysseus is fully willing to manipu-
late moral terms in the interests of doing whatever is 
expedient to achieve his own goals. This cynical, inconsis-
tent use of moral terms that are fashioned for the circumstan-
ces is characteristic of a panourgos. Finally, I argue that 
Sophocles shows us that Odysseus is actually motivated by 
selfish goals and not (as his character asserts) the general 
good of the community. The tragedian indicates this by 
14In holding this view I support the position of Mary 
Whitlock Blundell, "The Moral Character of Odysseus in 
Philoctetes," Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies, 28 (1987), 
321-329, over that of Martha c. Nussbaum, "Consequences and 
Character in Sophocles' Philoctetes," Philosophy and Litera-
ture, 1 (1976-77), 29-39. Blundell believes that Odysseus is 
motivated by selfish goals and that he is willing to do or say 
anything in order to achieve them. Nussbaum, on the other 
hand, holds that Odysseus is motivated by serving the inter-
ests of the state under whose auspices he is willing to do or 
say anything. I find Blundell's arguments in favor of 
Odysseus' basically selfish motivation to be more persuasive. 
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revealing that Odysseus' primary motivations are victory under 
any circumstances and the desire to be given the gift of honor 
which, by right, should go to Philoctetes. He, furthermore, 
shows the hypocrisy of Odysseus' claim to be motivated by 
concern for the commonweal through Philoctetes' damning 
disclosure that the son of Laertes initially refused to fight 
at Troy and had to be tricked and forced to go. 
In accord with the fundamentally similar anthropology 
which Sophocles and Aristotle share it is appropriate that 
Aristotle furnish us with a rational account of the emotional-
ly charged phenomena which the dramatist has presented. In 
this way, the philosopher contributes to this chapter a philo-
sophical analysis of the nature of villainy (panourgia). We 
have argued that Odysseus is a villain (panourgos) and it is 
the philosopher's part, here, to furnish a logos of the 
character of the panourgos and panourgia. Aristotle sees 
panourgia as related to the indeterminate capacity which he 
calls cleverness (deinotes). Cleverness is the ability to 
perform those steps (usually the most efficient) which are 
conducive to a goal and to achieve that goal. If the goal is 
noble then cleverness deserves praise, but if the goal is 
wicked then cleverness is criminal or villainous (panourgia). 
In this way we can see that, according to Aristotle, villainy 
is a kind of cleverness gone awry. The philosopher believes 
that this is due to a failure of moral virtue where one's 
admirable ability of determining the best means to a given end 
25 
is skewed and directed to wicked ends. The Stagirite, in 
addition, views villainy as a settled disposition (hexis) in 
which an individual habitually employs his talent to the 
attainment of wicked ends. 
Thus, I maintain that Aristotle provides an excellent 
logos of the character of Odysseus in his discussion of the 
nature of villainy. Aristotle shows us that the figure of 
Odysseus possesses an admirable trait which, because of a 
fundamental flaw in his character, is vitiated and employed 
for dubious ends. The philosopher's conception of villainy 
as a characteristic disposition (hexis) is also helpful in 
understanding the settled and incorrigible nature of Odysseus' 
wickedness. 
6. Choice and Responsibility: Neoptolemus 
In chapter five I consider the nature of choice and 
responsibility through the emotional turmoil, deliberation and 
choice which the figure of Neoptolemus makes in the play. In 
addition, I argue that the tragedian signifies Neoptolemus' 
responsible and excellent human agency in the transition he 
makes from using dei (characteristic of Odysseus) to employing 
chre (indicating choice). This is followed by Aristotle's 
analysis of deliberate decision or choice (prohairesis) in 
which I argue that the Stagirite's discussion of prohairesis 
bears many striking (and philosophically illuminating) 
resemblances to the decision which Neoptolemus makes in the 
play. 
26 
In many ways, this chapter is the heart of the disserta-
tion for many of the strands that are crucial to Sophocles' 
and Aristotle's anthropology come together here and are 
expressed through the authentic human agency of Neoptolemus. 
The advantages of this fuller ancient anthropology are most 
evident here because we see the way in which the entire 
person, rational, emotional and desiderative are taken into 
account through both the character of Neoptolemus and Aris-
totle's rich notion of prohairesis. We not only see operative 
all of the various elements of the human psyche but we see how 
they can constitute a harmonious whole as they are exercised 
by the virtuous person. The Kantian conception of the moral 
agent tends to be indifferent to the achievement of such 
psychological integration. We can see this most especially 
in Kant's own acquiescence to the view that morally right 
actions and inclinations will, almost inevitably, be in 
conflict and that reason will need to overcome recalcitrant 
emotions and desires in order that a moral agent may carry out 
her duty. The ancient conception of the moral agent does more 
justice to the entire person by taking seriously the emotions 
and desires (as well as reason) and requiring that all the 
elements of the human personality be integrated into an 
unconflicted whole. In accord with this anthropology it is 
the task of the poet to furnish us with the affective and 
immediate aspects of this topic through his drama and the part 
of the philosopher to furnish us with the logos that explains 
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and unifies the phenomena of human experience. 
Through the character of Neoptolemus, Sophocles provides 
us with a moving portrayal of the young man's transition from 
inauthentic to authentic human agency. Initially, Neoptolemus 
attempts to remove himself from responsibility for his own 
actions. This is evidenced by his consistent use of dei and 
the way that he, in Odyssean fashion, describes the action 
that he is taking as something to which he must, simply, 
submit. During the course of the play, however, Sophocles 
shows us that the son of Achilles experiences his deceitful 
pose to be intolerable and chooses to defy Odysseus and undo 
the damage that he has done to Philoctetes. The tragedian 
highlights the painful decision that Neoptolemus must make 
through the young man's pathetic wish that he had never left 
his home on Scyros and the way in which his choice is preceded 
by a long and agonizing period of silence where he is at a 
loss and is deliberating about what to do. Sophocles indi-
cates Neoptolemus' achievement of authentic human agency 
through his decision in the transition he makes from the 
language of gn to that of chre; in the moral maturity he 
displays when he is no longer intimidated by Odysseus; and, 
finally, in the way that he attains a new sense of his own 
moral identity by becoming reconciled to himself. 
It is, again, the philosopher's task to furnish us with 
a rational account of the disparate phenomena which the 
tragedian presents in his drama. Aristotle does this through 
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his discussion of the nature of choice or deliberate decision 
(12.rohairesis} . 15 Aristotle closely links choice with moral 
virtue. Virtue is, he asserts, a determinate disposition to 
make choices. Making a choice entails moral maturity because 
we claim responsibility for our own actions and understand 
that we are becoming who we are through the choices that we 
make. Hence, making choices is an adult affair; it is not for 
children. Choice or deliberate decision requires some form 
of reflective deliberation antecedent to the making of a 
decision because we are attempting to determine the course of 
action which will best promote our own and the larger com-
munity's flourishing. Finally, Aristotle understands excel-
lent choice to proceed from the sort of person whose emotions 
and desires are in harmony with his reason. Or, to put it in 
another way, excellent choice is founded upon the integration 
of the emotional and desiderative elements of the soul with 
the rational part of the soul. 
The above discussion of prohairesis furnishes us with 
an excellent philosophical account of the decision which we 
see Neoptolemus make in the play. Through the medium of 
philosophical discourse, the various elements of Neoptolemus' 
decision-making process can be viewed as a coherent whole. 
Thus, we see that choice involves virtue, assuming respon-
15see Blundell, "The Phusis of Neoptolemus," 141. 
Blundell mentions that Neoptolemus' choice resembles an 
Aristotelian prohairesis but does not spell out exactly how 
his choice can justifiably be so designated. 
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sibility for one's own actions, moral maturity and a fundamen-
tal integration of the emotional and desiderative parts of the 
psyche with the rational part. All of this Sophocles shows 
to us through what the figure of Neoptolemus goes through on 
stage. What the tragedian contributes that cannot be captured 
through rational discourse is the dramatic portrayal of the 
anguish that is involved in the process of deliberation and 
the struggle which is part of attempting to live the life of 
virtue. The poet furnishes us with the concreteness and 
immediacy of experience that it is his peculiar part to 
provide. 
7. Friendship and the Moral Life 
In chapter six I argue that both Sophocles and Aristotle 
see friendship as a central element in living the good life. 
They do not, however, view as an important ingredient in 
living well simply any kind of association or relationship, 
but only the sort of friendship where the person is loved for 
who he is and the good is wished for him for his own sake. 
Much modern moral philosophy, on the other hand, neglects the 
role of friendship in the formation of the moral agent either 
because of its Kantian character where the focus is on duty 
and the autonomy of the willing subject or because it tends 
to view morality as the crafting of an adequate procedure for 
making decisions with respect to various moral quandaries. 
In any case if, as we have been suggesting, morality has much 
more to do with what sort of person I am to become and what 
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sort of life I am to live then the question of friendship 
comes to be of central importance. This is the case because 
the issue of what sort of person I am to become and what sort 
of life I am to lead is intimately bound up with the kinds of 
people with whom I share my life and call my friends. Friends 
are an expression both of my own character and, in turn, help 
shape my character for good or ill. It is in this way that 
the issue of friendship, in the ancient conception of moral 
education and the moral agent, comes to be of central concern. 
For, given this understanding of moral anthropology, friends 
will be a critical factor in whether I lead a fulfilled or 
frustrated life. Once again, correlative to this fuller 
ancient anthropology which includes the emotional and the 
rational, it is the part of the poet to furnish us with a 
dramatic and emotionally evocative presentation of the 
phenomena of human experience while the philosopher provides 
us with a rational account that serves to explain and bring 
some unity to the phenomena presented by the dramatist. 
Sophocles discusses the issue of friendship by tracing 
for us the moving course of two individuals who grow in 
friendship, namely, Neoptolemus and Philoctetes. In addition, 
the tragedian employs Philoctetes' bow as a central symbol 
which serves as a kind of measure of the true status of their 
relationship. Heracles once gave the bow to Philoctetes as 
a token of gratitude for the son of Poeas' generous and true 
act of friendship. It is this very bow which, initially, 
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Neoptolemus seeks to obtain under the guise of genuine 
friendship with Philoctetes. In this way Sophocles shows us 
the shallow nature of Neoptolemus' original stance toward 
Philoctetes when the young man's interest in the suffering 
hero is nothing more than a means to the end of getting his 
bow. An implicit comparison is made between Philoctetes' 
genuine friendship with Heracles and Neoptolemus' sham 
friendship when the son of Poeas entrusts Neoptolemus with 
the bow because of the young man's compassion and nobility. 
The bow serves, here, as an ironic symbol of condemnation 
because it is being entrusted to someone who is in the process 
of violating everything that it represents. This does not, 
of course, last very long because Neoptolemus soon finds Odys-
seus' deceitful scheme intolerable and decides to undo 
everything which he has done. He determines to return the bow 
to its rightful owner and to establish their relationship upon 
a more genuine basis. 
Sophocles signifies Neoptolemus' attempts to establish 
a true friendship with Philoctetes by the young man's use of 
persuasion in trying to get Philoctetes to come to Troy. 
Deceit and force have both been tried and have been found 
wanting and thus Sophocles points to the only thing which has 
not been tried, the only thing, in fact, which respects the 
person and will not (in the end) be found wanting. Even 
though Neoptolemus' attempts at persuading Philoctetes fail 
Sophocles indicates to us that Neoptolemus is on the right 
32 
track through the intervention of the god-friend, Heracles. 
Heracles, in effect, sanctions the sort of friendship based 
upon openness and concern for the character of the beloved 
which Neoptolemus initiates, however unsuccessfully. 16 The god 
comes, himself, as a friend in order (at last!) to persuade 
philoctetes to go to Troy with Neoptolemus and to affirm the 
central importance that their friendship will play in achiev-
ing great things. By thus situating the fruitless and 
destructive nature of false friendship side by side with the 
promise of a heroic destiny based upon a friendship of genuine 
concern for the other, Sophocles points to the centrality of 
the latter kind of friendship as a crucial element in the 
achievement of heroic valour and virtue. In this way the 
tragedian shows us that the fruit of authentic friendship is 
the performance of great and virtuous deeds. 
Aristotle furnishes us with a detailed, analytical 
discussion of the nature and character of friendship. He 
enumerates three kinds of friendship (those of use, pleasure 
and character) which are differentiated by the various bases 
upon which affection for the other rests. Friendships that 
are based upon utility or pleasure are inferior because they 
are not grounded upon love of the person for who he is but 
upon some kind of incidental consideration. It is only in the 
friendship of character that the other is loved for who he is 
16see Christopher Gill, "Bow, Oracle, and Epiphany in 
Sophocles' Philoctetes," Greece and Rome 27 (1980), 143-144. 
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and the good is wished for him for his own sake. All three 
forms of friendship are, according to Aristotle, necessary to 
a flourishing life but the friendship of character, alone, is 
both necessary and sufficient to a life lived well. This is 
so inasmuch as Aristotle holds that only friendship which is 
grounded in the character of the beloved can serve as a stable 
and reliable basis for the mutual pursuit of the virtuous 
life. It is here, alone, that friendship becomes a kind of 
school of virtue in which friends make each other good through 
their life together. In this way we can see that Aristotle 
understands that a flourishing life is mediated through such 
friendships. 
Thus, both philosopher and tragedian hold that friend-
ship that is grounded in the character of the beloved is, 
alone, a fully realized form of friendship and that it is only 
this kind of friendship which is both a necessary and suffi-
cient condition of a life lived well. 
8. Tragic Catharsis and the Education of the Emotions 
In this brief appendix I amplify my argument regarding 
Aristotle's understanding of the emotions as cognitive in 
character through a consideration of the role of the emotions 
and catharsis in the Poetics and Politics. Aristotle argues 
that the successful tragic poet must structure his plot and 
develop his characters in such a way that compassion and 
terror (the two most important tragic emotions) are 
intelligible responses to the events depicted on stage. If 
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these emotions are appropriately aroused they will lead to 
what Aristotle argues is the peculiar pleasure of tragedy, 
namely, catharsis. The experience of catharsis, he argues, 
is both an aligning of the emotions with the judgments of 
reason as well as a release of emotional tension that will 
make us better able to hit the mean in the expression of our 
feelings in real life situations. 
Chapter 1 
THE INADEQUACY OF NATURE TO ATTAIN VIRTUE 
IN SOPHOCLES AND ARISTOTLE 
1.1 Introduction 
For the ancients, ethics was perceived to be an eminent-
ly practical matter. In this way they rightly perceived that 
morality was not a matter of constructing a sound moral 
theory, as we see is the case in much modern moral philosophy, 
but with becoming a particular kind of person and living a 
certain kind of life. Thus their point of departure is not 
an attempt to discern and formulate an abstract and universal 
principle (as we see, for example, with Kant} but an attempt 
to understand human nature in all of its fullness and variety. 
In the anthropology of Sophocles and Aristotle, a human being 
is understood to be a complex of emotions, desires and reason 
that must be brought into some kind of harmonious integration 
if the individual is to feel, act and live well. According 
to the tragedian and philosopher this excellent integration 
of the elements of the human psyche is not given to us by 
nature but requires the assistance of a sound moral education. 
Through this understanding of human nature, this anthropology, 
we can see that Sophocles and Aristotle appreciated both the 
complexity of moral agency and the contingent character of 
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ethics itself. They understood that the moral person was made 
up of many parts that had to be integrated well and that such 
integration would require education. This is, of course, a 
rather precarious business because the integration of these 
elements of the soul is difficult to achieve and may, of 
course, end in failure. Such a failure would constitute a 
broken and frustrated life. This conception of the moral 
agent also implies the need for others. The achievement of 
sound moral agency is thus dependent, in a significant way, 
upon others inasmuch as we shall need good teachers to 
instruct us in the ways of virtue and happiness. In this way, 
this ancient moral anthropology shows a profound appreciation 
of the social character of becoming a moral person. 
Moral philosophy in the Kantian tradition, would, of 
course, view the study of human nature as an irrelevant and 
wrongheaded point of departure. This is so because Kant holds 
that everything empirical is unsuitable to contribute to the 
principle of morality. For Kant the point is not to under-
stand how people actually act but how they ought to act. In 
addition, Kant shows no appreciation of the social and 
developmental character of becoming a moral agent because he 
focuses solely upon the autonomy of the willing subject to the 
exclusion of the role that others play in our burgeoning 
awareness of what it means to become a moral person. Further-
more, moral philosophy stemming from Kant tends to focus 
solely upon the role of reason and ignores or is positively 
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hostile to the part that the emotions play in becoming a moral 
agent. Finally, Kant showed no appreciation of the worth of 
the harmonious integration of the various elements of the 
psyche with respect to moral action. As we have seen, such 
a harmony was viewed by the ancients as the ground of excell-
ent choice. There is no moral worth to such integration of 
the emotional and desiderative elements with the rational 
element of the psyche in Kant's view. In fact, Kant sees that 
inner conflict between these various elements that results in 
the victory of reason over the emotions or desires is of 
greater moral worth than such integration. The model of 
integration, it seems to me, is superior to the Kantian view 
because it does not view emotions and desires as necessarily 
threatening to rational choice and action or as contributing 
nothing to an action's moral worth. In the ancient anthropo-
logy emotions and desires are potentially disruptive to 
rational choice and action but they are intrinsically capable 
of being educated and contributing to the moral development 
and maturity of the person. For the ancients, this integra-
tion was the conditio sine qua non of mature and moral agency. 
We have noted how the ancient anthropology of Sophocles 
and Aristole more fully appreciates the whole person in his 
rational as well as emotional aspects. We have also noted how 
this ancient conception of ethics does greater justice than 
modern ethics to appreciating the contingent character of 
morality. This stems, I would contend, from its greater sense 
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of the concrete nature of ethics. In keeping with this fuller 
anthropology which appreciates the whole person in both her 
rational and emotional aspects it seems entirely appropriate 
to include the work of both the literary artist and the 
philosopher in our analysis of the moral agent. We need to 
appeal to literature in the way that it is capable of force-
fully presenting the immediacy and concreteness of a situa-
tion. It is also needed for its ability dramatically to 
depict thinking and feeling characters who draw us in, 
emotionally speaking, and thereby help us to become more 
effective moral agents through the emotional identification 
with a particular moral situation that drama provides. The 
ancients viewed this as a form of moral education because they 
believed that we could be assisted in understanding how to 
respond to actual life situations through our witnessing of 
the various characters' actions and emotional responses on the 
stage. 
We shall also need to appeal to philosophy in order to 
understand the nature of moral agency inasmuch as we need more 
than simply an emotionally charged presentation of particulars 
that we receive from the dramatist. We also need the unifying 
and explanatory powers that it is the peculiar part of the 
philosopher to provide. In this way we shall turn to the work 
of Aristotle in order to receive a logos of the phenomena 
presented by the poet. Thus, it is my contention that we 
require both accounts in order properly to understand the 
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nature of the moral agent and the moral life. Literature is 
needed for its emotional power and its capacity for presenting 
the particulars of human experience in a forceful way. 
Philosophy is needed for its explanatory powers in bringing 
the diversity of the phenomena of human experience into some 
unified whole. Let us turn, then, to a more detailed con-
sideration of Sophocles' and Aristotle's position with respect 
to the relationship of nature to virtue and how their view 
constituted a break from the archaic tradition. 
Sophocles challenges the archaic Greek conception of 
nature as being sufficient for the achievement of virtue. 
According to the archaic understanding one's inborn nature is 
determinative of one's character. 1 A person is, as it were, 
1One of the clearest statements on nature as an inherited 
excellence comes in the works of Pindar. In his Pythian Ode 
8 Pindar says that it is due to nature that the noble spirit 
is made conspicuous from fathers to their children (Phua to 
gennaion epiprepei ek pateron paisi lema, Pythian 8.44-45). 
Pindar emphasizes here the importance of nature by placing it 
first in the sentence. Furthermore, he shows the centrality 
of inherited nature through his use of the preposition ek with 
the genitive pateron in juxtaposition with the dative paisi 
in line 45. In this way he emphasizes the fact that nobility 
of spirit and character (to gennaion lema) is directly passed 
down from fathers to their children. In his Olympian Odes and 
Nemean Odes Pindar makes a pointed comparison between that 
which comes by nature and that which comes by teaching. He 
praises the former and disparages the latter. In Olympian 13 
Pindar says that it is a hard struggle to hide one's inborn 
nature ( amachon de krupsai to suggenes ethos, Olympian 13. 13) . 
The idea seems to be that sooner or later this nature will 
assert itself, perhaps even against one's conscious wish or 
choice. The true poet, he says in Olympian 2, is the one who 
knows many things by means of nature (sophos ho polla eidos 
phua, Olympian 2.86), while those that have learned the art 
of poetry (mathontes, Olympian 2.86) are blustering and in-
temperate of tongue like crows (labroi panglossia korakes hos 
akranta, Olympia 2.87) chattering in vain against the god-like 
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born into who he is and thus his nature predetermines the 
quality of his character. If a person, for example, is born 
from a noble father then it would be expected that he or she 
would turn out to be equally noble. The base or wicked would, 
likewise, be expected to be born from the wicked. Sophocles 
shows us the inadequacy of this conception of ethics when 
Neoptolemus, the son of noble Achilles, is eventually induced 
to carry out an elaborate, deceitful scheme that he himself 
considers to be disgraceful. Neoptolemus initially opposes 
Odysseus but his rather naive and unreflective appeal to the 
nobility of his father's nature is no match for the pressure 
and rhetorical skill that the son of Laertes exerts on him. 
bird of Zeus. Again, in Olympian 9 he asserts that everything 
which is best comes from nature (to de phua kratiston hapan, 
Olympian 9.100) but many men have striven to acquire renown 
for virtue from mere teaching (polloi de didaktais anthropon 
aretais kleos orousan aresthai, Olympian 9. 100-102) . This 
latter sort of fame, Pindar says, has no part in the gods and 
thus is none the worse for being silenced (aneu de theou 
sesigamenon ou skaioteron chrem' hekaston, Olympian 9.103-
104). Finally, in Nemean Ode 3 he says that it is by means 
of inborn valor that a man has great power (suggenei de tis 
eudoxia mega brithei, Nemean 3.40) while the man who only has 
learning lives in darkness, breathing changeful purposes which 
go this way and that (psephenos aner allot' alla pneon ou pot' 
atrekei, Nemean 3.41-42). He never enters with a firm step 
but tastes of countless forms of prowess with an undecided 
mind (kateba podi murian d' aretan atelei noo geuetai, Nemean 
3.43). From a brief consideration of these texts from Pindar 
we can see the central place that nature has with respect to 
excellence (arete). Excellence in the form of physical 
prowess and moral virtue is passed on in toto from father to 
son and it is this kind of inborn power and strength that is 
alone worth having. The sort of excellence that comes from 
learning or training is disparaged as being chimerical and 
having no part in divine life. 
See also Lesky, Greek Tragedy, pp. 125-126 ; Rose, 
"Sophocles' Philoctetes and the Teachings of the Sophists," 
87-88, 97-98; Blundell, "The Phusis of Neoptolemus," 137-138. 
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Through the swift and certain succumbing of the character of 
Neoptolemus, Sophocles shows us in dramatic form the inade-
quacy of the archaic model with respect to its confidence in 
the sufficiency of nature for the achievement of virtue. In 
this way, by implicitly calling attention to the inadequacy 
of nature (phusis) for virtue, Sophocles highlights the 
importance of other factors necessary to the achievement of 
virtue namely, moral education and a moral guide or exemplar. 
Aristotle discusses in philosophic garb what 
medium of tragic poetry 
is 
in presented 
Sophocles. 
proclivity 
to us through the 
According to Aristotle we have a certain natural 
for the development of the virtues but this 
tendency needs to be augmented by the educative process of 
moral habituation. We are not born with the virtues through 
some kind of inherited nobility (as the archaic model would 
have it) nor are the virtues inculcated in us contrary to our 
natural proclivities but we have, as Aristotle sees it, a 
certain inborn potency to receive, develop and bring the 
virtues to perfection. The process of habituation is a kind 
of training of the emotions and desires through activity in 
such a way that we experience pleasure and pain at what we 
ought. This is, according to Aristotle, correct education and 
it is the indispensable foundation for the acquirement of 
complete virtue. 
Thus in this chapter I argue that Sophocles and Aris-
totle are in accord with each other on the insufficiency of 
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nature for the attainment of virtue. Sophocles shows us this 
insufficiency powerfully by actually presenting us with a 
particular case of an individual whose noble nature is 
overthrown by the bad influence of a wicked person, even if 
only temporarily. His great strength as a dramatic artist is 
precisely this ability to "discuss" a philosophical issue 
through the medium of a particular instance which has univer-
sal significance. Through the vehicle of dramatic action and 
characterization Sophocles is surely telling us that leaving 
noble natures heedlessly under the tutelage of the corrupt 
will inevitably spell disaster. 
Aristotle does not present us with characters in a drama 
because his medium is philosophical discourse. His statement 
of the case on the insufficiency of nature for virtue is 
therefore less vivid and immediate than that of Sophocles but 
he furnishes a certain precision in vocabulary and conceptual 
framework which is not the part of poetry to provide. In some 
ways, he will bring into sharper focus the moral phenomena 
that the dramatist presents so movingly through the medium of 
tragedy. It will be my purpose then in this chapter to 
demonstrate that for both tragedian and philosopher nature 
(phusis) is a good starting point or potential for the 
development of the virtues but requires, in addition, the 
nurturing of a sound moral education in which appropriate 
feelings and actions are established through habituation. Let 
us turn then to a consideration of dramatist and philosopher. 
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1 . 2 The Insufficiency of Nature for Virtue in Sophocles 
When Neoptolemus hears Odysseus' scheme (sophisma} to 
capture Philoctetes, he respectfully responds that he abhors 
doing whatever he feels distressed at hearing (ego men hous 
an ton logon algo kluon/ Laertiou pai tousde kai prassein 
stugo, Phil. 86-87} because, he says, it is neither his own 
nature nor that of his father's to do anything "by means of 
wicked art" (ephun gar ouden ek technes prassein kakes out' 
autos outh', hos phasin, houkphusas eme, Phil. 88-89). He 
states that he would rather fail acting nobly (kales dron 
examartein, Phil. 94-95} than succeed with wickedness (nikan 
kakos, Phil. 94-95). Unlike Odysseus for whom victory (nike} 
is everything, Neoptolemus is sensitive to his heritage, to 
the father whose reputation for nobility he wants to emulate 
and to his own principle of not doing anything "by means of 
wicked art." His own moral intuitions are that it is always 
better to act nobly and even to fail to achieve one's desired 
goal than to come away with victory through wickedness (Phil. 
88-89) . 
This is, of course, unintelligible to Odysseus. Through 
a series of clever verbal maneuvers, Odysseus gets Neoptolemus 
to accept the use of deceit (dolos) in order to make off with 
Philoctetes' bow. He promises the young man that he will 
carry off the twin gifts of a reputation for being wise 
(sophos} and good (agathos) when he successfully accomplishes 
his task (.Ehi!. 119). Whatever hesitations that Neoptolemus 
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may have had are now abandoned and he cries, "Let it go, I'll 
do it, throwing off all sense of shame." (ito poeso. pasan 
aischunen apheis, Phil. 120) . 2 Morally speaking, Neoptolemus 
has taken a significant step toward placing himself in the 
hands of Odysseus. It will not be a comfortable match. B. 
M. w. Knox has written that Odysseus and Neoptolemus "are 
strange bedfellows. 113 Indeed, the inexperienced and prin-
cipled young man coupled with the wily, amoral man of the 
world are an odd team and Neoptolemus will have to travel a 
2see The Philoctetes of Sophocles, ed. Sir Richard Jebb 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1954), p. 71. Jebb 
states here, "ito is a defiance of the possible consequences 
('happen what may'): cp. Eur. Med. 819 (Medea, having taken 
her resolve to kill the children) ito perissoi pantes oun meso 
logoi." After much painful deliberation Medea determines to 
kill her two children in order to make her revenge upon Jason 
complete. Of course, in the passage from Euripides, there is 
a kind of headlong ruefulness in Medea's use of the verb ito. 
It is unclear just how we are to take this ito used by 
Neoptolemus. We might imagine him uttering the word with the 
same sense of desperation as Medea. He is, of course, not 
about to embark upon as extreme an act as she but he is trying 
to muster all the strength necessary to perform an act that 
goes against his character. We might even take this utterance 
as the pleased and excited release of a young man who is just 
about to set out upon his first adventure and has high hopes 
of renown and glory. He has, after all, just been promised the 
highly prized epithets (though sophos certainly could be used 
pejoratively) of "wise and good" man. At any rate, whichever 
way we take this, as a pained or a pleased expression, this 
utterance appears to mark Neoptolemus' consent to give himself 
over to Odysseus (Phil. 84) and thus to abandon his former 
moral identity. 
3Bernard M. W. Knox, The Heroic Temper: Studies in 
Sophoclean Tragedy (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, University 
of California Press, 1964), p. 121. The quotation continues: 
"· .. in the prologue the cynical worldly wisdom of the older 
man provides a brilliant contrast with the all-too-naive 
idealism of the boy." 
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iong and hard road in order to discover his true moral 
identity. 
In this opening scene, Sophocles shows us how a prin-
cipled young man who is of excellent lineage abandons his 
moral intuitions under the coaxing and cajoling of the wily 
manipulator, Odysseus. He is now to embark upon a scheme that 
will do violence to his character. And yet, even here 
Odysseus has couched the results of carrying out the plan in 
such a way (namely, that Neoptolemus will be renowned for his 
wisdom and goodness) that it appears to be in accord with his 
noble nature (phusis). Odysseus is, in this way, playing as 
much of a deceit upon Neoptolemus as he is requiring Neop-
tolemus to play on Philoctetes. He knows that the young man's 
expression of pain (Phil. 86-7) shows an attraction to what 
is noble and good and a revulsion from the disgraceful. Hence 
he anticipates the need for masking the deed in terms of moral 
approbation. 
It is clear that Neoptolemus has good potential for the 
development of the virtues. We can see this in the pain and 
hesitation he feels (Phil. 86) toward Odysseus' proposal. 4 
Initially at least, he prefers open violence (bia) to the 
underhanded approach of the son of Laertes (all' eim' hetoimos 
4The word that Neoptolemus employs here is algos. It is 
a strong word signifying both mental and bodily suffering. 
He uses the same word at 806 to express the distress that he 
feels for Philoctetes' suffering. Philoctetes in turn, 
describes Neoptolemus as "bearing painfully" (algeinos pheron, 
Phil. 1011) the witness of his own treatment at the hands of 
Odysseus. 
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R.ros bian ton andr' agein/ kai me doloisin, Phil. 90-91). 5 
He demonstrates a proper sense of shame at telling such a 
terrible lie {ouk aischron hege deta ta pseude legein;, Phil. 
108) and does not know how he will muster the daring so boldly 
to face the suffering hero {pos oun blepon tis tauta tolmesei 
lakein;, Phil. 110). But in the end, Sophocles shows us that 
Neoptolemus relies too heavily upon his nature (phusis) as 
something of a defensive shield which will protect him from 
all wrongdoing. He firmly believes that the nature which he 
inherited from his father will prove to be a kind of inviol-
able bulwark against "doing anything from wicked design" 
{Phil. 88-89). The naivete of his confidence in his inherited 
nature makes him easy prey for the wiles of an Odysseus. 
In this opening scene, with its constant references to 
the nobility of Neoptolemus' nature {Phil. 51, 79, 88, 96,) 
and his subsequent and swift downfall into the practice of 
villainy {Phil. 120), Sophocles is critical of the archaic 
notion that one's inherited nature is a sufficient guarantee 
of excellence of character. In the archaic conception of 
things, one's nature was considered to be the core of qualit-
ies and characteristics which an individual inherited from his 
parents, particularly from the father. This core of character 
traits was considered inviolate and determinative of 
character. One's nature was considered to be the script, as 
it were, writ upon the soul. 
5see Blundell, "The Phusis of Neoptolemus, 138. 
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1.3 Sophocles Responds to the Archaic Tradition 
Sophocles constructs the opening scene of this play in 
response to the inadequacy of this archaic conception of 
nature. It is against this backdrop that he will seek to 
articulate a more nuanced conception of the role of nature 
with respect to moral excellence through the character of 
Neoptolemus. 
Sophocles shows us that while Neoptolemus' excellence 
of lineage is surely a fine starting point, a good potential6 
for the development of virtue, it cannot stand firm on its 
own. It must be bolstered by some form of correct education 
and moral guidance or it will become victim to precisely the 
sort of bold and shameless rhetoric that Odysseus employs 
(Phil. 109, 111) . As we have said, Neoptolemus has good 
potential for the development of the virtues. He feels 
appropriate pain at the idea of practicing deceit, but his 
emotional response is ridiculed by the son of Laertes (Phil. 
96-99) and thus Neoptolemus has no friendly support for the 
noble and honorable feelings that are the part of his nature. 
In this way, then, Sophocles is showing us the insuffic-
iency of the archaic model with respect to the achievement of 
excellence. Neoptolemus, the son of the noble warrior 
Achilles, easily abandons his principles under the pressure 
of an unscrupulous politician like Odysseus. He appeals to 
6on phusis as a potential or capacity for the development 
of moral excellence in the character of Neoptolemus see, 
Blundell, "The Phusis of Neoptolemus," 145-147. 
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his father's nature and the kind of principles and actions 
which that nature represents but all of these things are 
easily subverted and disposed of by Odysseus. What Sophocles 
is showing us is that Neoptolemus lacks someone who might 
teach him and act as an adequate moral example. He has, after 
all, been deprived of the role model of his father Achilles 
from an early age because of the war at Troy. It is rather 
ironic that Sophocles has him appeal to the inborn excellence 
which he has inherited from his father at the very time when 
that excellence will prove to be insufficient. Thus, we see 
that nature, though a good beginning for virtue, needs to be 
bolstered by excellent education, example and action, all of 
which Odysseus cannot provide. 
Two recent commentators on the play, Albin Lesky and 
Gregory McNamee, give a different interpretation of this play 
with respect to the question of the relationship of nature and 
character. 7 Both Lesky and McNamee argue that Sophocles is 
siding with the archaic conception of nature's sufficiency for 
the achievement of moral virtue. Inasmuch as nature 
(according to the archaic understanding) constitutes the 
essentially inviolable core of human personality that is 
inherited by birth Neoptolemus does not undergo, they argue, 
any real change in the course of the play but only re-assumes 
what he already had from the beginning. They do not grant, 
in my opinion, sufficient scope to the crucial role that 
7Lesky, Greek Tragedy; McNamee, Philoktetes . 
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sophocles has Philoctetes play as a moral guide and hence for 
the importance of education with respect to Neoptolemus' moral 
victory at the close of the play. Neoptolemus' nature does 
not re-assert itself unaided. His excellent nature is, as we 
have stated, a good starting point for the inculcation and 
development of the virtues but, in the absence of the moral 
guidance of Philoctetes, it would have stagnated and become 
thoroughly corrupted by the deleterious influence of the son 
of Laertes. 
We shall quote briefly first from McNamee, then exten-
sively from Lesky and follow up with our own discussion with 
respect to Sophocles' views on the relationship of nature and 
character. McNamee briefly articulates Sophocles' agreement 
with the archaic view concerning the centrality of nature in 
the achievement of moral excellence in the introduction to his 
excellent translation of the play: 
In his drama Sophokles places himself squarely among those 
who hold that one's character is determined not by 
environment or custom but by inborn nature (phusis), and 
that one's greatest dishonor is to act, for whatever end, 
in ways not consonant with that essence. Neoptolemus 
learns through the course of the Philoktetes that he is 
simply unable, by virtue of his noble birth, to obey the 
roguish Odysseus' commands: his ancestry and the nature 
it has given him do not permit him to act deceitfully, no 
matter what profit might tempt him. 8 
Lesky develops this conception of ancestry as the 
central category for understanding the moral character of 
Neoptolemus at much greater length. He argues that all Greek 
8McNamee, Philoktetes, pp. 1-3. 
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drama of the classical period (namely that of Aeschylus and 
sophocles) lacks the psychological and moral complexity of the 
drama of Euripides whose plays first presented the kind of 
interior dialogue and strife that have become the hallmark of 
contemporary drama. The decisive lack of any such complexity 
of character, he argues, is due to the pre-sophistic 
understanding of human nature as changeless and inflexibly 
determined: 
In a modern character drama an individual and all the 
different facets of his being are the centre of the 
action, and the changes that take place in him are 
frequently shown as well. Euripides--after a revolution 
in ideas about human nature--was the first to incorporate 
such changes in his dramatic representations. They do 
not occur in classical drama, in fact they are alien to 
its spirit, in a significant way. We saw that the actions 
of Neoptolemus, in different passages of the drama, were 
contradictory, but we should misinterpret the play if we 
ascribed this to a change in him as a person. A different 
concept altogether is needed to interpret this figure. 
When Odysseus explains his mission to him, he says 
understandingly (79): 'I know, young man, it is not your 
natural bent (phusis) to say such things nor to contrive 
such mischief.' With this word phusis we encounter the 
notion of an inborn quality in a man, which at that time 
was considered fundamental to human nature and which will 
help us to understand this play. Its psychological core 
is not a change in Neoptolemus but the victorious 
reassertion of his phusis against all temptation and after 
he had disowned it, however grudgingly. Neoptolemus 
himself states, at a decisive moment in the drama (902), 
one of the most profound truths of pre-sophistic Hellas 
when he speaks of the distress in which man lands himself 
if he disowns his phusis and does not act in harmony with 
it. And his greatest reward for the reassertion of his 
self are the words of Philoctetes (1310): 'You have shown 
your nature and true breeding, son of Achilles.' 
This concept of phusis as man's permanent possession, 
his inalienable, unchanging inheritance, contains a 
fundamental trait of Sophoclean man. Beyond it lies an 
idea that was inherent in archaic Greek culture and 
remained valid up to the end of the great classical 
period: what man inherited through his descent determined 
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his character once and for all. 9 
Lesky makes the distinction between classical portrayals of 
character and those of the post-sophistic type explicit in his 
comparison of Sophocles' character Ajax with the character of 
Euripides' Medea: 
When the attendant comes back from the palace with the 
boys and announces with joy that their sentence of 
banishment has been lifted, he finds Medea in a state of 
profound agitation. After he has left her we witness her 
inner struggle in a speech which, although it refers to 
the chorus once (1043) is essentially a monologue. The 
intensity with which inner experiences are portrayed here 
is unequalled in Attic tragedy; it also reveals man's 
tragic potentialities from a new angle. We are not shown, 
as in the death of Sophocles' Ajax, a rigid predetermina-
tion rooted in his phusis, but a human being as a prey to 
the contending play of forces which have their source in 
his soul, and are struggling for mastery over it. 10 
The interpretation of McNamee and Lesky does not do 
justice to the moral and psychological complexity of the 
character of Neoptolemus. They both argue as if Neoptolemus' 
reassertion of his nature is, after a brief struggle, a 
foregone conclusion. But this is far from the case in the 
play. From the moment Neoptolemus asserts that he will take 
part in Odysseus' scheme it is utterly unclear until the very 
end of the play (Phil. 1222ff.) whether Neoptolemus will 
recover the moral intuitions with which he began the play 
(Phil. 94-95) or be permanently corrupted by the influence of 
Odysseus. Sophocles never tires of pointing out that the 
9Lesky, Greek Tragedy, p. 125. 
10Ibid., p. 146. 
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influence of a wicked teacher can sink very deep. We see this 
when Neoptolemus, in Odyssean fashion, covertly excuses 
himself for his own wrongdoing by denying that Odysseus is 
responsible for having taken his fatherly inheritance and 
places responsibility instead upon those in power (Phil. 385-
388). Again, we witness this same distancing of himself from 
personal responsibility (a nefarious Odyssean trait) when 
Neoptolemus appeals to such abstractions as necessity (ananke, 
Phil. 922) and the expedient (to sumpheron, Phil. 926) when 
he seeks to justify the brutal way in which Philoctetes must 
be treated if Odysseus' scheme is to be successful. Sophocles 
is surely pointing to the central importance of the role of 
education and the potentially devastating influence of the 
teacher in the simply masterful way in which Neoptolemus 
throws himself, almost zealously, into the practice of 
deceiving Philoctetes (Phil. 343-390). The ancient audience 
watching this for the first time must have wondered whether 
the son of Achilles had, in fact, given himself over once and 
for all to the son of Laertes (Phil. 84) ! 
Sophocles' Neoptolemus seems to me to have every bit of 
the psychological and moral complexity that Lesky attributes 
to Euripides' Medea. His struggle is in many ways similar to 
that of Medea inasmuch as he is the victim of the same kind 
of interior conflicts and anguish that afflict her. Medea has 
her great soliloquy in which she agonizes whether actually to 
go through with the killing of her children (Medea 1038-1080), 
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but Neoptolemus is also plagued by this sort of inner 
division. He is paralyzed by emotional confusion (aporia} and 
remorse just at the point when Odysseus' scheme is going to 
carry the day (Phil. 895-899). His use of the word algos 
(grief, distress} highlights his mental suffering (Phil. 806, 
cf. also 1011} and, like Medea, he is so divided that he cries 
out at several points in the play, "What shall I do?" (Phil. 
908, 969, 974). The struggle and confusion that Sophocles 
portrays through the character of Neoptolemus show us that for 
the playwright the emergence of virtue is something tenuous 
and difficult. It comes in and through struggle and pain and 
requires the assistance of a worthy role model if it is to 
come to the light. When the son of Achilles returns to the 
stage again after his extraordinary silence we are not 
witnessing the mere reassertion of his nature in a fashion 
that is in some way rigidly predetermined, 11 but are seeing 
what happens when a person, after much painful deliberation, 
has opted fundamentally for one way of life over another. 
Since the character of Neoptolemus is more complex than Lesky 
and McNamee indicate, since he is as it were, three-dimen-
sional and not one-dimensional, we must take into considera-
tion other factors than only his nature. This is what 
Sophocles is showing us with the character of Neoptolemus: a 
promising nature is not sufficient for virtue as Pindar and 
the archaic tradition would have it, but requires in addition 
11 Lesky, p. 146 
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the nourishment and guidance of correct education if it is to 
attain the goal of excellence. 12 
1.4 Nature and Virtue in Aristotle 
Aristotle also maintains the insufficiency of nature 
for virtue but develops his position through the medium of 
philosophical discourse. He renders explicit and thematic 
the relationship of nature to the moral life that is presented 
dramatically in Sophocles. Because he is doing philosophy 
Aristotle cannot show us in as moving a way as the tragedian 
the struggle that is involved in the quest to achieve virtue. 
This is the peculiar virtue that is part of the tragedian's 
art to show. But he does furnish a clearer conceptual schema 
through which to understand the action that Sophocles 
presents. 
For Aristotle, we have a certain natural affinity or 
orientation toward the good, but this natural predeliction is 
clearly insufficient for the achievement of virtue in the 
complete sense. Like Sophocles, then, Aristotle holds that 
nature is a good starting point for the development of the 
virtues but he makes it explicit that moral training is the 
12see Rose, "Sophocles' Philoctetes and the Teachings of 
the Sophists," 89; Blundell, "The Phusis of Neoptolemus," 138, 
145. Rose correctly points to the importance of education in 
the character formation of Neoptolemus and Blundell rightly 
perceives that Sophocles is emphasizing the potentiality of 
Neoptolemus' phusis. 
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condition sine qua non of the full realization of nature's 
potentialities with respect to the question of excellence 
(arete). In the opening of his Nicomachean Ethics, he says 
that every undertaking seems to aim at some good and so it has 
been well said that the good is that at which all things aim 
(dio kalos apephenanto tagathon hou pant' ephietai, EN 1094a2-
3). But natural proclivity must, according to Aristotle, be 
united to education or training in the form of habituation 
(ethos) if nature is ever to be brought to completion. 13 
Aristotle points out the philosophical implications of the 
connection between character and habituation by indicating the 
etymological similarity of the words ethos (character) and 
ethos (habituation, custom or practice, EN 1103a17-19). If 
moral excellence is necessarily connected to ethos (habitu-
ation, practice), then, Aristotle asserts, none of the moral 
virtues are engendered in us by nature (delon hoti oudemia ton 
ethikon areton phusei hemin enginetai, EN 1103a19-20}. If it 
takes habituation to arrive at the moral virtues then we do 
not simply grow into them by nature but we acquire them 
through practice. 
Aristotle states this negatively by asserting that if 
the moral virtues are acquired by some kind of habituation 
then they cannot be engendered by nature inasmuch as natural 
properties cannot be altered by habit. If we acquired our 
13see Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A study in Moral 
Theory (Notre Dame, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 
1984), pp. 52-53. 
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moral characters by nature then there would be no hope of our 
ever altering them. They would be fixed and inviolate much 
like the archaic conception of nature that Sophocles is 
challenging, and much like the stone to which Aristotle refers 
that cannot be habituated to stay up no matter how many times 
one throws it upward (EN 1103a20-22). The moral virtues, 
Aristotle conludes, are engendered in us neither by nature nor 
contrary to nature but we are capable, by nature, of receiving 
or accepting them (out' ara phusei oute para phusin enginontai 
hai aretai alla pephukosi men hemin dexasthai autas EN 
1103a23-25) and bringing them to perfection through habitua-
tion (teleioumenois de dia tou ethous, EN 1103a25-26) . 14 
The notion of practice as a way of developing, augment-
ing and completing our natural powers, while implicit in 
Sophocles, is at the very center of Aristotle's moral 
philosophy. This is why such emphasis is placed upon action. 
For Aristotle, activity is the road to becoming a particular 
kind of person: 
For the things which we have to learn before we can do 
them we learn by doing: men become builders by building 
houses, and harpists by playing the harp. Similarly, we 
become just by the practice of just actions, self-con-
14Aristotle indicates the general insufficiency of natural 
capacities with a view to the acquirement of virtue in his 
discussion of the relationship of practical wisdom (phronesis) 
to moral virtue (ethike arete) in EN VI .12. The natural 
capacity (dunamis, EN 1144a23) of cleverness (deinotes) 
requires the correct education of the passions in order to 
become the virtue of practical wisdom. Similarly, natural 
virtue (phusike arete) can only become virtue in the full 
sense (kurios arete) by the experienced and educated guidance 
of practical wisdom. 
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trolled by exercising self-control, and coura~eous by 
performing acts of courage. (EN 1103a32-1103b2.) 5 
It is by action too that the education of our emotiorts takes 
place: 
It is by acting in the face of danger and by developing 
the habit of feeling fear or confidence that some become 
brave men and others cowards. The same applies to the 
appetites and feelings of anger: by reacting in one way 
or in another to given circumstances some people become 
self-controlled and gentle, and others self-indulgent and 
short-tempered. (EN 1103b14-20.) 16 
Aristotle lays particular and striking emphasis upon the 
necessity of persistent practice with a view to the acquisi-
tion of the virtues when he cautions us concerning the vast 
difference between practicing the virtues or merely talking 
about them: 
Thus our assertion that a man becomes just by performing 
just acts and self-controlled by performing acts of self-
control is correct: without performing them, nobody could 
even be on the way to becoming good (ek de tou me prattein 
tauta oudeis an oude melleseie ginesthai agathos). But 
most people do not perform such acts, but by taking refuge 
in argument (epi de ton logon katapheugontes) they think 
that they are engaged in philosophy and that they will 
become good in this way. In so doing, they act like sick 
men who listen attentively to what the doctor says, but 
fail to do any of the things he prescribes. That kind of 
philosophical activity will not bring health to the soul 
any more than this sort of treatment will produce a 
heal thy body. ( EN 1105b5-18.) 17 
Habituation is necessary with a view to bringing about the 
proper response to pleasure and pain. Aristotle contends that 
15Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics trans. by Martin Ostwald 
(New York, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1962), p. 34. 
16ostwald, p. 34 
17ostwald, pp. 39-40. 
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the entire matter of the study of ethics is necessarily 
concerned with pleasure and pain inasmuch as it is not 
unimportant for our actions that we feel joy and pain in the 
right or wrong way (dia tout' oun anankaion einai peri tauta 
ten pasan pragmateian ou gar mikron eis tas praxeis eu e kakos 
chairein kai lupeisthai, EN 1105a5-7). He reiterates this 
same point when he states that a sign (semeion, EN 1104b5) of 
our character disposition is furnished by the pleasure or pain 
that accompanies our activities. It is crucial, he says, that 
we be brought up from our earliest days to delight and be 
pained at what we ought (dio dei echthai pos euthus ek neon, 
hos ho Platen phesin, hoste chairein te kai lupeisthai hois 
dei, EN 1104b12-4). This is what Aristotle, following Plato 
calls correct education (orthe paideia, fill 1104b13) . 18 It is 
18In Republic III .12 ( 401e-402a) Plato talks about the 
power of music to instill feelings of pleasure and pain at the 
proper things in the young. Music is especially suitable to 
the education of youth because rhythm and harmony "sink down 
into the depths of the soul" (kataduetai eis to entos tes 
psuches ho te ruthmos kai harmonia, Republic, 401d6-7) and 
"take the strongest hold upon it, leading the soul to grace-
fullness and making it graceful" (kai erromenestata haptetai 
autes pheronta ten euschemosunen kai poiei euschemona, 
Republic 401d7-8). He maintains that children need to be 
emotionally attuned to what is disgraceful and noble from an 
early age. This emotional education he insists, must be 
instilled even before the children are capable of understand-
ing the reason why something is disgraceful or noble (ta men 
kala epainoi kai chairon kai kata dechomenos eis ten psuchen 
trephoit' an ap' auton kai gignoito kales te kagathos tad' 
aischra psegoi t'an orthos kai misoi eti neos on prin logon 
dunatos einai labein, Republic, 401e4-7). It is through this 
emotional affinity with the beautiful and the good established 
in their youth that children will be capable of recognizing 
the reason or reasons why something is noble or disgraceful 
later in their adult lives (elthontos de tou logou aspazoit' 
an auton gnorizon di' oikeioteta malista ho houto trapheis;, 
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the indispensable foundation for the development of moral 
excellence. 
1.5 Conclusion 
I have argued that the ancient anthropology (and its 
concomitant conception of the moral person and the moral life) 
of Aristotle and Sophocles is superior to more modern concep-
tions of the moral agent for several reasons. First, this 
anthropology shows a much greater appreciation of the concrete 
character of ethics in its concern for the question of human 
nature. The question of the development of the virtues was 
the central concern of the ancients and they saw that this 
issue was directly related to the sufficiency or insufficiency 
of human nature to attain them. In this way we can see that 
Sophocles and Aristotle start with the empirical and make 
important judgments with respect to the necessity or non-
necessity of moral education based upon a human being's 
nature. Moral philosophy in the Kantian tradition is much 
more abstract because it holds that the question of human 
nature and human experience in general is unimportant to the 
formulation of the moral law. 
Secondly, we have seen that the ancients show an 
appreciation of the complexity of the moral agent that is 
lacking in much modern moral philosophy which focuses solely 
upon the rational to the exclusion of the role of the emo-
Republic 401a3-4). 
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tions. It is precisely this recognition and appreciation of 
all of the elements of the human psyche, rational, emotional 
and desiderative, and the need for their harmonious integra-
tion, that leads the ancients to the insight that this harmony 
of parts is simply not given to us by nature. 
and Aristotle understand that nature is 
Thus Sophocles 
insufficient to 
achieve virtue and that moral education is necessary. In this 
way they also appreciate the developmental character of the 
life of virtue and the social aspect of becoming a moral agent 
that is decidedly lacking in the Kantian conception of moral 
philosophy. 
I have argued, in addition, that, given this anthropol-
ogy, it is entirely appropriate to appeal to or to include 
literature as well as philosophy in order fully to appreciate 
those elements that are a part of becoming a moral person. 
Literature is needed for its concreteness and emotional 
evocativeness in the formation of the moral agent while 
philosophy is needed for its ability to furnish an explanatory 
and unifying logos of the phenomena presented by the 
dramatist. 
The philosopher provides the conceptual framework 
through which we see that human nature is a potentiality to 
receive the virtues only with the aid of educative habitua-
tion. The tragedian shows us the insufficiency of unaided 
nature to attain virtue through the dramatic portrayal of a 
young nobleman's initial fall into villainy because of the 
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influence of a wicked teacher and a naive over-reliance upon 
his noble nature to keep him on the path of virtue. It is the 
peculiar virtue of poetry (especially tragic poetry) to show 
graphically through action the struggle and the uncertainty 
that is involved in attempting to live the life of virtue. 19 
And it is in this way (by portraying the struggle, the 
necessity of a good role model and the uncertainty of the 
outcome) that Sophocles challenges the archaic conception of 
achieving virtue through noble descent. The son of Achilles 
clearly has a certain affinity for virtue (pos oikeion tes 
aretes, EN 1179b30-31}, loving what is noble and hating what 
is disgraceful (stergon to kalon kai discherainon to aischron, 
fil! 1179b31-32}. Still, this is only a good beginning; it is 
no guarantee of the achievement of virtue. It is like 
preparing the soil in advance, Aristotle says, for the recep-
tion of the seed (EN 1179b26-27). In order for the seed to 
grow and become sturdy and strong, continuous activities in 
accord with virtue are required in order that virtue may take 
permanent root (EN llOSbl0-15). Both Sophocles and Aristotle, 
then, point to the notion that nature is a good potential or 
starting point for virtue but that it requires the bolstering 
and development that only habituation and education can give. 
Neoptolemus is ripe for the reception of the virtues (EN 
1103a26} but much more will be required of him if he is to 
find his way to moral maturity. He will have to be educated 
19Macintyre, After Virtue, pp. 163-164. 
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in the very human school of suffering, will have to discover 
the true meaning of friendship and make a choice that will be 
determinative of his character and fate. 
Chapter 2 
MORAL EXEMPLAR AND MORAL STANDARD IN SOPHOCLES AND ARISTOTLE 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I develop further the theme, touched 
upon in the previous chapter, of the importance of a role 
model in the formation of the moral person. I also address 
the broader question of the ultimate standard of value for 
Sophocles and Aristotle. Once again we can see the preference 
for the concrete over the abstract in the ancient conception 
of ethics in several ways. First, we note that the recogni-
tion for the need of a teacher stems directly from the 
understanding that human nature is insufficient to achieve 
virtue. This is based upon an empirical judgment. Secondly, 
the remedy that is sought to augment the deficiency of nature 
is not in terms of formulating some kind of abstract and 
universal principle (the categorical imperative, the principle 
of utility) but is in terms of a particular individual from 
the community who is well-equipped to instruct the student and 
inculcate the habits of virtue in him. Of course, the appeal 
to a concrete individual as a standard of action would be, for 
a Kantian, utterly wrongheaded. Again, for Kant, experience 
is immaterial to the doing of ethics and no number of excel-
lent moral exemplars could ever add up to the exceptionless 
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rigor demanded by the moral law. But, in the ancient concep-
tion of the moral agent, such exceptionless rigor is unrealis-
tic and out of touch with the contingent character of moral 
action. Thirdly, we can see here an implicit recognition and 
affirmation of the inherently social character of the forma-
tion of the moral agent. We grow into moral goodness not by 
gaining insight into the nature of our moral autonomy but in 
and through watching others feel, choose and act well. Again, 
it is my contention that Sophocles and Aristotle share the 
same basic moral anthropology and that this conception of the 
moral agent is superior to more recent developments. As a 
corollary to this anthropology that takes into account the 
whole person and enjoys a richer sense of the elements of the 
moral life it is my contention that we, as potential moral 
agents, need the strengths of both poetry and philosophy. We 
need poetry for its immediacy and concreteness as well as its 
ability to depict and evoke the emotions. On the other hand 
we need philosophy for its explanatory power and its ability 
to furnish a logos that can serve to unify the more disparate 
strands of human experience presented through the medium of 
poetry. Let us turn to a more detailed examination of the 
contributions of Sophocles and Aristotle in this chapter. 
In Sophocles we shall see how the elaborate lie that 
Neoptolemus tells Philoctetes actually mirrors the young man's 
own moral dilemma. It is my contention that Sophocles is 
showing us through Neoptolemus' fiction the dire consequences 
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that ensue for the young and inexperienced when they are 
guided by the morally wicked. The insufficiency of unaided 
nature to achieve moral virtue is made devastatingly clear by 
Sophocles when we chillingly witness Neoptolemus speak in very 
Odyssean tones as he covertly excuses himself from any moral 
responsibility for his actions (Phil. 385-388). Contrariwise, 
the figure of Philoctetes, in marked contrast to Odysseus, is 
seen to be a much more adequate model for the son of Achil-
1 les. It is Philoctetes who reawakens in the young man a 
sense of his own moral identity when he encourages him to live 
up to the legacy of his father and to the nature which was 
bequeathed to him. For example, he lavishly praises Neop-
tolemus for nobly enduring his sufferings with him (Phil. 869-
871, 874-876). The good role model praises his student when 
he acts well and censures him when he acts wickedly. Philoc-
tetes roundly abuses Neoptolemus with his words when he finds 
out that the son of Achilles has betrayed him to Odysseus. 
1It is my contention that Sophocles is in fundamental 
sympathy with the character of Philoctetes and hence I shall 
assume that he "approves" of the affect that the son of Poeas 
has on Neoptolemus. His sympathy with the figure of Philoc-
tetes is shown in the final routing of Odysseus from the stage 
at the end of the play where Philoctetes gets the last word: 
Know this much young man, that these supposed foremost of 
the Achaeans are mere false and blustering heralds who are 
bold with their words but cowards at the spear point 
(Phil. 1305-1307). 
Sophocles further shows his sympathy for Philoctetes in the 
epiphany of Heracles who comes finally to vindicate him for 
the injustice of his sufferings, to free him from his physical 
pain and to reinstate him into human society. 
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He forces the young man to feel the shame of what he has done 
and it is precisely this sense of shame which, in part, leads 
Neoptolemus to choose to abandon Odysseus' scheme and to 
pursue a more just course of action. 
Aristotle makes programmatic what is portrayed by 
Sophocles in the relationship between Philoctetes and Neop-
tolemus. Sophocles shows us the way in which the older man 
exercises a formative influence on the son of Achilles while 
Aristotle argues for the importance of the lawgiver in 
inculcating proper habits in the citizen body. Thus I shall 
examine 1) the educational relationship which Sophocles 
depicts in the play, 2) the role which Aristotle assigns to 
the lawgiver in the moral formation of the citizen body and 
3) Aristotle's notion of the person 
This will 
of practical wisdom 
direct us from the (phronimos or spoudaios) . 
question of the particular moral exemplar to the wider 
question of the ultimate standard of value itself. In this 
regard it is my contention that Aristotle and Sophocles share 
a fundamental sense that the ultimate standard by which we are 
to make judgments regarding human existence is a divine one. 
Both tragedian and philosopher share a basic sense that the 
normative measure rests with or in God. The parallel in their 
thought is interesting and noteworthy. Sophocles shows us 
this when the impasse to which the play comes at the human 
level is finally resolved on the divine level with the 
epiphany of Heracles. Aristotle points to this same standard 
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when he asserts that the sight (skopos) to which the person 
of practical wisdom (phronimos) looks in order to determine 
the mean and general horizon of his pursuits is that which 
will most promote the contemplation of God. In this way both 
tragedian and philosopher show, by implication, the insuf-
ficiency of making judgments by human standards alone and the 
need to introduce a standard which transcends the human 
sphere. Let us turn then to a consideration of Neoptolemus' 
fictional account of how he lost his father's inheritance. 
2.2 The Absence Of A Role Model In Sophocles 
Sophocles brings vividly to life the devastating 
consequences of the lack of a role model in the elaborate lie 
that Neoptolemus tells Philoctetes, a lie that is a kind of 
mirror of his own moral situation. In this gross fiction, 
Neoptolemus says that Odysseus and his father's caretaker, 
Phoenix, came for him because they said that, since his father 
died, it was fit that no one else take the citadel of Troy but 
he (Phil. 347). Allured by the promise of heroic renown 
(Phil. 352-53), Neoptolemus sets off for Sigeion. When he 
lands, the entire army come out to greet him, surrounding him 
and swearing that they see the great Achilles alive once again 
(ekbanta pas espazet', omnuntes blepein/ton ouket' onta zont' 
Achillea palin, Phil. 357-58). 
Neoptolemus approaches Agamemnon and Menelaus in order 
to lay claim to the weapons of his father, which are his in-
heritance by right. The Atreidae inform him that he can have 
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the rest of his father's belongings but that another man 
(Odysseus) is "master" (kratunei, Phil. 366) of Achilles' 
weapons. Neoptolemus is outraged and curses both Odysseus 
and the Atreidae for their presumption. Odysseus is in turn 
roused to anger (dechtheis pros haxekousen, Phil. 378) and 
threatens Neoptolemus with never making it back to scyros with 
the weapons of his father in his hand. Neoptolemus says that 
he sailed for home abused and deprived of his inheritance "by 
that bastard, son of bastards, Odysseus" (Phil. 384). 
Even though the story that Neoptolemus is telling 
Philoctetes is fiction, Sophocles is showing us here a great 
deal about the kind of moral betrayal that the son of Achilles 
is enacting by carrying out Odysseus' scheme. There is a tag 
at the end of Neoptolemus' account, a kind of commentary that 
Sophocles puts into the mouth of the son of Achilles concern-
ing Odysseus which is most revealing of all. But we shall 
simply concern ourselves with this fictional account first and 
then turn to Neoptolemus' significant commentary on his own 
story. 
First of all, we note that the most significant symbol 
of his father's former presence and identity as a noble 
warrior, his weapons, have been given away to Odysseus. 
Through the loss of this highly charged symbol it seems 
plausible to suggest that Sophocles is showing us Neoptolemus' 
betrayal of his father's nature. The story, then, signifies 
that Neoptolemus has forsaken his nature and hence his own 
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moral identity by giving himself over to Odysseus for 
shameless actions {Phil. 83-5}. By his actions, he is proving 
to be more the son of Laertes (pai Laertou} than the son of 
Achilles (pai Achilleos} . And yet this is indeed ironic 
inasmuch as in the story that he tells, Neoptolemus appears 
as the very image of his deceased father. The entire army is 
so taken with his resemblance that they surround him in their 
greeting and swear that it is Achilles come back from the 
dead. There is something doubly ironic that the very son who 
has just disowned his moral inheritance should appear in his 
own lying tale as the spitting image of his father. There 
is, then, a great discrepancy between the Neoptolemus of the 
fictional account who, in righteous indignation, seeks to 
claim his fatherly inheritance and the Neoptolemus who is, in 
reality, disowning his phusis and his very identity by his 
actions. In masterful fashion Sophocles communicates to his 
audience the moral peril that the son of Achilles is in 
through the vehicle of the very lying tale that the latter 
employs in order to deceive his father's old friend. 
It is- through the close association that Neoptolemus 
draws between himself and his father in his fictional account 
that we can surmise that Neoptolemus is struggling with his 
moral identity, between being a pai Laertou or a pai Achil-
leos. In short, we might say that though he is denying his 
nature through his actions, he is still very much his father's 
son and still closely identifies himself with his father. But 
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the struggle is not over and has not been won by Neoptolemus 
as we shall see in an examination of the closing lines of his 
story to Philoctetes. 
Sophocles brilliantly depicts the moral struggle that 
is going on in the character of Neoptolemus in the closing 
lines of his story where there is a strange and inexplicable 
reversal of his sentiments toward Odysseus. As we have seen, 
Odysseus was, in particular, the source of Neoptolemus' 
outrage. His father's weapons had been given to Odysseus and 
the son of Laertes claimed that this had been justly done 
(nai, pai, dedokas' endikos houtoi tade, Phil. 372) because 
he was there to save both Achilles' weapons and his body from 
marauders (ego gar aut' esosa kakeinon paron, Phil. 373). 
Odysseus, in turn, rather vaguely accuses Neoptolemus of not 
being where he should have been in the battle (auk esth' hin' 
hemeis, all' apesth' hin' ou s' edei, Phil. 379). It is, at 
any rate, Odysseus whom Neoptolemus accuses, in the end, of 
depriving him of what was rightfully his (pleo pros oikous, 
ton emon tetomenos/pros tou kakistou kak kakon Odusseos, Phil. 
383-84). In the closing lines of his story, however, 
Neoptolemus lets Odysseus off the hook and says that he does 
not lay the blame so much on him as those in power, namely, 
the Atreidae (kouk aitiomai keinon hos taus en telei, Phil. 
385). This is the case, according to Neoptolemus, because 
the entire city and army is in the hands of its leaders (polis 
gar esti pasa ton hegoumenon/stratos te sumpas, Phil. 386-87). 
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Those who are unruly or out of control, he goes on to say, 
become wicked by the words of their teachers (hoi d'akousmoun-
~es broton/didaskalon logoisi gignontai kakoi, Phil. 387-88). 
rt seems quite clear that Neoptolemus is covertly defending 
himself and his own actions by defending Odysseus. 2 He is 
making a kind of moral subterfuge. By his statement, here, 
he seems to be more than ever pai Laertou. 
As we have seen already, it is characteristic of 
Odysseus to deny any responsibility for his actions and this 
is exactly what we see Neoptolemus doing here. Sophocles' 
placing of these lines just here is a stroke of genius because 
we catch a brief glimpse of Neoptolemus' pain and the urgent 
need he has for justifying himself. He is actually in league 
with the very man whose villainy he is so desperately attempt-
ing to excuse. Confused, ashamed and internally divided, 
Neoptolemus is forced to fool and console himself by telling 
himself yet another fictitious story in the manner of 
Odysseus, namely, that he is not responsible for his own 
actions but his wickedness and deceit must be laid at the feet 
of his teacher, the son of Laertes. Neoptolemus concludes by 
saying that the whole story has been told. 3 
2see also Philoctetes ed. T.B.L Webster (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1970}, p. 95; The Philoctetes ed. 
J. c. Kamerbeek (Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1980}, p. 77. 
3Neoptolemus says that the whole story has been spoken 
(logos lelektai pas, Phil. 389} and these lines reverberate 
at many levels of meaning and irony. Indeed, Neoptolemus has, 
in one sense, told Philoctetes his entire tale. But the tale 
is a lie and so in another sense he has not at all told him 
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From this passage, Sophocles is showing us that Neop-
tolemus is in very grave danger of losing his moral identity. 
with no one to guide him or to support the moral principles 
with which he initially opposed Odysseus (Phil. 86-95) he 
simply falls prey to Odysseus' rhetoric and ethic of expedi-
ency. He loses a sense of who he is and what he stands for 
very quickly by engaging himself in a scheme that does 
violence to his character. What is so telling about Neop-
tolemus' commentary at the end of his lying tale is that he 
is not only acting like Odysseus in carrying out this scheme 
but he is even beginning to talk like Odysseus. Indeed, we 
may sense that there is hope for Neoptolemus because we see 
that he painfully feels the need to justify himself. But on 
the other hand it is clear that Sophocles is showing to us 
the perilous state that he is in because he is attempting, in 
classic Odyssean fashion, to distance himself completely from 
personal responsibility for his own actions. He is trying to 
the entire story. In fact, Philoctetes is more than ever in 
the dark after Neoptolemus tells him his entire story. This 
business of having or not having, hearing or not hearing the 
whole logos is played upon throughout the Philoctetes. At 
241, after just having answered Philoctetes' questions 
evasively and with a minimum of information, Neoptolemus says 
to Philoctetes, "You know everything." When the tradesman 
comes to muddy the waters further by relating yet another 
deceit, he says to Neoptolemus and Philoctetes at the close 
of his logos, "You heard everything" (Phil. 620). The entire 
play is filled and fueled by a series of half-truths until the 
very end. In the end, Neoptolemus will tell Odysseus, "Know 
it well, that you have heard the whole story" (eu nun episto 
pant' akekoos logon, Phil. 1240) and, at last, we will know 
the entire and real account--and it will be a story of recon-
ciliation and fidelity to the demands of justice and 
friendship. 
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skirt the fundamental issue of personal responsibility by 
attributing his own wicked choice to his "teacher" Odysseus 
(Phil. 388) . 
It is a subtle and terribly ironic position that Neop-
tolemus is in, a worthy example of Sophocles' notorious use 
of irony. Odysseus is seen to be a poor moral exemplar and 
yet he has instructed the young man well in the wiles of 
deception. 4 We sense Neoptolemus' anxiety in his closing 
"explanation" of his lie and yet he is still ignoring that 
feeling and acting as the instrument of Odysseus' scheme. 
Neoptolemus seems to "know" that something is wrong but is 
unwilling to allow himself to know that he knows. At any 
rate, what Sophocles is pointing to here are the moral perils 
to which a young person like Neoptolemus is subject when there 
is no one who might act as an adequate role model. In 
Neoptolemus' case we see not only what happens in the absence 
of a moral exemplar but the potential for wickedness when 
one's paedagogue is morally dubious. It will be Neoptolemus' 
task, as we shall see, to throw off the influence of Odysseus 
and discover a sense of his own moral identity in and through 
the test to which he will be subjected. This Neoptolemus will 
do in the relationship that he develops with Philoctetes who 
4Philoctetes says of Odysseus' 'instruction' of Philoc-
tetes later in the play: 
Your wicked soul, always looking through the recesses [of 
Neoptolemus) gradually taught him well to be clever in 
wickedness even though it is unlike his nature and he was 
unwilling to do this. (Phil. 1013-15.). 
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acts as a kind of role model for him. 
In a very real sense, Odysseus and Philoctetes compete 
with each other to be the final and decisive moral influence 
on the young man. Neoptolemus will (as we shall see) even-
tually surpass even Philoctetes in moral maturity (see Phil. 
1299-13 04) , 5 but the initial guidance and support that he 
receives from Philoctetes for the moral intuitions which were 
ridiculed by Odysseus, the way that Neoptolemus strives to be 
held in esteem by the older man, and the way in which Philoc-
tetes forces Neoptolemus (through shame) to strive to live up 
to his father's noble nature all contribute to the younger 
man's profound choice at the end of the play. Let us turn 
then to a consideration of the passages relevant to these 
matters in the drama. 
2.3 Philoctetes As The Role Model In Sophocles 
Philoctetes first confirms many of Neoptolemus' initial 
feelings and intuitions by his expression of appropriate 
feelings toward the wicked. It is true that he is pre-
occupied to the point of obsession with paying back his 
enemies for the wrong that he has suffered at their hands, but 
he gives expression to certain moral categories of what is 
praiseworthy and blameworthy which Neoptolemus has neglected 
in his service to Odysseus. When Philoctetes hears Neap-
tolemus' story about how he lost his father's armor to 
5I shall discuss this in chapter 6 in my examination of 
the relationship of friendship to the moral life. 
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Odysseus, Philoctetes asserts that this sounds like the sort 
of thing that Odysseus would do. He goes on to say: 
I know that he would touch any wicked story with his 
tongue and be willing to do anything (panourgias, Phil. 
408). He will commit every injustice to achieve his goal 
(meden dikaion es telos melloi poein, Phil. 409). 
In this way, then, Philoctetes has characterized Odysseus' 
actions as those of a panourgos, one who is willing to do or 
say anything to get what he wants. They both agree that this 
sort of person is utterly worthless and together lament that 
warfare and the gods take only the good and leave people like 
Odysseus and Thersites behind (Phil. 428-30, 446). 
It appears that Philoctetes arouses Neoptolemus' former 
sense of nobility and pride when the former ponders about the 
injustice of the scheme of things: 
How in the world are we to understand this, when these men 
die and Odysseus is still here where it ought to be said 
that he is a dead man instead of these (Phil. 428-430)? 
Sophocles shows Neoptolemus' solidarity with Philoctetes' 
feelings of moral outrage and has him state rather cryptical-
ly, "That clever wrestler Odysseus ... but even clever plans 
are often tripped up" (Phil. 431-2) . Al though it is not clear 
just what Neoptolemus is saying it appears that the tragedian 
is hinting that Neoptolemus himself may be the instrument of 
the overthrow of Odysseus' twisted scheme. The young man 
seems to have been awakened to his original reservations about 
Odysseus by the sufferings and righteous indignation of the 
outraged hero. Sophocles does not come out and have Neop-
tolemus state explicitly that he will foil Odysseus' plans. 
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He reveals things gradually, constructing his play in a way 
that respects the fact that the son of Achilles has become 
morally confused by his involvement with the wicked Odysseus 
and that his discovery of who he is after the moral obfusca-
tion that he has suffered will be gradual and emergent. In 
this way, then, Philoctetes helps bring Neoptolemus back to 
the original moral principles which he abandoned under 
pressure from Odysseus (Phil. 86-95). Sophocles shows us that 
Philoctetes is a moral exemplar in that he shows the young man 
the way back to a proper moral assessment of the situation. 
Another way that Sophocles shows us that Philoctetes 
acts as a moral exemplar to Neoptolemus is the manner in which 
he encourages the young man to do what is morally noble and 
in keeping with his father's nature. He accomplishes this 
simply by his manner of addressing the young man. He often 
calls attention to Neoptolemus' noble heritage by employing 
his patronymic (Phil. 260) and by calling him "noble one" 
(gennaion, Phil. 799, 801). He challenges Neoptolemus to take 
him on board his ship instructing him: 
Truly, for those who are noble (toisi gennaioisi) the 
disgraceful is hateful and what is good is glorious. If 
you fail to do this, reproach is disgraceful, but if you 
do it, child, the prize is of great glory . (Phil. 
475-478). 
In a remarkable parallel to what Odysseus said earlier when 
trying to get the young man to give up his moral scruples 
(Phil. 79-85), Philoctetes encourages Neoptolemus to take up 
the challenge saying, "The burden is truly not even for a 
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whole day. Take it upon yourself, dare to do it (hemeras toi 
mochthos ouch holes mias. tolmeson, Phil. 480-481)! 6 It is 
through this parallel that Sophocles makes apparent that 
Philoctetes is acting as a kind of moral counterpart to the 
figure of Odysseus. He invites Neoptolemus to do what is 
noble and encourages him to live up to his nature, while 
Odysseus challenges the son of Achilles to throw off his 
nature and engage in shameful actions. 
Like any good teacher, Philoctetes rewards his pupil for 
the excellent and praiseworthy behavior that he exhibits. 
Philoctetes does this by offering Neoptolemus the chance to 
handle his bow and even to be its keeper. Philoctetes asserts 
that Neoptolemus alone is able to boast that he has touched 
and handled the bow. And this boast is his, he explains, 
because of his virtue (aretes hekati, Phil. 669). Philoctetes 
says that he too acquired the bow because of a good deed that 
60dysseus says to Neoptolemus: 
I know, child, that it is not your nature to say such 
things nor to scheme to do wicked things, but dare (tolma) 
to grasp for some sweet portion of victory, and there will 
be time later to look just. But now give yourself to me 
for shamelessness for just a brief portion of the day . 
(nun d' eis anaides hemeras meres brachu/dos moi 
seauton, Phil. 79-84). 
Just as Odysseus, the morally corrupt exemplar "dares" 
Neoptolemus to overcome his phusis and commit injustice, so 
Philoctetes "dares" the young man to do what is noble and in 
keeping with those who are gennaioi. The parallel between 
line 480 and 83 is particularly striking. Again, Odysseus 
invites Neoptolemus to act shamelessly for "a brief part of 
the day," while Philoctetes implores Neoptolemus to act nobly 
and take upon himself a burden which will "not last for even 
a whole day." 
78 
he performed. 7 
The converse of the good teacher's praise is his blame 
and Philoctetes unleashes a torrent of abuse upon Neoptolemus 
when he finds out that he has been grossly deceived by him. 
philoctetes' harshness is understandable, however, because the 
"pupil" who has betrayed him is also ( or at least has been 
posing as) his friend. When Neoptolemus informs Philoctetes 
that he must sail to Troy and plunder it and then refuses to 
return the bow which was entrusted to him, Philoctetes cries 
out: 
You fire and utter terror, you hateful masterwork in 
terrible villainy (panourgias) ! What things you have done 
to me, your suppliant! What ways you have deceived me! You 
bastard, aren't you ashamed of looking at me? (Phil. 927-
930.) 
It is important to note here how Sophocles has Philoctetes 
identify Neoptolemus with the figure of Odysseus. In this way 
the tragedian points again to the severe consequences that a 
wicked teacher can bring about and the need for a good role 
model. Philoctetes is saying that Neoptolemus is, as Jebb 
puts it, "a work of art in panourgia, a man in whom panourgia 
assumes its subtlest form. "8 Philoctetes had earlier (Phil. 
407-409) referred specifically to Odysseus' amoralism as 
panourgia. He is now saying that Neoptolemus surpasses even 
Odysseus in villainy, being himself the masterwork of panour-
7He is speaking here, of course, of having lit the dying 
Heracles' funeral pyre. 
8see Jebb, The Philoctetes of Sophocles, p. 163. 
g_ia. 
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Philoctetes awakens once again the shame that Neap-
tolemus asserted he threw off in order to carry out Odysseus' 
scheme (Phil. 120). The son of Achilles is unable to respond 
to Philoctetes and can only turn his face away in shame (hod' 
hara palin, Phil. 935) . 9 Philoctetes' severe castigation of 
Neoptolemus sets him in the direction of the pain, grief and 
pity that will ultimately lead the young man to discovering 
his moral identity and to making a decisive choice against 
Odyssean expediency. In this way again, we see that Sophocles 
has the figure of Philoctetes act as a moral exemplar, 
instructing Neoptolemus with respect to what it is appropriate 
to feel and to do. 
2.4 The Lawmaker And Educator As Role Model In Aristotle 
Aristotle's lawmaker plays much the same role with 
respect to the citizen body that we see Philoctetes play with 
Neoptolemus in the play. Just as Philoctetes guides and 
brings out the best in the son of Achilles so also Aristotle's 
lawmaker is the one who knows how to formulate the sorts of 
laws which will engender excellence of character among the 
citizens. rt is not the part of just anyone, he says, to 
inculcate a good disposition in a person (hontina gar oun kai 
ton protethenta diatheinai kales ouk esti tou tuchontos, EN 
9rt is interesting to note that Neoptolemus anticipated 
the very shame that he was to feel toward Philoctetes when he 
questioned Odysseus about lying to Philoctetes, "How then will 
anyone take it upon himself to say these things and look him 
in the face? 11 (pos oun blepon tis tau ta tolmesei lake in;, 
Phil. 110.) 
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1180b25-26} but only the part of one who knows (tou eidotos, 
fil! 1180b27). ,o With respect to the inculcation of the virtues, 
the one who knows for Aristotle is the lawmaker. It is up to 
the lawmakers to habituate the citizen body in such a way that 
they become morally good (hoi gar nomothetai tous politas 
ethizontes poiousin agathous, EN 1103b3-4). This he says, 
should be the will of every lawmaker (to men boulema pantos 
nomothetou, EN 1103b4-5). Those who do not inculcate the 
citizen body in the ways of moral excellence fail as lawmakers 
(hosoi de me eu auto poiousin hamartanousin, EN 1103b5). This 
is the chief difference he claims, between a good constitution 
and a worthless one (kai diapherei touto politeia politeias 
agathe phaules, EN 1103b6). Aristotle points to the impor-
tance of the educative role of laws and the lawmaker at 
Nicomachean Ethics X when he states that it is difficult to 
obtain a correct rearing ( agog es orthes, EN 1179 b31) from 
youth if one has not been brought up under the right laws. 
Living with self-control and tenacity is not pleasant for the 
majority of people (EN 1179b32-33, Pol. 1339a29}, especially 
for youth and so their upbringing and pursuits must be 
regulated by laws. Once this education has become a part of 
the fabric of their characters (sunethe genomena, EN 1179b35-
36) it will no longer be painful. 
In Politics VIII Aristotle explicitly states that the 
10Aristotle employs the predicate genitive of character-
istic in both instances. In this way he specifically empha-
sizes that which it is a particular person's power to do. 
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education of the young requires the special attention of the 
lawgiver (Pol. 1337al0-11). Failure to do so on the part of 
the lawgiver results in direct harm to the constitution (Pol. 
1337al4). Aristotle sets forth a general program of studies 
for children within a system of public education. The youth 
are to be trained in both the "illiberal" (useful) and liberal 
arts (Pol. 1337b5ff.). Education by habit must come before 
education by reason according to Aristotle, inasmuch as the 
emotions manifest themselves before reason (Pol. 1338b4-5) . 11 
Of particular interest in this regard is the importance that 
Aristotle accords to the place of music in the educational 
curriculum of the young. Music is the ideal vehicle for 
educating the youth because learning is a painful process 
(Pol. 1339a29) and music is, on the other hand, one of the 
most pleasant of things (Pol. 1339b21). 12 According to 
Aristotle, rhythms and melodies contain representations 
(homoiomata, Pol. 1340a18, cf. also 1340a39-40} of emotions 
such as anger and gentleness and character dispositions such 
11This is important with respect to the relationship of 
Philoctetes to Neoptolemus. Philoctetes does not educate the 
young man intellectually but morally. It is fundamentally an 
education sentimentale that he receives from Philoctetes, one 
in which he learns to feel pleasure and pain appropriately (EN 
1104bll-14). 
12Plato also discusses the importance of music in the 
education of the young in Republic III (40ld5-402a4). Here 
he states that the rhythms and harmonies of good music sink 
down deep into children's souls and make them graceful 
(euschemona, Republic 401d8), enabling them to discern (at the 
emotional level) what is praiseworthy and what is disgraceful. 
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as courage and self-control as well as all other moral 
qualities (Pol. 1340a21-22). The point of exposing children 
to these various rhythms and melodies is to habituate them to 
feel appropriate pleasure and pain with respect to the 
emotions and moral qualities that are represented by the music 
(Pol. 1340a15-19). Because of the nature of music and its 
power, everyone is disposed to being thrown into a correspond-
ing state of feeling when they hear that which it represents 
(Pol. 1340a13-14). Music assists in the educative process by 
providing a pleasurable means of training individuals to feel 
appropriate delight, love or hatred toward the various moral 
qualities (virtuous or vicious) that are brought to life 
through the medium of rhythm and melody (tend' areten peri 
to chairein orthos kai philein kai misein dei delon hoti 
manthanein kai sunethizesthai methen houtos hos to krinein 
orthos kai to chairein tois epieikesin ethesi, Pol. 1340a15-
18) . Correct habituation in feeling appropriate pain and 
delight at representations is close, Aristotle says, to 
expression of appropriate feeling with respect to actual life 
situations (f.Ql. 1340a23-25). 
Thus far we have shown the central place that is 
accorded to the role of the moral exemplar in the thought of 
Sophocles and Aristotle. Sophocles' moral position regarding 
the role model is made clear in his depiction of the educa-
tional relationship of Neoptolemus and Philoctetes. Philoc-
tetes acts as a moral guide to the young man in that he 
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instructs Neoptolemus to feel pleasure and pain appropriately 
with regard to the things that he has done. It is through the 
dramatic presentation of this relationship that Sophocles 
demonstrates the decisive part that a good role model can 
play. Through the medium of philosophical discourse Aris-
totle, for his part, discusses the role of the educator and 
lawmaker with respect to the proper training of the youth and 
education of the citizen body. He is fundamentally dealing 
with the same issues that the tragedian is but on a larger 
scale, that is, within the context of the polis. Thus, his 
discourse is directed to the development of a kind of program 
of education for the youth and the setting up of a system of 
laws that will inculcate virtue in the citizen body. For both 
tragedian and philosopher, then, the crucial role of excellent 
moral guidance is made apparent. 
2.5 Sophocles And The Issue Of The Standard Of Value 
Having thus considered the role of the exemplar as a 
moral guide I would like to turn now to a consideration of the 
notion of the exemplar in the broader sense of the term, that 
is, to the issue of the ultimate standard or measure by which 
moral judgments are made. Both Sophocles and Aristotle 
address themselves to this issue and it is my contention that 
they have a certain affinity with each other in their appeal 
to God as the standard or paradigm by which things in the 
human realm are to be judged and understood. Aristotle shows 
us this in his assertion that the ultimate target with regard 
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to which all other things are chosen and done by the phronimos 
is the contemplation of God. Sophocles, in similar fashion, 
points to the inadequacy of human answers to the question of 
justice and shows how this problem can only be brought to a 
resolution through the intervention of the divine. Let us 
turn then to an examination of the play with respect to the 
question of a standard of value. 
The question concerning a standard of value is from the 
very beginning of the play asked within a theological frame-
work in the drama. It is placed side by side with the 
question of the justice or injustice of the gods and their 
presence or absence in human affairs. When Neoptolemus tells 
Philoctetes that the noble Ajax has died in the battle at 
Troy, the son of Poeas responds: 
My god, the poor wretch! But of course not the son of 
Tydeus, nor that bastard son palmed off on Laertes from 
Sisyphus. They don't die, even though men like these 
shouldn't be alive. (Phil. 416-418.) 
Philoctetes then asks about Nestor and Neoptolemus informs him 
that Nestor is fairing badly since his son Antilochus died 
(Phil. 425). Philoctetes again responds: 
Ah me! You have mentioned two whose names I would least 
want to hear among the dead. What are we to make of this 
(ti deta dei skopein) when these men die and someone like 
Odysseus remains among the living when it should be he who 
is said to be a corpse instead of these? (Phil. 426-430.) 
Finally, when Philoctetes inquires about a certain worthless 
and underhanded man named Thersites (Phil. 439-440) and 
Neoptolemus responds that he heard he was still alive, 
Philoctetes bursts out: 
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He would be! No one wicked ever perishes, but the gods 
wrap them up well and protect them. They delight in 
turning away from Hades those whose deeds are smooth and 
utterly wicked (ta men panourga kai palintribe) and they 
always send out of life those who do what is just and 
good. How can we make sense of these things? How can we 
speak in praise when wanting to praise the divine gover-
nance of things I discover that the gods are wicked? 
(Phil. 446-452.) 
In the above passages we can see that Philoctetes is strug-
gling to understand why the gods permit the good and just to 
die and the wicked to flourish. He is bewildered by the 
seeming absence of a divine standard in the world. He knows 
that human affairs should be governed by and conform to such 
a standard but he is tormented by the apparent absence or 
indifference of the gods. 13 Sophocles drops a hint that such 
a standard will not long remain absent in Neoptolemus' 
seemingly casual response to Philoctetes: 
O offspring of your father from Oeta, for the future I 
shall be on my guard against Troy and the sons of Atreus 
by looking at them from afar. (Phil. 453-455.) 
Neoptolemus' lines here are unremarkable except for the 
reference to Oeta in his address of Philoctetes. Oeta is the 
mountain of Malis where the apotheosis of Heracles took place 
13see Webster, Philoctetes p. 99: "skopein means almost 
'what should one's philosophy be?': what sort of a looking 
should one do, when the observed facts rule out looking 
towards the gods" (es theous blepein, Ant. 922); Kamerbeek, 
The Philoctetes p.80: "ti_. . dei skopein: the nearest 
parallel seems to me O.T. 964 pheu pheu ti det' an o gunai 
skopoito tis/ten Puthomantin hestian, and the implied meaning 
is: 'Where can we look for a divine power upholding the moral 
order of the world.'" 
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after Philoctetes consented to light his funeral pyre. 14 The 
connection of Philoctetes, Heracles and Oeta is made explicit 
throughout the course of the play (Phil. 479, 490, 664, 729, 
1430). The placing of this particular address in the mouth 
of Neoptolemus directly after Philoctetes has expressed 
despair concerning the gods' presence in human affairs is no 
accident. Sophocles is signaling to us the connection of 
Philoctetes to Heracles and thereby foreshadowing the latter's 
theophany as the response to the former's anguish. It is only 
with the in-breaking of the divine in the play that Philoc-
tetes' questions are answered in any definitive way. Neop-
tolemus attempts to provide a response to the injustices that 
Philoctetes has suffered by consenting to take him home (Phil. 
1402). But while he is doing what is just we sense that his 
compassionate response will not be adequate inasmuch as 
Philoctetes' wound will remain unhealed. With the theophany 
of Heracles Sophocles provides Philoctetes with a way of 
understanding his former sufferings, the opportunity to be 
healed (fillil. 1424), a sound and lasting friendship with the 
son of Achilles (Phil. 1434-1437), and the chance to be 
honorably reinstated into the human community. Through the 
theophany of Heracles Sophocles brings to a kind of resolution 
the many injustices which Philoctetes has suffered by 
providing the ultimate standard (albeit at times inscrutable) 
14see Kamerbeek, The Philoctetes p. 83. 
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by which human affairs are to be judged and understood. 15 
2.6 Aristotle And The Question Of The Standard Of Value 
Aristotle like Sophocles is concerned with providing a 
standard for both resolving conflicting interpretations with 
respect to the best course of action and the best life to be 
lived as a whole. At the level of action he provides the 
person of practical wisdom (phronimos or spoudaios, for all 
intents and purposes interchangeable terms) as a kind of 
embodied ideal of practical intelligence. In the general 
definition of moral virtue in Book II of his Nicomachean 
Ethics, Aristotle states that the mean is defined by reason 
(horismene logo, EN 1107al) or however the person of practical 
wisdom would determine it (hos an ho phronimos horiseien, EN 
1107al-2). The determination of the best or most appropriate 
thing to be done in a given situation is the part of the 
phronirnos whose peculiar excellence is logos in the service 
of practical truth, that is, truth with respect to what should 
be done (EN 1139a27-32). The person of practical wisdom thus 
applies logos to the ever-varying situations of life in 
exemplary fashion. In Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics 
Aristotle states explicitly that the practically wise person 
acts as a kind of standard and measure with respect to what 
is to be done and pursued (hosper kanon kai metron auton on, 
EN 1113a34-35). The prudent person can play a normative role 
15See Blundell, Helping Friends, p. 224; MacIntyre, Whose 
Justice?, pp. 62-63; Reinhardt, Sophocles, pp. 190-192. 
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in this way because the excellence of his character and 
practical judgment is such that the factual and normative 
coincide in his ethical choices. In his judgments the 
apparent good is co-terminous with the actual good inasmuch 
as his judgments are made according to right reason (EN 
1113a22-24, 1103b31-33). It is in his discussion of the 
ultimate measure of the right reason (orthos logos) which a 
prudent person employs that Aristotle appeals to the divine. 
At the beginning of Nicomachean Ethics VI Aristotle 
attempts to clarify the nature of the right reason which a 
prudent person employs in determining the mean. He states 
that there is a target (skopos) which a rational person fixes 
his gaze upon as he strains and relaxes his efforts to attain 
it ( esti tis skopos pros on apoblepon ho ton logon echon 
epiteinei kai aniesin, EN 1138b22-23). Aristotle defined this 
target in Nicomachean Ethics I as happiness (eudaimonia). He 
states here that happiness is our highest good and that 
knowledge of the nature of happiness will equip us like 
archers who have a target (skopon, EN 1094a24) to hit the 
proper mark. He goes on, however, in Book VI to assert that 
there is also a standard (horos, EN 1138b23) that determines 
the means which lie between excess and deficiency to which the 
prudent person looks. Aristotle confesses here the inadequacy 
of stating that the prudent person acts as right reason 
demands and asserts that he must define what right reason is 
and what standard determines it (EN 1138b33-34). Aristotle 
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never follows through with his promise in Nicomachean Ethics 
VI, 16 but it seems to me that he does provide us with just this 
standard in the closing pages of his Eudemian Ethics. 
In Eudemian Ethics VIII Aristotle states that a doctor 
has a certain standard (tis horos, EE 1229a22) by reference 
to which he judges health or its lack in bodies and in 
relation to which things which are done to the body are 
wholesome but if done less or more than the standard dictates 
are unwholesome. In this way the standard is normative of the 
medical art as a whole. The prudent person (spoudaios, EE 
1249a25) according to Aristotle, must also have such a 
standard with respect to action and choice (EE 1249a25-b2). 
The standard which Aristotle proposes is the service and 
contemplation of God (ton theon therapeuein kai theorein, EE 
1249b21). This is the end and reference to which practical 
wisdom issues her commands (hou heneka he phronesis epitattei, 
EE 1249b14-15). Whatever mode of choosing and of acquiring 
things good by nature (bodily goods, wealth, friends or other 
goods) will best promote the contemplation of God is the best 
standard (haute ariste kai houtos ho horos kallistos, EE 
1249b19) and conversely, whatever standard hinders us from the 
contemplation and service of God is the worst {EE 1249b20-21). 
This, Aristotle asserts, is his statement of what is the 
standard of nobility (horos tes kalokagathias, EE 1249b24) and 
16see Whitney J. Oates, Aristotle and the Problem of Value 
(Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 
276-283. 
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the aim of things that are intrinsically good (ho skopos ton 
haplos agathon, EE 1249b25) . 17 In this way then, Aristotle 
appeals to a standard that transcends strictly human horizons 
in much the same way that Sophocles does through the theophany 
of Heracles. Thus both tragedian and philosopher are in 
agreement that it is only by appeal to the divine that we 
shall find an adequate standard with respect to the question 
of value in the human realm. 
2.7 The Significance Of The Appeal To The Divine As A Standard 
As we have already seen, both poet and tragedian appeal 
to the divine as the final court of appeal, as it were, by 
which things in the human realm are to be judged and under-
stood. The poet and the philosopher have, however, somewhat 
different emphases in their reference to the divine. Both 
surely furnish us with the sense of the inadequacy of a purely 
human perspective but the poet seems to stress more the 
fragmentary and partial nature of human understanding and 
human action and the need for some kind of divine illumina-
tion. The philosopher, on the other hand, appears to stress 
the divine spark that exists within a human being and the 
necessity of not frustrating that spark by defining the human 
dimension solely in terms of the ethical and political 
spheres. Be that as it may, the central point that must be 
understood, here, is that the ancients did not see the human 
17 See Stewart, Notes, 2: pp. 8-9. 
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good or any system of goods as self-authenticating but 
required a reference to the divine as the source of the 
goodness of all human goods. Let us explore this in more 
detail. 
After Neoptolemus has returned Philoctetes' bow to him 
the young man attempts to convince the ragged hero to come to 
Troy, be healed by the sons of Asclepius and win immmortal 
glory on the battlefield as was prophesied by Helenos (Phil. 
1330ff.). Philoctetes vacillates painfully and almost yields 
to the young man's pleas (Phil. 1350-1352). In the end, 
however, Neoptolemus is incapable of persuading Philoctetes 
to come because of the latter's intractable will and 
suspicion. In his anguish, Neoptolemus cries out that it may 
be best for him to stop trying to persuade Philoctetes to 
yield and for the hero simply to live without the final 
salvation which was coming to him (Phil. 1396). Neoptolemus 
heroically offers to take Philoctetes home as he promised and 
they are about to embark when Heracles appears. 
Sophocles has quite clearly set this final scene up in 
such a way that all of the proposed solutions are inadequate 
and require some other form of resolution. That resolution, 
for the poet, is theophany. Human understanding of the 
prophecy of Helenos has proved to be inadequate and partial 
throughout the play (Phil. 603-619, 839-840, 989-990, 1337-
1342) and we know that if the son of Achilles takes Philoc-
tetes back home that the hero will never be freed from the 
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wound that has tormented him for so long. In this way, the 
poet stresses the fragmentary nature of human understanding 
and the tragic inadequacy of human action to bring about 
justice in the world. A god is needed to help clarify the 
situation for mortals who are all too often blind and to guide 
them to more fruitful action. 
What is unique here is that Sophocles has a god break 
into the human scene as an act of friendship to a mortal. 
Heracles tells Philoctetes that he has left the seat of heaven 
and come for his sake (ten send' heko charin ouranias/hedras 
prolipon, Phil. 1413-1414). Philoctetes responds readily to 
the god's (and his former friend's) words, calling them "a 
longed for utterance" (oh pthegma potheinon, Phil. 1445). 
Sophocles is, in fact, at pains to show that the friendship 
that is established between Philoctetes and Neoptolemus runs 
parallel to the friendship that exists between Philoctetes and 
Heracles (Phil. 654-670). In this way then, Sophocles 
presents to us something of a divine condescension that is 
motivated by friendship or love. 18 The poet shows us that a 
god can intervene in human affairs in order to augment the 
necessarily partial understanding and inadequate actions of 
human beings. This intervention can also, he seems to be 
telling us, be motivated by a god's concern for the tragic 
plight of an individual. 
18see MacIntyre, After Virtue, pp. 157-158; Whose 
Justice?, pp. 62-63. 
93 
Aristotle's appeal to God is as the telos or horizon for 
humanity's own striving to model itself after the divine. 19 
In the passage from EE VIII.3 cited above, the standard by 
which practical wisdom issues her commands is said to be that 
which promotes the service and contemplation of God. In EN 
x.7 we are essentially given the explanation as to why this 
standard is the most appropriate one. It is because, as 
Aristotle states, there is something divine in us: 
But such a sort of life would be better than human for he 
will live in this way [i.e., the contemplative life] not 
inasmuch as he is human but inasmuch as there is something 
divine in him (ou gar he anthropos estin houto biosetai 
all; he theion ti en auto huparchei, EN 1177b27-28). 
Aristotle does, of course, furnish other significant reasons 
as to why the contemplative life is that which is the best for 
human beings to live, namely, that contemplation is the most 
unimpeded form of activity, is the most pleasant, the most 
self-sufficient and is the only one that is really done for 
its own sake (EN 1177a20ff.). But these are all ultimately 
dependent upon what human beings are and that there is, as 
Ar is tot le states, something di vine in us that must not be 
circumscribed within the boundaries of the ethical and the 
political. There is, to be sure, a certain tension between 
the life of praxis and theoria as Aristotle delineates these 
in the Nicomachean Ethics. Throughout much of the Nicomachean 
Ethics Aristotle appears to lay stress upon the good that can 
19See MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 158; Jonathan Lear, 
Aristotle: The Desire to Understand (Cambridge, New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 299-302. 
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be achieved by human beings through action. Thus, the 
architectonic science of the good is said to be politics (EN 
1094a27-28, 1095a17-18) and the virtues are to be developed 
with a view to the flourishing of the individual and the 
community (EN 1103bff.). These goals appear to be at variance 
with a life devoted, ultimately, to contemplative activity. 
There is, furthermore, a certain tension between the 
self-sufficiency which Aristotle assigns to the contemplative 
and his recognition that friendship is "most necessary for 
life" (anankaiotaton eis ton bion, EN 1155a4-5). Aristotle 
seems to recognize this himself when he admits that even the 
wise person who is supremely self-sufficient (autarkestatos, 
EN 1177bl) will, perhaps, be able to engage in contemplative 
activity even better with colleagues (beltion d' isos suner-
gous echon, EN 1177a34). Again, there is a certain tension 
here, in Aristotle's thought, between the solitary and self-
sufficient contemplative as exemplifying the ideal sort of 
life and the life of the individual who is deeply involved in 
and committed to others' lives in friendship, seeking, as they 
must, to become as good as possible and to contribute mutually 
to the making of the best political community. 
Aristotle appears to be caught in this tension because 
he, much like Plato, holds that a human being is metaxu, i.e., 
the sort of midling creature who, metaphysically speaking, 
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dwells "between" animals and gods. 20 In short, we as human 
beings are the middle term, the bridge between the realm of 
the world and the realm of God. In this way, according to our 
composite nature, the highest and best life to lead would be 
that of the exercise of the virtues. And Aristotle spends 
much of his time telling us just this in the Nicomachean 
Ethics. But this is not the whole story inasmuch as there is 
something divine within us that must be recognized and 
exercised. According to Aristotle, the practice of philosophy 
is the quintessential way in which this divine element may be 
actualized. 
Philosophy, Aristotle maintains, begins with a sense of 
wonder where an individual realizes that he does not know a 
thing and desires to know it. But, according to Aristotle, 
our desire is not simply to know various facts about phenomena 
but to know why the phenomena are as they are. In this way, 
our wonder and desire to know may only be satisfied through 
understanding the cause or explanation which underlies the 
disparate phenomena. This is precisely what we are doing, 
Aristotle maintains, when we are engaged in philosophic 
contemplation, that is, we are moving toward an understanding 
of the principles and causes of the world. 21 For Aristotle, 
the exercise of this kind of understanding is itself divine 
because it is in this way that we participate, in a human 
20see Symposium 203e-204a, 207d-208b. 
21 see Lear, The Desire to Understand, pp. 6-8. 
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mode, in the way that God (who is himself a first principle 
and primary cause) understands the world. Hence, it is 
through this understanding of primary causes and first 
principles that we actually transcend our own nature. 
It is because Aristotle holds that there is this divine 
element within us which is realized through contemplation that 
he assigns the happiness which stems from the active life of 
virtue to a secondary status. 22 This is not to demean the 
ethical and political spheres, it is only to place them within 
their proper perspective given the reality of the divine that 
is within us and which is our ultimate horizon. In this way 
then Aristotle appeals to a divine standard inasmuch as he 
holds that there is something di vine within us and that 
through the emulation of God we should, ourselves, strive to 
become immortal as far as that is possible (all' eph' hoson 
endechetai athanatizein kai panta poiein pros to zen kata to 
kratiston ton en hauto, EN 1177b33-34). 
This appeal to the divine as the ultimate standard was 
widely shared in ancient culture. By making reference to a 
standard that transcends the strictly human dimension the 
ancients implicitly affirmed that the human good or, indeed, 
any system of goods could not be understood to be self-
authenticating or self-validating inasmuch as those very goods 
had their origin in the transcendent. rt is in this way, 
furthermore, that we see that the ancients attempted to secure 
22see Lear, The Desire to Understand, pp. 309-318. 
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the objectivity of values. For, by including this reference 
to the divine, they implicitly recognized that human beings 
do not create their own nature but rather attempt to bring 
into realization a nature and purpose that is already given 
and is peculiarly ours to attain. The importance of the 
transcendent with respect to the moral sphere is rarely 
recognized today. It is, at least in part, due to this loss 
of the role of the transcendent that we have forgotten or lost 
the sense that there is even such a thing as human nature. 
This ignoring of the transcendent dimension and its consequen-
ces has given rise to many rootless conceptions of moral 
agency in which the human person is seen as creating his or 
her nature from the very foundations on up. It seems to me 
that such positions are doomed to failure because they are 
bound to be either arbitrary or totalitarian in character. 
Again, this would be so inasmuch as values would be seen as 
created and not as discovered or detected in the very nature 
of things. 
2.8 Conclusion 
In conclusion, then, I have shown in this chapter that 
Sophocles and Aristotle share certain fundamental affinities 
with respect to the importance of the role model and the 
broader question of the standard of value in general. It has 
been my contention that their recognition of the importance 
of a role model stems from their shared anthropology and 
general conception of the elements that are a part of the 
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education of the moral agent. We have noted that, in attempt-
ing to understand what constitutes the moral life, Sophocles 
and Aristotle do not begin with abstractions but with human 
nature and the insufficiency of human nature to attain virtue. 
It is from this empirical judgment that they infer the 
necessity of the teacher if the individual is to be educated 
in those virtues that are requisite to his flourishing. Once 
again we see the ancients' preference for the concrete over 
the abstract in their appeal to a living person to serve as 
a guide in the formation of the moral person. This, as we 
have stated, is in marked contrast to moral philosophy in the 
Kantian tradition where the moral worth of examples is called 
into question inasmuch as they cannot furnish us with the kind 
of absoluteness required by the moral law. Thirdly, I have 
suggested that the ancient model is preferable to more modern 
developments in the way that the ancient model appreciates 
both the developmental and social character of becoming a 
moral agent. This is the case because while modern moral 
philosophies concentrate upon the formulation of a correct 
principle as the foundation of proper moral education the 
ancients see that moral education takes place, first and 
foremost, through a particular relationship that the student 
has with his teacher. It is this relationship and its affect 
upon the student that they saw as crucial and not the accuracy 
of a certain principle. In keeping with this ancient 
anthropology which takes into account the entire person I have 
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relied upon Sophocles to furnish us with the particulars of 
human experience through an emotionally charged medium which 
elicits our own emotional response. Aristotle, on the other 
hand, I have employed in order to provide us with the logos 
of the phenomena that Sophocles presents. In this way, we 
take into account both the diversity and unity of experience 
as well as the emotional and rational aspects of the human 
person. 
Sophocles shows both the devastating consequences that 
a poor role model can have and the crucial importance that the 
moral exemplar plays. The tragedian artfully depicts the 
former through the vehicle of Neoptolemus' lying tale to 
Philoctetes as well as his final commentary on the tale. 
Sophocles furnishes us we have argued, through the gross 
fiction that Neoptolemus tells, with a kind of mirror of his 
own condition of having betrayed his moral identity. 
Sophocles, furthermore, makes Neoptolemus' perilous state 
shockingly clear in the brief commentary that the young man 
gives at the close of his story where, in Odyssean fashion, 
he lays responsibility for his own actions at someone else's 
feet (Phil. 6, 388) . In this way Sophocles shows to us 
graphically that the son of Achilles' moral degradation has 
begun inasmuch as he is presented as imitating his wicked 
teacher. Sophocles demonstrates the crucial importance of the 
moral exemplar in the way that Philoctetes awakens in the 
young man the sense of shame that he said he would dismiss in 
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order to carry out Odysseus' scheme and in the way that he 
assists the son of Achilles in honoring his original moral 
principles (Phil. 86-95). Again, it is the distinct advantage 
of poetry to present and analyze universal themes (the moral 
perils to which youth and inexperience are vulnerable, the 
necessity of good moral guidance) through particulars. 
Because of its immediacy and emotional evocativeness, poetry 
is peculiarly suited to the moral education of the person. 
Sophocles does this for us in his dramatic poetry through the 
medium of characters in a play. 
Aristotle's educator and lawmaker, I have argued, play 
much the same role with respect to the individual and the 
citizen body respectively as the tragedian depicts is the case 
between Philoctetes and Neoptolemus. Aristotle does not 
depict for us a particular relationship but, through the 
medium of philosophical discourse, argues for the central 
importance of the educator and the lawmaker with a view to the 
moral formation of individuals and the citizen body as a 
whole. 
I have, in addition, proposed that Sophocles and Aris-
totle are in fundamental agreement with respect to the 
ultimate standard by which things in the human realm are to 
be judged. It is my contention that both Sophocles and 
Aristotle share a basic sense that the standard of value can 
only be truly found by appeal to the divine. In this way we 
see that for both the tragedian and the philosopher we do not 
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create our own good but actualize a purpose that is a part of 
our nature. The human good is not self-creative and so, 
according to this ancient conception, the divine is the ground 
of the very possibility of the objectivity of values. 
We have spoken in this chapter about the importance of 
the role model and moral education. It is time now to turn 
to a consideration of what is to be educated in greater 
detail. Both Sophocles and Aristotle focus to a significant 
degree upon the emotions and the important role that they play 
with respect to moral education. Let us turn then to an 
analysis of the role of the emotions in moral education in 
Sophocles and Aristotle. 
Chapter 3 
THE EMOTIONS AND MORAL EDUCATION IN SOPHOCLES AND 
ARISTOTLE 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I shall explore the role which the 
emotions play with respect to moral education and virtue in 
Sophocles and Aristotle. Once again we can see that this 
ancient anthropology demonstrates a concern for the whole 
person. This is the case because the poet and philosopher 
both take the affective side of the human psyche seriously and 
appreciate that it has a crucial role to play in the process 
of the formation of the moral agent. According to the 
ancients, it is the emotions which need to be educated and 
brought in line with the dictates of reason. But the emotions 
are not simply irrational drives or impulses that are un-
educable. Far from it. They are, themselves, cognitive in 
character and are capable of orienting us (however unthemati-
cally) toward the good that is to be done. They can do this 
by communicating to the individual who is experiencing them 
certain things about his character or by revealing the general 
contours of a moral situation. In this way, Sophocles and 
Aristotle see emotional response as a mode of initiation into 
the moral life. As corollary to this more robust anthropol-
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0 gy, I shall employ the poet to explore the emotional and 
concrete aspects of the moral life while the philosopher will 
be employed to furnish us with an explanatory logos of the 
phenomena that are presented by the dramatist. In this way 
we shall best be able to take into account both the diversity 
and unity of experience as well as the emotional and rational 
aspects of the human person. 
Modern moral philosophy stemming from Kant either 
ignores the role of the emotions in the moral formation of the 
individual or is positively hostile to them. It shows no 
appreciation of the ways in which the emotions can assist us 
in living the good life and can, in fact, actually start us 
on our way to realizing that life. In this way it is operat-
ing from only a partial and impoverished conception of the 
moral person. 
Sophocles will furnish us with a powerful example of the 
way in which the emotions can disclose aspects of character 
when he shows that Neoptolemus realizes what he is incapable 
of doing at the risk of violating his moral identity through 
the feelings of shame and compassion that Philoctetes arouses 
in him. By pointing to the cognitive nature of the emotions 
(most especially evident in his Rhetoric) Aristotle shows that 
the emotions are indeed capable of signifying something about 
the nature of the given situation and to assist the individual 
in the making of an appropriate or virtuous response. The 
philosopher's discourse on the nature of the emotions will 
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help us to understand that it is the cognitive component of 
the emotion which is the efficient cause of its arousal. He 
will show that the emotions cannot be ignored in the construc-
tion of the best polity and that they can furnish valuable 
information as to what a friendship should be like. He 
attempts in other words, to give an explanation of the nature 
of the emotions rather than to portray a particular feeling, 
what it may be like to feel it and what that feeling may do 
to a person. This sort of analysis is the chief strength of 
philosophy and what it can do. 
In order to know what it may be like to feel an emotion 
or to see an emotion in action we must go to the poets. For 
poetry's chief virtue is the concrete and dramatic 
presentation of truth, in this case, a truth about the nature 
of human emotion and its function in the moral life. Thus, 
Sophocles points to the same truth as Aristotle, namely, that 
the emotions are capable of orienting us to the good, but he 
does this by presenting us with a character who feels various 
emotions which change him and lead him to take a different 
course of action. Both philosopher and tragedian point to the 
cognitive ground of the emotions. We see this in Aristotle's 
focus upon the cognitive element of the emotion as that which 
gives rise to emotional response and Sophocles' depiction of 
Neoptolemus coming to know himself through his feelings for 
Philoctetes and the gross injustice he has committed. Both 
philosopher and tragedian maintain that the emotions can 
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furnish a. certain orientation to the good. Aristotle shows 
this in the way that the emotions furnish an intimation of 
what real friendship should be like and Sophocles in the way 
that Neoptolemus' feelings help bring about a moral 
transformation in him. But each, working in his respective 
media, has his own particular way of discussing the same issue 
and shedding different facets on the same truth. 
3.2 The Character of Neoptolemus 
In order to demonstrate that Sophocles presents the view 
of the emotions for which I am arguing I shall examine the 
rather extensive scene which occurs about mid-way in the drama 
just after Philoctetes suffers his attack of pain and the 
aftermath of that attack when Neoptolemus confesses to his 
role in Odysseus' scheme and Odysseus himself returns to the 
stage. I shall make references to other parts of the play but 
the central focus will be this important scene and how it 
shows that Neoptolemus' emotions provide the initial impetus 
to his later moral transformation at the end of the play. 
Philoctetes has just suffered an attack of excruciating 
pain and will soon fall into unconsciousness. He calls upon 
death and wonders why it never comes to him (Phil. 797-798). 
He then calls upon the son of Achilles and requests that he 
burn him alive in the volcanic fire of Lemnos. He informs 
Neoptolemus that it was just for this deed (setting the 
funeral pyre ablaze for the suffering Heracles) that he won 
the bow with which the young man has recently been entrusted 
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(Phil. 801-803). The generous parallel that Philoctetes has 
drawn coupled with the request for suicide has clearly touched 
Neoptolemus and he is thrown into a reflective silence in 
which he is oblivious to Philoctetes' further questions: 
Burn me, my noble one, in this so called Lemnian fire! 
For I too deemed it worthy to do this to the child of Zeus 
for these very weapons which you now hold safe for me. 
What do you say child? Why are you silent? Where are you 
child? (Phil. 801-805.) 
Sophocles shows us that Neoptolemus has been touched by 
Philoctetes' words when he answers by expressing the pain that 
has been in his heart for a long time over the sufferings of 
his friend (algo palai de tapi soi stenon kaka, Phil. 806) . 1 
Sophocles is showing us here that the young man's emotions are 
telling him that he is treating Philoctetes unjustly and that 
by doing so he is acting in violation of his very character. 
His grief for Philoctetes thus directs him toward moral 
change. We see this even more powerfully depicted as the 
scene progresses. 
Philoctetes falls into a deep sleep from utter exhaus-
tion and Neoptolemus, true to his word, remains by Philoc-
tetes' side. When the son of Poeas awakens he can hardly 
believe his eyes and cries out: 
I would never have hoped child that you would so compas-
sionately (eleinos) take my sufferings upon yourself and 
1The verbal parallel here is noteworthy. Neoptolemus 
first employs the verb alqo when he expresses his distress 
about participating in Odysseus' unjust scheme in the opening 
of the play (Phil. 86). Sophocles' use of the verb here again 
furnishes us with the first clear sign that the son of 
Achilles is terribly shaken by his circumstances. 
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remain and help me {Phil. 869-871.) 
He continually refers to Neoptolemus' nobility of nature and 
how he could never have expected such treatment from Odysseus 
and the Atreidae (Phil. 872-875). When Neoptolemus bids 
Philoctetes to lean against him and stand up Philoctetes tells 
the young man to take heart because his usual manner will set 
him upright once again (tharsei to toi sunethes orthosei m' 
ethos, Phil. 894). Sophocles shows himself to be master of 
both drama and irony in Neoptolemus' response to this seeming-
ly innocent remark of Philoctetes. Neoptolemus cries out as 
if he were stabbed, "Papait What should I do from here" (Phil. 
895)? But why should Philoctetes' simple statement set off 
such an emotional response from Neoptolemus? It seems that 
it is because Sophocles, through Neoptolemus' reaction, means 
us to catch the double entendre of the phrase. The word that 
has been translated above as "manner" (ethos) has a variety 
of other meanings, among them being "custom, way or charac-
ter." Neoptolemus has thus far in the play betrayed his usual 
character and it is to this that Sophocles is pointing in the 
cry which Neoptolemus utters. 2 Neoptolemus is led to ask 
himself, "Will my customary character, my true moral identity 
set me upright?" This is the ultimate question for Neop-
tolemus and is the question with which Sophocles is centrally 
2see Benardete, "Chre and Dei," 
"Consequences and Character," 46. 
297; Nussbaum, 
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concerned in the play. 3 
Philoctetes is confused and concerned with Neoptolemus' 
outburst and wonders what is wrong. Neoptolemus expresses his 
distressed confusion when he says that he does not know which 
way to turn his powerless words (ouk oid' hopoi chre taporon 
trepein epos, Phil. 897) and that he is right now in the 
middle of an emotional perplexity which will not let him go 
(all' enthad' ede toude tou pathous kuro, Phil. 899). This 
is, indeed, the emotional counterpart to Socratic aporia. 4 
When Philoctetes asks Neoptolemus whether it is disgust with 
3What we have in this brief but significant scene is an 
Aristotelian recognition (anagnorisis). Aristotle tells us 
that anagnorisis, as the name itself signifies, is a change 
from ignorance to knowledge and so involves a change to either 
friendship or enmity among those who are defined in their 
relation to good fortune or bad fortune (ex agnoias eis gnosin 
metabole, e eis philian e eis echthran, ton pros eutuchian e 
dustuchian horismenon, Poet. 1452a30-2). In this scene, 
Neoptolemus goes from ignorance to some kind of knowledge. 
He is painfully brought face to face again with himself and 
the incongruity that exists between the ethos that constitutes 
his moral identity and the ways that he has betrayed that 
identity. Furthermore, Neoptolemus' recognition brings him 
to the point of decision as to whether to treat Philoctetes 
as a friend or an enemy. Odysseus had taught Neoptolemus to 
treat Philoctetes with suspicion and to pose deceitfully as 
his friend. Now Neoptolemus is utterly perplexed (Phil. 896, 
899) at which way to turn and how to precede in a scheme that 
he can no longer morally countenance. Neoptolemus' anag-
norisis is accompanied by compassionate grief and terror 
(Poet. 1452a38-bl) because we deeply sympathize with Neop-
tolernus' situation and we are anxious that he make the right 
decision. We know that Neoptolemus has not heeded his moral 
feelings and intuitions in the past (Phil. 120) and so we both 
identify with him in his perplexity as well as hope that he 
will follow the dictates of his conscience and that ethos 
which will "set him straight." 
4See Blundell, "The Phusis of Neoptolemus," 140. 
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his illness that is making him say these things (Phil. 900-
901) the young man responds that everything is disgusting 
(hapanta duschereia, Phil. 902) when one acts out of character 
and does what is unseemly (Phil. 902-903). It is shame and 
emotional distress5 which leads Neoptolemus to confess to 
Philoctetes the plot to take him to Troy (Phil. 906, 909, 912-
913). The young man's confession, however, only leads him to 
deeper feelings of shame at what he has done and greater 
compassion for the broken man whom he has so wronged. When 
Philoctetes expresses his outrage at Neoptolemus, the son of 
Achilles can only look away in silence and disgrace (Phil. 
935, 951). He is paralyzed at this point, unable to act upon 
the promptings of his feelings but equally unable to ignore 
them. He has not yet come to a decision and chosen what to 
do. 6 Neoptolemus confesses that a terrible feeling of 
compassion (oiktos deinos, Phil. 965; cf. also 1074) has come 
over him for Philoctetes and he knows (and we know) that he 
will be forced to come to terms with these feelings and be 
reconciled to them or renounce them once and for all. 
Of course we know that when Neoptolemus re-enters the 
stage with Odysseus near the close of the play he has not 
renounced his feelings but has become reconciled to them 
5Neoptolemus employs the verb signifying strong grief and 
sorrow, aniaomai twice in a space of seven lines in this 
scene. 
6we shall take up the issue of choice in the moral 
development of Neoptolemus in the next chapter. 
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(Phil. 1222-1263). He has followed the lead of their prompt-
ings. He proclaims to Odysseus that his former involvement 
in the plot was a disgrace (Phil. 1234, 1248) thus confirming 
the suspicions that his emotions had aroused. In our examina-
tion of this scene of the play I have shown that Neoptolemus' 
experiences of the emotions of shame, compassion and various 
feelings of extreme distress guide him and provide the impetus 
for a reconsideration of the justice of what he is doing. His 
emotions both check him and furnish a certain orientation to 
the good which, in the end, he chooses not to ignore. In this 
way then I have demonstrated that Sophocles is presenting us, 
through the central character of Neoptolemus, with the thesis 
that the emotions can guide and provide a certain direction 
to reasonable choice by orienting the individual to the good 
that is to be done. The emotions thus provide a kind of 
initiation into the moral life by disclosing to an individual 
who he is and what he is willing to do or unwilling to do at 
the risk of doing violence to his moral identity. 
3.3 Two Examples Of Emotion From The Politics And Nicomachean 
Ethics 
Aristotle like Sophocles showed sensitivity to the way 
in which the emotions can set the individual in the direction 
of leading the moral life. Through the medium of philosophi-
cal analysis he attempts to demonstrate the connection that 
exists between emotion and cognition. In the first example 
from Politics II Aristotle shows the way in which the emotions 
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delineate the proper bounds of what can reasonably be done by 
practical intelligence, thus indicating that the emotions can 
perform a certain limiting function on the proposals of 
reason. In the second example from Nicomachean Ethics VIII 
Aristotle shows that the emotions can also furnish positive 
direction to practical reason by defining in general outline 
the qualities or characteristics that should be part of the 
make-up of a particular virtue, in this case, the virtue of 
. d h' 7 fr1en s 1p. Interestingly enough, in both of these examples 
Aristotle points to the primacy of familial feeling in 
directing action or placing limits upon what reason asserts 
should be done. 
texts. 
Let us turn to a consideration of these 
In this first passage, Aristotle criticizes Plato's 
proposed communism of wives and children in Republic V: 
But speaking generally such a law is bound to bring about 
the opposite state of things to that which rightly enacted 
laws ought properly to cause and on account of which 
Socrates thinks it necessary to make these regulations 
about the children and women. For we think that 
friendship is the greatest of good things for the poleis 
(for it is in this way that there are the least political 
factions and revolutions) and the unity of the state, 
which Socrates praises most highly is that which he both 
thinks and asserts is the work of friendship, just as we 
know that Aristophanes in the discourses on love says that 
when lovers desire each other because of their extreme 
affection they want to be fused together and both become 
one from being two. In such a union, however, both would 
necessarily be destroyed or at least one, and in the polis 
friendship would inevitably become watery because of such 
7 see Harold Baillie, "Learning the Emotions," The New 
Scholasticism, 62 (1988) 221-227. Both of these examples and 
the issues surrounding them are deeply indebted to Professor 
Baillie's analysis. 
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an association, and [in such a polis] son could least of 
all say "my father" and father "my son." For just as a 
little sugar mixed in with a lot of water makes an 
imperceptible mixture, so it also must come about that the 
mutual relationship based on these names must become 
imperceptible, since in such a sort of republic their will 
be the least possible necessity for people to care for one 
another as father for sons or son for father or brothers 
for each other. For there are two things that most of all 
cause human beings to care for and to love each other, 
something being one's own and something being beloved to 
one, neither of which are able to exist with those who are 
so governed. (Politics 1262b3-25.) 8 
In this passage we can see that Aristotle holds the view that 
the nature of the emotional bonds which exist between kin 
provides an extremely important clue as to the kind of 
political arrangement that can or cannot be established. The 
emotional ties which bind father to son, mother to daughter, 
wife to husband can be ignored only at the cost of the very 
stability of the polis. Aristotle, like Plato, believes that 
unity is crucial to the existence of the state but the kind 
of unity which Plato seeks to establish in the Republic with 
his communism of wives and children does violence to the basic 
feelings that those who are akin have for each other. For 
Aristotle, these feelings have a prior claim to that of the 
unity of the state and cannot be simply forced into a politi-
cal blue-print that does not take them into account. Plato's 
kallipolis so waters down friendship (en de te polei ten 
philian anankaion hudare ginesthai dia ten koinonian ten 
toiauten, Politics 1262b15-6} and the significant emotional 
8Aristotle, The Politics, translated by H. Rackham (New 
York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1932), pp. 80-83, adapted. 
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ties that bind people together that he actually ends by 
establishing the very conditions which make revolution and 
political faction possible. This is, of course, precisely 
what Plato sought to avoid, for he, like Aristotle, thinks 
that friendship is one of the greatest goods for the city and 
that it ensures that revolutions will be few (philian te gar 
oiometha megiston einai ton agathon tais polesin houto gar an 
hekista stasiazoien, Politics 1262b8-10). 
In this way, then, we can see how Aristotle viewed the 
emotions as being capable of providing initial direction and 
guidance to reason. In this particular example, the emotions 
function more negatively, that is, they delineate the proper 
limits within which rationality may operate. 
Baillie puts it: 
As Harold 
In Aristotle's eyes, Plato's political reasoning, which 
ought to be the highest expression of practical intel-
ligence, has suggested 'something fine but impractical.' 
That is, the program may appear rational, but is actually 
irrational. No matter how artful its principles may be, 
the position cannot succeed because it does not recognize 
human emotional reality and it chooses means outside the 
limits imposed on action by the emotions. ("Learning the 
Emotions," The New Scholasticism, 62 (1988) 225.] 
Aristotle saw the emotions as capable of providing initial 
positive direction too. We have just seen above that Aris-
totle asserts that there are two things that most of all 
(malista) make people care for each other (kedesthai) and love 
each other (philein), namely, something being one's own (to 
idion) and something being beloved (to agapeton) . In the 
passage from the Nicomachean Ethics we see that these two 
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things come directly into play. The example is rather unusual 
inasmuch as Aristotle takes his cue from women (not a sphere 
where he usually bothers to take much direction!) specifical-
ly, the relationship that mothers have with their children: 
But it [friendship] seems to consist more in loving than 
in being loved. A sign (semeion) of this is the way that 
mothers rejoice in loving their children. For some 
mothers give their own children away to be nursed9 and, 
though knowing and loving them, do not seek to be loved 
in return ( antiphileisthai d' ou zetousin) if both of 
these things are not possible but it is enough for them 
if they can only see them flourishing (eu prattontas); 
they retain their own love for them even though their 
children can give back (aponemosi) nothing of those things 
that are befittin~ to a mother because of their ignorance. 
(EN 1159a27-34.) 1 
The relationship between mother and child is a natural one 
while that of two friends is ethical inasmuch as it involves 
choice (prohairesis; cf. EN 1163a20f.) . Still, Aristotle 
employs the natural and emotional bond between mother and 
child as the "pre-ethical" paradigm of the later ethical 
relationship of friendship. This natural, emotional bond of 
mother and child furnishes initial, positive direction to the 
character of the excellent friendship. If friendship is to 
be excellent, Aristotle is saying, then it should consist more 
in a willingness to give love than to receive it and this 
willingness is well-illustrated in the natural relation of 
mother to child where the mother, though she cannot hope to 
9The verb here, trephesthai is somewhat ambiguous. It 
can either mean to nurse or rear a child. In either case the 
mother is giving her child away to someone else to take care 
of for a time. 
10ostwald, p. 229, adapted. 
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be 1oved in return by her infant, is content only to know that 
her child is flourishing. 
From an examination of both of the above passages, then, 
we see that Aristotle appreciates well the way in which the 
emotions are capable of guiding practical intelligence by 
providing it with a general orientation to the good which is 
to be done. Aristotle shows that the emotions orient us to 
the good by an analysis of specific emotions and the cause or 
causes for which they arise in his Rhetoric. Let us turn to 
a consideration of three different emotions which Aristotle 
discusses in order to see once again how the Stagirite 
connects emotional response to the good. 
3.4 An Analysis of Emotions In Aristotle's Rhetoric 
In this section we shall consider the emotions of shame, 
compassion and righteous indignation. These three are the 
best to examine inasmuch as they most clearly show that 
Aristotle holds that emotional response is oriented to the 
good. Before we analyze these emotions in their par-
ticularity, however, it will be helpful to set forth briefly 
the immediate background to Aristotle's discussion as well as 
his general understanding of the nature of rhetoric in its 
relationship to emotional response. 
The immediate background to Aristotle's discussion of 
rhetoric and the emotions is Plato's analysis of the nature 
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of rhetoric in the Gorgias. 11 In this dialogue (often affirmed 
to be part of Plato's "middle period") Socrates asserts that 
rhetoric is a species of flattery (kolakeias men oun egoge 
eipon morion, Gorgias 466al). According to Socrates there 
are four genuine arts that are concerned with the real care 
(therapeia) of the body and the soul. These four are medicine 
and gymnastic, justice and legislation respectively. The 
"art" of flattery divides herself into four and insinuating 
herself into each of these parts, pretends to be that genuine 
art into whose guise she has slipped (tetracha heauten 
dianeimasa hupodusa hupo hekaston ton morion prospoieitai 
einai touto hoper hupedu, Gorgias 464c8-10}. Thus cookery 
assumes the form of medicine, cosmetics the form of gymnastic, 
sophistry the form of legislation and rhetoric that of 
justice. Each genuine art then has its sham counterpart 
(antistrophon, Gorgias 465d8) which stems from the "art" of 
flattery (he kolakeutike, Gorgias 464c7). In this way, 
Socrates argues that rhetoric is a mere semblance of a part 
of politics (politikes moriou eidolon, Gorgias 463d2) which 
shamefully aims not at what is best but only at what is 
pleasant (hoti tou hedeos stochazetai aneu tou beltistou, 
Gorgias 465al-2, see also 462c8, 462el}. It is the counter-
part of cookery in the soul, acting in the soul as the latter 
does on the body (antistrophon opsopoiias en psuche hos ekeino 
11 The Gorgias is subtitled "Or On Rhetoric; Refutative" 
(e peri retorikes anatreptikos.) 
~ somati, Gorgias 465d8-9). 
117 
He denies that rhetoric is a 
genuine art (techne) since he holds that it cannot give an 
account of the real nature of the things it applies and thus 
is incapable of telling the cause of any of them (Gorgias 
465alf.). He refuses, he says, to call anything a genuine art 
(techne) which is fundamentally irrational (ego de technen ou 
kalo ho an e alogon pragma, Gorgias 465a6-7). 
In the Gorgias then, Plato's verdict is that rhetoric 
(at least as practiced by his contemporaries) is nothing but 
a shameful and ignorant knack (empeiria, Gorgias 465a4) which, 
by pandering to the emotions and desires of an audience, aims 
only at their gratification and not at what is truly best for 
them (Gorgias 502e3ff.). There is, clearly, for Plato such 
a thing as a legitimate form of rhetoric (Gorgias 503d6ff.). 
But it appears to be only practiced by Socrates and not by any 
of his contemporaries (Gorgias 521d6ff.). Socrates practices 
this true form of rhetoric because he does not aim at emotion-
al or psychological gratification but only at the inculcation 
of justice and the removal of injustice from the souls of his 
fellow citizens. 12 
12In the peroration of his defence Socrates makes known 
to the jury his deliberate refusal to appeal to crying and 
bringing up his children to the bench in order that he might 
move the jury to take pity on him (hina hoti malista 
eleetheie, Apology of Socrates 34c4). For a defendant to seek 
acquittal by appealing to such "pitiful dramatics" (ta eleina 
tauta dramata, Apology of Socrates 35b7) is, according to 
Socrates, an invitation to the jury to perjure themselves 
(oukoun chre oute hemas ethizein humas epiorkein outh' humas 
ethizesthai, Apology of Socrates 35c5-6). In similar fashion, 
Socrates rejects appeal to the emotions in his parting words 
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In response to Plato's rather damning critique of 
rhetoric (or at least the rhetorical practice of his genera-
tion) Aristotle attempts something of a rehabilitation. For 
my purposes, I shall focus upon the way in which Aristotle 
attempts this rehabilitation through a brief consideration of 
his understanding of the nature of rhetoric and especially the 
view of the emotions which emerges in the course of his 
discussion. It will be my contention that the role of 
cognition in emotional response which Aristotle delineates in 
Rhetoric II skirts the Platonic critique of rhetoric in the 
Gorgias as an art which appeals only to the irrational part 
of the human soul. It is precisely because Aristotle presup-
poses this cognitive element present in the emotions that he 
holds that rhetorical appeal to the emotions is not an appeal 
to the irrational but is founded upon an apprehension of the 
good latent in emotional response which can legitimately be 
elicited by the rhetorician in his audience. Again, such 
elicitation of emotions in an audience is not base pandering 
to the irrational inasmuch as Aristotle maintains that the 
emotions are connected, however unthematically, with the real. 
Aristotle makes known his opposition to the Platonic 
to the jury when he asserts that he was convicted because of 
his refusal to say what would have been most sweet for them 
to hear (tou me ethelein legein pros humas toiauta hoi' an 
humin men hedista en akouein, Apology of Socrates 38d7-8), 
namely, his lamentations and wailing (threnountos te mou kai 
oduromenou, Apology of Socrates 38d9). These are things, he 
says, which they have become accustomed to hear from others 
but he refuses to do it and considers it unworthy of him 
(anaxia emou, Apology of Socrates 38el). 
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critique in the very opening lines of his Rhetoric where he 
echoes the Gorgias: rhetoric is no longer the "counterpart of 
cookery" ( antistrophos opsopoiias, Gorgias 465d8} but the 
"counterpart of dialectic" (antistrophos te dialektike, 
Rhetoric 1354al-2}; again, it is no longer a "part of flat-
tery" (kolakeias morion, Gorgias 466al} but a "part of 
dialectic" (morion ti tes dialektikes, Rhetoric 1356a31} which 
legitimately "slips into the guise of politics" (hupoduetai 
hupo to schema to tes politikes he retorike, Rhetoric 
1356a27ff.). 13 Rhetoric is a part or counterpart to dialectic 
inasmuch as rhetoric, like dialectic, is not a science that 
deals with the nature of any definite subject but, like 
dialectic, is a certain faculty for furnishing arguments (peri 
oudenos gar horismenou oudetera auton estin episteme pos echei 
alla dunameis tines tou porisai logous, Rhetoric 1356a37-39). 
It furnishes arguments to those who are in a position of 
making judgments (Rhetoric 139lblff.} with respect to the 
contingent and changing world of human existence. 14 In short, 
it is the art of rational discourse which seeks to find in the 
subject matter that which is possibly persuasive (Rhetoric 
1355b10-ll} to those who are in the process of deliberating 
with a view to choosing a particular course of action. 
13Note Aristotle's echo of Plato's use of the verb hupoduo 
in Gorgias 464c-d. See William M.A. Grimaldi, S.J., Studies 
in the Philosophy of Aristotle's Rhetoric (Wiesbaden, Franz 
Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1972), pp. 85-86. 
14see Grimaldie, Aristotle's Rhetoric, pp. 26-27. 
120 
Grimaldie puts the matter well: 
[Aristotle] points out that the ultimate goal of rhetor-
ical activity is the effort to perceive in a given 
subject, or problem, or situation, those elements in it 
which may effect persuasion. The act of rhetoric seeks 
out those factors which lead a reasonable mind to accept 
the subject or the problem (A 2, 55b8-14). This is the 
proper activity of rhetoric and there it rests. It does 
not effect persuasion as some of the technographers said 
(A 1, 55b 10; Topics 101b5-10), nor does it, as far as 
Aristotle is concerned, make persuasion in the same sense 
as the artist makes his object. Rather it creates an 
attitude in another's mind, a sense of the reasonableness 
of the position proposed, whereby the auditor may make his 
own decision. The art, or technique, of rhetoric is the 
ability to perceive and to present evidence which makes 
decision, and a definite decision, possible; but to stop 
with the presentation. 15 
There are two things to note thus far: rhetoric is an affair 
of the "logistic" part of the soul inasmuch as it deals with 
the contingent (EN 1139alff.) and more importantly, for our 
purposes, it addresses itself to those who are in the process 
of deliberating with a view to making a choice. Choice 
(prohairesis), according to Aristotle, is an activity that 
involves both reason and appetition inasmuch as he defines it 
as a kind of deliberative desire (bouleutike orexis, EN 
1113all, cf. also 1139a32-33) and thus choice is connected 
with that part of the soul which has to do with our desires 
and emotions. 
According to Aristotle, rhetoric can legitimately appeal 
to the desiderative and emotional part of the human psyche 
inasmuch as this is the part of the soul which brings about 
personal conviction and motivates action for, as he states, 
15Grimaldie, Aristotle's Rhetoric, p. 27. 
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reason by itself will not cause action (EN 1139a35-36). But 
this appeal to the desires and emotions is not a mere stirring 
up of irrational drives and forces which impel individuals to 
act but is based, as Aristotle sees it, upon some apprehension 
or cognition that is latent in emotional response. 16 It is my 
contention that this cognitive component of the emotions 
orients the individual to the good that is to be done either 
for himself or for another. Let us take a closer look at how 
Aristotle views the emotions and how emotional response can 
orient an individual to the good. 
Aristotle gives his general definition of the emotions 
at the beginning of Rhetoric II: 
The emotions (ta pathe) are all those feelings on account 
of which men undergoing a change (di' hosa metaballontes), 
differ (diapherousi) with respect to their judgments (pros 
tas kriseis), and are accompanied by pain and pleasure, 
for example, anger, compassion, fear and as many other 
sorts of feelngs that there are as well as the opposite 
of these feelings. (Rhetoric 1378a24-27.) 17 
The central thing to note in this definition is the cognitive 
character of emotional response. The emotions are not simply 
"blind promptings and urgings that merely happen to us, 1118 
16see Grimaldie, commentary, p. 16: "I agree with Forten-
baugh' s thesis on the role of cognition in these Aristotelian 
emotions (see his Aristotle on Emotion) , and view it as 
further confirmation that in the Rhetoric A. is analyzing the 
fundamental nature of human discourse as reasoned and reason-
able." 
17Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, trans. by John Henry 
Freese (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1926) p. 173, adapted. 
18see Nancy Sherman, The Fabric of Character (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 169. 
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inasmuch as their arousal implies some kind of cognitive 
perception however indistinct or unthematic. The cognitive 
component of the emotion is the efficient cause of its arousal 
and serves also to delineate the essential features of each 
t , 19 emo ion. For example, in Rhetoric II.2 Aristotle defines 
anger as a desire (orexis) for revenge that is accompanied by 
pain (meta lupes) on account of an apparent slight (dia 
phainomenen oligorian) 20 to oneself or one's own, when the 
slight is unjustified (me prosekontos). We see the cognitive 
19on the cognitive element of emotion as efficient cause 
see Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion, pp. 10-16. See also 
Grimaldie, Commentary p. 17: "When A. decides to study the 
emotions he is engaged with the causality of the 
emotions and with varying aspects of the four causes. For 
example, when he considers the disposition of the person 
experiencing the emotion, he is in effect taking up an 
analysis which can be specific only by way of determining in 
this particular instance material, efficient, formal, and 
final causes of the emotion. In the same way, when he 
considers the persons toward whom one experiences the emotion, 
he is coping with efficient and final causes, and again with 
efficient causes when he takes up the things which bring about 
the emotion." 
20Note how Aristotle employs the preposition dia here to 
express causal efficacy in exactly the same way that he does 
in his general definition of the emotions given above. 
Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion, pp. 10-12, points out that 
Aristotle is in part, engaged in an attempt to clarify Plato's 
efforts at showing the relationship between emotion and 
cognition in his Philebus. Fortenbaugh argues that Plato did 
indeed see their connection but employed the unhappy preposi-
tion "with" (meta, Philebus 37e10) to express their relation-
ship instead of "on account of" or "because" (dia) . The 
former signifies according to Fortenbaugh, a misleading sense 
of "simple concurrence" in which emotion just happens to 
accompany a thought or opinion rather than the causal efficacy 
that is signified by the preposition dia. It is because 
Aristotle was the first to employ the preposition dia to 
express the causal nexus of emotion and cognition that 
Fortenbaugh credits the Stagirite with making an advance on 
Plato's discussion. 
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element present in Aristotle's conception of the emotion of 
anger in that it is the perception of being slighted which is 
the efficient cause of the emotion arising. The same struc-
ture will be implicitly operative in Aristotle's analysis of 
the emotions of shame, compassion and righteous indignation. 
Aristotle defines shame as a kind of pain or disturbance 
(lupe tis e tarache, Rhetoric 1383bl5) with respect to 
misdeeds, whether of past, present or future, that tend to 
bring dishonor. He states that if this definition of shame 
is correct then we ought to feel shame as a result of misdeeds 
which bring disgrace to ourselves or to those for whom we care 
(ei de estin aischune he horistheisa ananke aischunesthai epi 
tois toioutois ton kakon hosa aischra dokei einai e auto e 
hon phrontizei, Rhetoric 1383b18-21). Aristotle then proceeds 
to catalogue an impressive variety of situations and scenarios 
in which a feeling of shame would predictably arise. He is 
aware that these situations will not induce shame in everyone. 
The shameless will not experience this disturbance or pain 
because, as Aristotle contends, it is characteristic of 
shamelessness to feel contempt or indifference when engaging 
in such disgraceful deeds (oligoria tis kai apatheia peri ta 
auta tauta, Rhetoric 1383bl7-18). But for Aristotle, when one 
is involved in actions such as the following, one ought to 
feel the uneasiness and pain of shame. 
Thus, deserting one's fellows in battle by taking flight 
warrants feeling shame because it stems from cowardice (apo 
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g_eilias gar, Rhetoric 1383b23}; similarly withholding a 
deposit, for this is due to injustice {ap' adikias gar, 
Rhetoric 1383b24); making a profit out of the poor or the 
dead, because this shows base love of gain and stinginess (apo 
aischrokerdeias gar kai aneleutherias, Rhetoric 1383b29-30}; 
overpraising a person's good qualities and playing down his 
bad, for this is a sign of flattery (kolakeias gar semeia, 
Rhetoric 1383b39-40}; speaking at great length about oneself, 
making all kinds of professions and taking the credit for what 
another has done, because this is a sign of boastful charla-
tanery (alazoneias gar, Rhetoric 1384a7). Feelings of shame 
or disgrace arise as a result of involvement in such scenarios 
as are depicted above. Shame alerts the individual to a 
certain range of vices having to do with misdeeds which bring 
dishonor and thus assists in directing the individual away 
from such vices and toward the good. In this way then the 
emotion of shame orients the individual toward the good by 
preventing him from engaging in vicious acts with psycho-
logical impunity. Shame, which would normally accompany such 
acts, goads the individual to change her ways and act more in 
accord with what is good or just. 
The emotions of compassion (eleos) and righteous 
indignation (nemesis) are also oriented to the good though in 
a different fashion from the emotion of shame. While shame 
serves to check someone who is engaged in something disgrace-
ful these two emotions alert the individual to the good by 
125 
sympathetic identification with another's sufferings. Thus 
Aristotle defines compassion as a kind of pain that is excited 
by the sight of evil, deadly or painful, which happens to 
someone who does not deserve it (tou anaxiou tunchanein, 
Rhetoric 1385b16). Significant for our purposes is the fact 
that this feeling is aroused as a sympathetic response to 
someone suffering undeservedly. In this way compassion has 
a moral dimension inasmuch as implicit in feeling this emotion 
is a judgment that an individual is suffering something which 
they ought not to be suffering. The efficient cause of the 
feeling is precisely this perception of another's undeserved 
suffering. Righteous indignation, in similar fashion, is 
being pained at the undeserved good fortune of another (to gar 
lupeisthai epi tais anaxiais kakopragiais, Rhetoric 1386bll-
12). According to Aristotle, both of these emotions (eleos 
and nemesis) show good character (ampho ta pathe ethous 
chrestou, Rhetoric 1386b14-15) and they imply each other, for 
if we sympathize with and feel compassion for those who suffer 
undeservedly then we ought to be indignant with those who 
prosper undeservedly (dei gar epi men tois anaxios prattousi 
kakos sunachthesthai kai eleein tois de eu nemesan, Rhetoric 
1386b15-16). 
From this brief analysis of Aristotle's discussion of 
the emotions in the Rhetoric we can see that Aristotle 
supports 
depicted 
the view of the emotions that is dramatically 
in Sophocles' drama, namely, that the emotions 
126 
provide a kind of initial direction or orientation to the 
good. We have seen this to be the case in the emotions that 
we have considered. Our analysis of shame shows that this 
emotion directs the individual to the good by the experience 
of pain and uneasiness which accompanies acts which are 
disgraceful. The emotional distress of shame points to an 
individual's engagement in actions and situations which ought 
to be avoided. Compassion and righteous indignation also 
furnish this initial orientation to the good by sensitizing 
a person to the injustice of undeserved suffering as well as 
the injustice of undeserved prosperity. In this way then we 
can see how for Aristotle the emotions are capable of orient-
ing the individual to the general moral contours of a given 
state of affairs. And thus, the rhetorician's appeal to the 
emotions in his audience are not, as Plato claims in the 
Gorgias, a pandering to the irrational, but an appeal to the 
whole person (as reasoning, desiring and feeling) as she 
deliberates with a view to choosing a course of action. 
3 .. s Conclusion 
In this chapter we have seen that the fuller anthropol-
ogy of Aristotle and Sophocles has allowed them to recognize 
and appreciate the role of the emotions in the process of 
becoming a moral person. According to this ancient anthropol-
ogy the emotions are not simply non-rational impulses but are, 
as we have seen, cognitive in character and capable of 
furnishing a certain impetus to the good. They are educable 
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and able to be informed in such a way that they come to be 
aligned with the rational element. In this way we have seen 
that the emotions are capable of initiating us into leading 
the good life by the orientation to the good which they 
provide. We have also seen how this anthropology and concern 
for the whole person is in marked contrast with more modern 
developments, especially those stemming from the Kantian 
tradition. For Kant, the emotions play no role in the 
constitution of the moral agent or the moral worth of actions. 
If the emotions play any role at all, it is only as needing 
to be suppressed or overcome by reason in the interests of 
carrying out one's duty. In this way it has been my claim 
that Kant's conception of the moral agent is truncated and 
impoverished when seen in the light of this more robust and 
fuller anthropology which takes into account a wider range of 
the elements of the human psyche. 
As a corollary to this fuller anthropology I have 
maintained that, given the nature of the poet's art, it is 
appropriate to appeal to the poet to present human experience 
in its more immediate and emotionally evocative aspects. And 
again, given the nature of the philosopher's art, I have 
contended that it is appropriate to appeal to the philosopher 
to furnish us with a logos that explains and provides some 
kind of unity to the multiplicity of the phenomena that are 
presented by the dramatist. 
The tragedian presents his position on the emotions 
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dramatically through the character of Neoptolemus and the way 
in which his feelings communicate to him the violence that he 
is doing to his moral identity as well as the injustice of his 
involvement in Odysseus' scheme to steal Philoctetes' bow. 
The medium of dramatic poetry is ideally suited to the task 
of an exploration of the emotions inasmuch as it is capable 
of presenting a character on stage who experiences various 
emotions and who is in a situation which invites us to 
identify with him and feel with him the emotions that are 
portrayed. There is thus an immediacy that poetry furnishes 
that cannot be found in philosophical discourse. Sophocles 
most especially employs the full force of his medium in 
setting forth his thesis on the orientation of the emotions 
to the good in the brilliant "recognition" scene where 
Neoptolemus echoes Philoctetes' former screams of pain. This 
scene is particularly noteworthy in the way that Sophocles so 
skillfully links Neoptolemus' feelings of anguish with the 
question of whether he will discover his true moral identity 
through the surprising and memorable vehicle of parallelism 
and double entendre. 
For Aristotle, too, the emotions have a cognitive aspect 
and manifest a certain orientation to the good. Philosophical 
discourse is not as suitable a medium for a discussion of the 
emotions as poetry inasmuch as philosophical analysis does not 
help us to feel the emotions as poetry does. And it may very 
well be the case that the only way to understand the nature 
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of the emotions and emotional response is to feel them the way 
that a tragedian can make us feel them through the depiction 
of characters in a concrete situation. Still, Aristotle's 
analysis has its place in our discussion of the nature of the 
emotions. What we come to understand through the 
philosopher's work is the precise relationship between 
cognition and emotion, namely, that the perception of a 
certain state of affairs (e.g. outrage) is the efficient cause 
of emotional response (anger). This insight helps us to see 
how the emotions can be oriented to the good in such feelings 
as compassion where a sympathetic response is aroused on 
account of the perception of another's undeserved suffering 
or in a feeling like righteous indignation where pain is felt 
on account of another's undeserved good fortune. Aristotle 
helps us to understand the relationship of cognition and 
emotion by showing their connection in terms of efficient 
causality. Aristotle also helpfully points to the way in 
which the emotions can put a limit on the proposals of reason 
(as in his critique of Plato's kallipolis) and to the way in 
which they can furnish positive direction to the character of 
what a virtue such as friendship should be. In this way too 
he shows that the emotions provide this impetus or orientation 
to the good for which I have argued in this chapter. In the 
next chapter we shall focus on choice and responsibility and 
examine the relationship of the emotions to reason in order 
to understand how their integration is related to moral 
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maturity and the making of a choice. 
Chapter 4 
CHOICE AND RESPONSIBILITY IN SOPHOCLES AND ARISTOTLE: 
THE CHARACTER OF ODYSSEUS 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I shall attempt to assess the moral 
character of Odysseus through a consideration of the nature 
of choice and responsibility with respect to both tragedian 
and philosopher. The performing of these two tasks is related 
inasmuch as I shall employ the notions of choice and responsi-
bility as a way of revealing the kind of character that 
Odysseus is. Our analysis of the character of Odysseus is in 
keeping with this ancient anthropology that we are attempting 
to flesh out. For the ancients ethics was a practical 
discipline in which the central question was the concrete 
issue of character and not, as in more recent developments, 
the construction of a correct decision-procedure or the 
formulation of an abstract, exceptionless law. Because 
character was seen as of central importance, the use of 
examples, both good and corrupt, were also seen as playing a 
central role in the moral formation of the individual. 1 This 
1Even Plato, who chastises the poets in the Republic for 
presenting corrupt characters to Athenian audiences, filled 
his dialogues with such fools as Euthyphro and Meno and such 
cynics as Polus, Callicles and Thrasymachus. 
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ancient appreciation of the vital importance that role models 
or examples play in the education of the moral agent has been 
devalued or forgotten. It seems that this phenomenon in 
modern moral philosophy could very well be traced back to the 
influence of Kant inasmuch as he argued that examples were 
useless as far as contributing to our understanding of the 
moral law. Again this was the case for Kant because he held 
that nothing empirical could contribute to the principle of 
morality. 
Our consideration of the character of Odysseus will 
serve as a kind of anti-type. We shall be witnessing vice in 
action and shall note a number of things about it. First, we 
shall see how vice produces enmity and disrupts the establish-
ment of genuine friendship among the three characters. 
Second, Odysseus' corrupting influence upon the young and 
impressionable Neoptolemus will be noted. The son of Laertes 
teaches Neoptolemus in the ways of injustice and deceit. 
Thirdly, we shall see that Odysseus practices moral subterfuge 
through the various ways in which he attempts to eschew moral 
responsibility and choice. Fourthly, it will be seen that 
Odysseus' vicious character distorts his ability to deliberate 
soundly inasmuch as we shall see that his ends are ignoble and 
the means that he sees as appropriate to those ends are 
skewed. 
As a corollary to the ancient anthropology of Sophocles 
and Aristotle we shall appeal to the tragedian to present the 
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emotionally evocative and immediate aspects of human ex-
perience. The philosopher will be appealed to in order to 
provide us with an explanatory discourse on the phenomena that 
are presented by the poet. In this way we shall best be able 
to take into account the diversity and unity of experience as 
well as the emotional and rational elements of the human 
person. 
It will be most instructive, in our analysis of the 
character of Odysseus, to turn to an examination of his 
language. Sophocles furnishes us with an important clue with 
respect to Odysseus' eschewing of personal responsibility and 
agency in his consistent use of the Greek dei as well as other 
adjectives signifying "external" or "objective" necessity. 
Noteworthy in this regard also is the interesting fact that 
Philoctetes, Neoptolemus and the man sent in disguise by 
Odysseus as a tradesman all refer to the son of Laertes as 
force (bia) . Since Odysseus continuously eschews moral 
responsibility through his appeal to what must be done in the 
circumstances it is particularly appropriate that Sophocles 
has his characters refer to him as a kind of abstract force. 
Continuing with our analysis of Odysseus' language I 
shall show that the son of Laertes employs moral language in 
an utterly inconsistent way. Time and again we see him saying 
whatever he needs to say in the interests of obtaining 
Philoctetes' bow. Although it can be quite easily shown that 
Odysseus manipulates moral language in the play, Sophocles 
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makes Odysseus' final goals more ambiguous and more difficult 
to discern. Is he acting as an instrument of the state in 
whose service he is willing so "selflessly" to compromise 
himself as to practice deceit and manipulate moral language 
or is he an utterly selfish individual who sees the entire 
situation as an opportunity for personal aggrandizement? I 
shall contend that Sophocles is showing us that Odysseus' 
overriding goals are selfish and that he is not placing 
himself in the service of the general good but is attempting 
to exploit a situation for his own prestige and honor. In 
this way I shall argue that the son of Laertes is precisely 
what Philoctetes says he is in the play, a panourgos, namely 
someone who is willing to do anything in order to achieve his 
own objectives. Odysseus is capable of acting justly and 
piously if this happens to be in line with his own goals but 
has absolutely no scruples in abandoning the norms of conven-
tional morality if such norms will conflict with his own aims 
and purposes. 1 The incongruity of Odysseus' moral language 
seems to go hand in hand with his shunning of personal respon-
sibility and lack of moral identity inasmuch as his own course 
of action (and indeed identity) is determined by what is most 
expedient and will bring success (Phil. 81, 109 and especially 
1049-1052). 
Aristotle has his own discussion of panourgia in 
Nicomachean Ethics VI.12. He juxtaposes his discussion of 
1see Blundell, "Odysseus in Philoctetes," 320-321. 
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this kind of criminal activity with the nature of cleverness 
and practical wisdom. Aristotle's analysis of panourgia will 
make a philosophical contribution to our understanding the 
kind of character which Sophocles is presenting in his play. 
Through the philosopher's analysis, it will be shown that 
Odysseus has the meritorious capacity of being able to 
determine the most efficient means to a given end but that he 
abuses and twists his ability by directing his efforts toward 
consistently wicked ends. Let us turn then to a consideration 
of the character of Odysseus. 
4.2 Necessity And The Denial Of Responsibility 
In an excellent article which examines the distinction 
between two common Greek verbs which express necessity Seth 
Benardete writes: 
In Sophocles' Philoctetes we can observe how an entire 
play can find its action reflected in the opposition of 
chre and dei. 2 
Benardete's statement will be born out in this chapter as I 
employ the distinction between chre and dei as an interpretive 
tool for demonstrating that Odysseus' language shows his 
hostility to assuming responsibility for his actions. 
Dei essentially expresses the necessity that external 
circumstances impose upon an agent without there being any 
contribution on the part of the agent to the matter at hand. 
Chre, on the other hand, signifies a certain internal or 
2Benardete, "Chre and Dei," 297. 
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subjective necessity that an agent experiences for choosing 
a particular course of action over another. 3 In short, chre 
implies choice and the participation of the agent in determin-
ing his or her own destiny while dei implies simple submission 
to circumstances that do not admit of the possibility of 
choice. It will be my underlying claim throughout this 
analysis that Sophocles has the character of Odysseus consis-
tently employ this term expressing external necessity (dei, 
as well as other impersonal verbs of necessity) as a way of 
signifying his denial of personal responsibility through the 
strategy of describing situations in such a way that he simply 
must submit to them. 
From the very outset of the play we witness Odysseus' 
attempts at removing himself from responsibility for the 
actions which he performs. In his opening lines he informs 
Neoptolemus that he deserted the son of Poeas on the shores 
of Lemnos because he was ordered to do this by his superiors 
(tachtheis tod' erdein ton anassonton hupo, Phil. 6). This 
may in turn, be a subtle hint to the son of Achilles to do 
likewise because he soon orders the young man to carry out his 
commands in a similar, unquestioning fashion. The consistency 
with which Odysseus employs g.!ti. and other verbs expressing 
external necessity throughout the play is striking. He makes 
it clear to Neoptolemus that he is present as a subordinate 
officer (hos huperetes parei, Phil. 53) and that he must (dei, 
3Ibid., 285. 
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£jlil. 50) be noble in the purpose for which he has come even 
if he hears that he must carry out things that are strange and 
new (kainon, Phil. 52). This latter, of course, is a euphem-
ism for the deceitful plan to steal Philoctetes' bow which he 
will soon reveal. Philoctetes, he asserts, must (dei, Phil. 
54) be taken by deception and duped with underhanded words 
(Phil. 55); the bow must be stolen (tad' ouchi klepteon, Phil. 
57); the scheme must be carried out (dei sophisthenai, Phil. 
77) in order that Neoptolemus can become the thief of the 
invincible weapon. Odysseus teaches the son of Achilles how 
to be irresponsible also. Just as he deferred to "those in 
power" (Phil. 6) as responsible for what he did so he also 
invites Neoptolemus to give himself over to him (dos moi 
seauton, Phil. 84) for shamelessness for the brief part of a 
day. 4 
According to the prophecy of Helenos ( at least as 
reported by the tradesman) Philoctetes was to be persuaded to 
leave his island abode and to come to Troy willingly (ei me 
tonde peisantes logo/agointo nesou tesd' eph' hes naiei ta 
nun, Phil. 612-613). But Odysseus completely disregards the 
4It is interesting to note that the tradesman ( one of 
Odysseus' men) whom the son of Laertes sends to further the 
progress of the scheme speaks in Odyssean fashion when he 
asserts that he will hold Neoptolemus responsible for the 
outcome of disclosing information that he thinks should remain 
hidden (se thesomai tend' aition, Phil. 590). Neoptolemus too 
(as we shall see) removes himself from responsibility for his 
actions (Phil. 385-388) in exactly the same way that Odysseus 
does at the very opening of the play (Phil. 6). Sophocles 
appears to be showing us that everyone connected with Odysseus 
is engaged in eschewing personal responsibility. 
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prophecy and employs this same impersonal language of 
necessity with Philoctetes. 5 When Neoptolemus has gained 
possession of Philoctetes' bow and Philoctetes is imploring 
the son of Laertes to return it to him Odysseus bursts onto 
the scene and declares that the young man will never return 
it even if he wants to. He proceeds to taunt Philoctetes 
saying that he must go with his men or they will escort him 
by force (alla kai se dei/steichein ham' autois e bia stelousi 
~, Phil. 982-983); Philoctetes must take Troy and raze it to 
the ground by force (Troian s' helein dei kai kataskapsai bia, 
Phil. 998); the son of Poeas must take this path (he d' hodos 
poreutea, Phil. 993); he must submit and obey (peisteon tade, 
Phil. 994) . Again, Sophocles shows us with devastating 
clarity Odysseus' flight from responsibility by the way in 
which the latter describes every situation where there is a 
critical choice to be made as one in which the individual must 
simply submit to an anonymous force that is larger than 
5When Odysseus finally lays hold of Philoctetes' bow 
later in the play we see that he gives up on Philoctetes (and 
the prophecy) all together. He will assert that the bow is 
all that is needed (Phil. 1047ff). This is what he, in fact, 
hints at with Neoptolemus when he first describes the scheme 
to him at the beginning of the play. When the son of Achilles 
asks what profit it is to him that Philoctetes goes to Troy, 
Odysseus answers that the bow alone will capture the city 
(hairei ta toxa tauta ten Troian mona, Phil. 113). It seems 
somehow appropriate that Odysseus focuses, in the end, on the 
prized object rather than the man since he constantly employs 
impersonal verbs which appeal only to the necessity that a 
certain state of affairs be brought into being and not that 
an individual meaningfully participate (for example, through 
cooperation, negotiation or persuasion) in the bringing about 
of such a state of affairs. See Nussbaum, "Consequences and 
Character," 32. 
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himself. Swift and unthinking subordination is the only 
appropriate response when the reality of choice has been 
denied. 
Sophocles further confirms Odysseus as an individual in 
flight from moral responsibility by having three different 
characters refer to him as force (bia) during the course of 
the play. Philoctetes refers to Odysseus as force (bia) when 
he angrily recounts to Neoptolemus how he has suffered at the 
hands of the Atreidae and Odysseus for the past ten years 
(Phil. 314). Neoptolemus, confirming Philoctetes' account, 
again calls Odysseus bia (Phil. 321). Finally, the spy sent 
by Odysseus in the guise of a tradesman also refers to 
Odysseus as bia when he tells Neoptolemus that he and his men 
are coming to take Philoctetes back to Troy (Phil. 592). We 
have already seen the way in which Odysseus refers to imper-
sonal necessity and other forms of expediency in order to 
justify his actions. Sophocles, in a sense, indicates to us 
what the ultimate moral implications of Odysseus' position 
would be by having other characters in his play refer to the 
son of Laertes as an abstract force. Again, these references 
to Odysseus as force are in keeping with his own response to 
and description of moral situations, namely, that personal 
commitments and choices do not exist because submission to 
forces which dictate what one must do is the only reality. 
This is either what Odysseus actually believes or what he 
wants others to hold in the interests of justifying the kinds 
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of actions that he wants to take. The references to him as 
bia are perfectly in keeping with his character inasmuch as 
~
they point to the way in which Odysseus shuns responsibility 
for his own actions. 6 By means of these references to 
Odysseus as an abstract force scattered throughout the play 
sophocles subtly acknowledges Odysseus' own appeal to force 
as a central category of his moral thought. 
The passage which best sums up Odysseus' own moral 
position comes near the close of the play when Odysseus has 
won possession of the bow and realizes that he will not be 
able to persuade Philoctetes to sail to Troy. Sophocles has 
Odysseus reveal his identity (or lack thereof) in what he says 
here: 
I could say many things in response to Philoctetes here 
if he would permit me, but as it is now, I am master of 
one argument (logou). For where a certain kind of man is 
6odysseus' denial of personal responsibility is 
interestingly illustrated near the close of the play in his 
heated exchange with Neoptolemus. When it becomes clear to 
Odysseus that Neoptolemus intends to return Philoctetes' bow, 
Odysseus tells the son of Achilles that there is someone who 
will prevent him from doing this (estin tis estin hos se 
kolusei to dran, Phil. 1241). When Neoptolemus asks who it 
is that will prevent him, Odysseus says that the entire unruly 
mob of Achaeans will, and that he is among them (xumpas 
Achaion laos en de tois ego, Phil. 1243). He reiterates his 
threat to Neoptolemus by referring to the army and the 
vengeance that they will exact for this betrayal (Phil. 1250, 
1257). Sophocles shows us that even when Odysseus finds 
himself in a situation where personal and direct action can 
be taken he hides behind a collectivity. His reference to 
himself at 1243 is only as one among a threatening and 
impersonal mob ready to impose its collective will. In this 
way the tragedian indicates that Odysseus is the sort of 
individual who is incapable of seeing himself as a personal 
agent with the power of carrying out actions which he chooses. 
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required I filn that kind of man (hou gar toiouton dei 
toioutos eim' ego) and where there is the judgment of just 
and good men you couldn't find anyone more reverent than 
I. I am the sort whose nature it is to want to win in 
everything (nikan ge mentoi pantachou chrezon ephun, Phil. 
1047-1052). 
In this passage we see that Odysseus describes himself as a 
kind of moral cipher who, because he is without character or 
moral scruples, is capable of becoming whatever kind of person 
is required (dei) by the given situation. In this way 
Odysseus enunciates a position of radical moral irrespon-
sibility as is evidenced by his use of the objective dei that 
we explored above. 
4.3 Manipulation And Villainy 
In addition to removing himself from responsibility for 
his own actions the son of Laertes twists and manipulates 
moral language to suit his own ends or to get others to do 
what he wants them to do. Sophocles is showing us, I main-
tain, that this kind of manipulation betrays Odysseus' 
cynicism regarding moral terms and simply being ethical at 
all. 7 We see the son of Laertes freely re-define moral terms 
or frankly place morally incompatible terms side by side in 
a completely irresponsible and cynical fashion. Again such 
disregard, I contend, is all in the service of his own ques-
tionable ends, because for Odysseus the end justifies any 
7see Blundell, "Odysseus in Philoctetes," 321. 
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means to that end. 8 A passage which is central for revealing 
Odysseus' willingness to employ his formidable rhetorical 
powers in the service of his ends comes at the beginning of 
the play in one of his avuncular lectures to Neoptolemus: 
Child of a noble father, even I myself, when I was once 
young, used to have a quiet tongue and a hand ready for 
action (glossan men argon cheira d' eichon ergatin) but 
now, having gone out into the testing ground of the real 
world (eis elenchon exion), 9 I see that it is the tongue, 
not deeds that governs all things (panth' hegoumenen, 
Phil. 96-99). 
Sophocles is revealing to us here Odysseus' general mode of 
operation throughout the play. Odysseus proves time and again 
(at least initially) that it is the tongue which governs all 
things. 10 Sophocles thus portrays for us the terrible 
8I shall explore the questionableness of Odysseus' ends 
later in this chapter. 
9See Jebb, Philoctetes, p. 68 for an excellent commentary 
on this particular phrase. 
10In his emphasis on the transforming possibilities of the 
tongue Odysseus calls to mind the well-known Sophist, Gorgias. 
In the only complete work which has come down to us, the 
Encomium of Helen, Gorgias notoriously defends Helen on the 
ground that if she was persuaded to go with Paris she ought 
to be excused because the power of the word (logos dunastes 
megas estin, Encomium 8) is so great as to compel the soul to 
obey and approve of whatever is done (logos gar psuchen ho 
peisas hen epeisen enankase kai peithesthai tois legomenois 
kai sunainesai tois poioumenois, Encomium 12) . Logoi he says, 
can drug and bewitch (exepharmakeusan kai egoeteusan, Encomium 
14) the souls of its hearers. 
In Plato's Gorgias, Gorgias, like Odysseus, praises the 
powers of the tongue (via rhetoric) to recast and manipulate 
reality. Gorgias contends that if a doctor and a rhetorician 
were to engage in a verbal bout with each other on the subject 
of who should be appointed physician, it would be the rhetori-
cian who would be appointed over the medical doctor because 
of the former' s facility with words (Gorgias 456b7-cl). There 
is, Gorgias asserts, no subject on which the rhetorician would 
fail to speak more persuasively than the very professional who 
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incoherence that moral language is liable to undergo when a 
character like Odysseus employs his considerable rhetorical 
powers for questionable purposes. I shall focus primarily on 
the beginning of the play where Odysseus employs moral terms 
inconsistently in order to get Neoptolemus to play a part in 
his scheme to steal Philoctetes' bow. 
The first passage concerns the moral term noble 
(gennaios). Odysseus tells Neoptolemus that he must be noble 
(gennaion, Phil. 51) not only in physical prowess (me monon 
to somati, Phil. 51) but in the purpose for which he has 
come (eph' hois eleluthas, Phil. 50). Neoptolemus is the son 
of Achilles and is thus by birth of noble physical powers. 
But Odysseus is hinting at something else here which he will 
not come out and simply state. The sort of "nobility" which 
Odysseus is getting at seems to involve two things: a willing-
ness unquestioningly to subordinate himself to the "something 
new" (ti kainon, Phil. 52) which Odysseus will soon reveal to 
be his scheme and to carry out that scheme successfully. In 
this way then Odysseus aligns nobility with subservience (all' 
en ti kainon hon prin ouk akekoas/klues hupourgein hos 
huperetes parei, fhil. 52-53) and with successfully executing 
has expert knowledge of that subject (Gorgias 456c4-6). 
Gorgias is quick to point out, however, that the teacher of 
rhetoric cannot be blamed if his art is put to bad use because 
he imparted the skill to be used justly {Gorgias 457b8-cl). 
a clever and deceitful plan ( sophisma) . 11 
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It is not my 
contention that Odysseus himself believes that nobility is 
compatible with these things but he needs to cover over his 
own deeds with a word like gennaios in order to get the son 
of a noble father to cooperate with his designs. 12 In short, 
Odysseus does not really care about the substance of moral 
discourse unless it is useful to him. 13 Having initially 
couched the deed to be done in terms of nobility, Odysseus 
proceeds quickly to talk of the necessity of deceiving the 
soul of Philoctetes by means of words (Phil. 54-57). Neop-
tolemus is to play the part of a kind of surrogate Odysseus 
in that he too is to manipulate others by means of manipulat-
ing language. 
We see this same kind of inconsistency in the use of 
moral terms and masking of wicked deeds in the language of 
nobility in what follows. Neoptolemus is to become a thief 
(klopeus, Phil. 77); to contrive evil deeds (technasthai kaka, 
Phil. 80) which are shameless (anaides, Phil. 83) and deceit-
ful (dolo, Phil. 101) and is to be known through his involve-
11 see Knox, The Heroic Temper, p. 125. 
12odysseus demonstrates that he himself knows the true 
meaning of the word gennaios when he orders a remorseful 
Neoptolemus to go and because he is noble (gennaios) not to 
look at Philoctetes any longer lest he destroy their good 
fortune (Phil. 1068-1069). Odysseus is, of course, worried 
that because of Neoptolemus' noble nature (and the compassion 
that is part of such nobility) the young man will so regret 
the deceit that he has practiced that he will attempt to undo 
what he has wrought. 
13see Blundell, "Odysseus in Philoctetes," 320. 
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ment in such an affair as just (dikaioi, Phil. 82) , most 
revered of mortals (eusebestatos broton, Phil. 85), wise and 
good (sophos kagathos, Phil. 119). Again, it is not my 
contention that Odysseus believes that such contradictory 
moral terms as shamelessness and reverence are in fact 
compatible. He does not. What he does know with devastating 
clarity is that if one needs someone of noble character to 
carry out a deed of questionable moral integrity then one must 
couch the deed to be done in terms that are morally acceptable 
and even attractive to that individual. This is what we see 
Odysseus doing above. Sophocles shows us that Odysseus 
manipulates the son of Achilles in the very same way that the 
latter will soon take advantage of Philoctetes. The tragedian 
also portrays the moral cynicism of Odysseus who cares nothing 
for the substance of moral terms except as they may be useful 
to him in the achievement of his own goals. 
As was mentioned in the introduction, it is not clear 
what Odysseus' final goals are. He claims to be the servant 
of Zeus and simply to be carrying out the god's will (Phil. 
989-990). He appears to have the general welfare of the 
Greeks in mind when he says that Neoptolemus will cause 
suffering for all of the Greeks if he fails to carry out the 
scheme successfully (ei d' ergase/me tauta lupen pasin 
Argeiois baleis, Phil. 66-67). The Chorus defend Odysseus on 
these same grounds when they claim that the son of Laertes was 
given a command "as one from many" (keinos d' heis apo 
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pollon/tachtheis, Phil. 1143-1144) and at their mandate 
achieved a common benefit for his friends (tout' 
ephemosuna/koinan enusen es philous arogan, Phil. 1144-1145) . 14 
It is my opinion that Odysseus is not a selfless servant of 
the state but is driven fundamentally by the desire for 
personal honor, success and power and that he is willing to 
do or say anything in order to secure these things. In this 
way, then, he is the panourgos (criminal, "one who will do or 
say anything") that Philoctetes says that he is. 
Odysseus' assertion that he is the servant of Zeus is 
but a convenient ploy for claiming that he has divine sanction 
for pursuing his own goals. Sophocles makes this quite clear 
in his depiction of Odysseus' utter willingness to disregard 
the prophecy of Helenus once Philoctetes' bow is in his 
14see Nussbaum, "Consequences and Character," 29-39. 
Nussbaum argues that Odysseus is a kind of selfless 
utilitarian who disregarding his own scruples, acts in the 
interests of the larger community. He is someone who "accords 
ultimate value to states of affairs," specifically that state 
of affairs which is "the greatest possible good of all 
citizens." Nussbaum further argues that it is Sophocles' 
purpose in the play to show the "initial attractiveness" of 
such a position and "its ultimate defectiveness." The 
ultimate defectiveness of Odysseus' position, according to 
Nussbaum, lies in the fact that his fixation on bringing about 
certain states of affairs leads him to accord no value to such 
things as friendship, justice and personal integrity. 
I do not disagree with Nussbaum in her judgment that 
Sophocles shows us the moral bankruptcy of Odysseus' position 
but I disagree with her on the issue of Odysseus' ultimate 
motivation for his actions. It seems to me that Sophocles 
leaves us with enough evidence that Odysseus' real goal in 
getting Philoctetes' bow is the personal prestige and power 
that this will afford him among his peers and not, as Nussbaum 
would have it, bringing about the "greatest good for the 
greatest number" of those Greeks fighting at Troy. 
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possession (Phil. 1054-1062). The prophecy was that the bow 
and its owner Philoctetes would take Troy. But Sophocles 
shows us an Odysseus who is indifferent to the message of 
zeus' prophets and hence as someone who cannot be viewed as 
seriously committed to his commands. In this way it is 
doubtful that Odysseus is doing anything but appropriating 
divine sanction for his own purposes. 
Sophocles provides us with ample evidence that the son 
of Laertes is pursuing private and selfish goals even though 
in the play Odysseus portrays himself as an individual who 
is looking out for the general welfare. Victory and honor 
appear to be his overriding ends. It is for the sake of 
grasping a "sweet portion" of victory that Odysseus first bids 
Neoptolemus to throw off his sense of shame and become 
involved in the scheme (Phil. 80-82). The attainment of 
victory he says, will later make them appear just (Phil. 82). 
Before Neoptolemus sets off to find Philoctetes, Odysseus 
prays to Hermes, the sender of guile and to Athena Victory 
who, he claims, "always saves me" (Phil. 133-134). Sophocles 
shows us that indeed, Victory is Odysseus' salvation (Phil. 
109) and final goal when later in the play, he declares that 
he is, by nature, the sort of man who wants to win in all 
circumstances (nikan ge mentoi pantachou chrezon ephun, Phil. 
1052). This winning is defined both in terms of the success 
of his deceitful scheme and his aim to appropriate the honor 
that was due to Philoctetes in the battle at Troy. When 
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odysseus has finally secured the bow through the assistance 
of Neoptolemus he declares that Philoctetes is now superfluous 
and that the gift of honor from the Greeks will now be 
apportioned to him (hemeis d' iomen kai tach' an to son 
geras/timen emoi neimeien, Phil. 1061-1062). Contrary to 
Neoptolemus who declares that he would rather fail acting 
nobly than win acting wickedly (Phil. 94-95), Odysseus 
declares that he must win in any and every circumstance 
whether it be by wicked or noble means. 
It is very unlikely, it seems to me that Odysseus is 
really a public servant at all. Sophocles has Philoctetes 
reveal the damning evidence that Odysseus was unwilling to 
serve the Greeks at all by going to fight in their behalf at 
Troy. 15 Philoctetes bitterly expresses his outrage at having 
been dishonorably abandoned (atimon ebalon, Phil. 1028) by 
Odysseus and the Atreidae when he freely volunteered to fight 
and Odysseus had to be tricked and forced to go (klope te 
kananke zugeis/epleis ham' autois, Phil. 1025-1026). 16 In this 
way Sophocles shows us the hypocrisy of Odysseus who claims 
to be only serving the public interest through his scheme 
when, in fact, he was himself forced by deceit and necessity 
to go to Troy. Truly it was Philoctetes who was the public 
servant not Odysseus. The tragedian, furthermore, points to 
15According to legend Odysseus attempts to skirt fighting 
at Troy by feigning madness. 
16See Rose, "Philoctetes and the Sophists," 93-94. 
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the irony of Odysseus' continual appeals to necessity and the 
use of deceit in order to secure Philoctetes' bow when it was 
precisely these two things which had to be used on Odysseus 
in order to get him to carry out his public duty to the 
Greeks. In this way I contend, Odysseus' pretensions to being 
a faithful, public servant appear to be dubious. 
It is my opinion that Sophocles intends for us to view 
the son of Laertes as a panourgos, an individual who is 
willing to do and say whatever is necessary in order to 
achieve his own goals. 17 The true character of Odysseus is 
revealed through the figure of Philoctetes with whom the 
tragedian is in fundamental sympathy. 18 Upon hearing Neop-
17See Knox, The Heroic Temper, pp. 124-125; H. D. F. 
Kitto, Form and Meaning in Drama {London, Methuen and Co. 
Ltd., 1956), pp. 108-109. 
18It seems to me that it is possible to assert that the 
tragedian is in basic sympathy with the character of Philoc-
tetes for a number of reasons. First, Sophocles shows us that 
it is Philoctetes who awakens the son of Achilles to a sense 
of his real moral identity by acting as a role model for the 
young man ( see chapter 2) . Second, Sophocles assigns to 
Philoctetes the final and devastating statement on the 
character of Odysseus when the latter is ignominiously run off 
the stage: 
You must know this much at any rate: these so-called 
foremost of the army are the Greeks' false heralds. They 
are bold with their words but cowards at the spear point 
(kakous/ontas pros aichmen en de tois logois thraseis, 
f.hil. 1306-1307). 
Once again, in this way Sophocles alludes to Odysseus' belief 
in and commitment to the power of words over deeds which the 
son of Laertes stated earlier (Phil. 96-99). Finally, 
Philoctetes' healing and reinstatement into society, in spite 
of his wildness (Phil. 1321) and unyielding nature (Phil. 
1321-1323, 1343, 1352, 1386, 1388, 1392, 1393-1396) show 
Sophocles' fundamental sympathy with the suffering hero. 
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tolemus' tale, 19 Philoctetes proclaims: 
Yes, I know that he would attempt every wicked argument 
with his tongue and any form of criminality (panourgias) 
in which he would be willing to do everything unjust in 
order to attain his end (meden dikaion es telos melloi 
poein, Phil. 407-409). 
Philoctetes gives voice to the very expediency which we have 
seen Odysseus exercise in the course of our discussion. 
According to Philoctetes, Odysseus is the sort of man for whom 
the end will justify any means to its attainment. Sophocles 
has Philoctetes point to the very etymology of the word 
panourgia in his mention of Odysseus' willingness to both do 
and say anything. This etymological reference is made in even 
more explicit terms in a later passage where Philoctetes 
describes Odysseus as, "the one who says all things and dares 
all things" (all' est' ekeino panta lekta panta de/tolmeta, 
Phil. 633-634) . zo Finally, Sophocles indicates a close 
connection between Odysseus and villainy when Philoctetes 
unleashes a torrent of abuse upon Neoptolemus for having 
19Philoctetes' mention of Odysseus' villainy and injus-
tice is strategically placed here by Sophocles as a response 
to Neoptolemus' own lying tale about how he lost his patrimony 
to Odysseus. Thus, Philoctetes is making his statement to one 
who is actually in the grip of the very one being condemned. 
Sophocles' notorious irony is again at work. But the irony 
carries a point because it is this very panourgia (which 
Neoptolemus is practicing on Philoctetes through his lying 
tale) that will soon come down on the young man's own head in 
the form of harsh condemnation from Philoctetes (Phil. 927). 
~See Blundell, "Odysseus in Philoctetes," 315-316. 
Blundell refers to the excellent passage (38d-39a) in Plato's 
Apology further to illustrate the meaning of panourgia. 
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deceived him. When Philoctetes begs Neoptolemus to give him 
his bow back and the young man refuses based upon a very 
odyssean appeal to impersonal expediency and having to listen 
to "those in power," (Phil. 925-926) Philoctetes cries out, 
"You utter fire and terror, you hateful master work of 
terrible villainy" (panourgias/deines technem' echthiston, 
Phil. 927-928)! Philoctetes is condemning Neoptolemus for 
surpassing even Odysseus in his willingness to do or say 
anything in order to achieve his goal. 
In summary then, I have argued in this section that the 
term which best suits Odysseus is panourgos inasmuch as he is 
willing to say or do anything in the interests of achieving 
his own goals. I have argued that the tragedian indicates 
that we are to understand Odysseus in this fashion in a number 
of different ways. First of all, Odysseus is characterized 
by this term on several occasions by Philoctetes with whom, 
I have argued, Sophocles is in fundamental sympathy. The 
tragedian identifies Odysseus with the works of a panourgos 
and shows that he is aware of the etymological meaning of the 
term in his drama. Second, Sophocles indicates Odysseus' 
basic irresponsibility through his consistent employment of 
the Greek ruu which, as I have argued, signifies Odysseus' 
attempt to remove himself from moral responsibility through 
the subterfuge of appealing to impersonal necessities which 
simply dictate what he must do. Again, this is a strategy by 
which Odysseus seeks to accord himself free reign to do 
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whatever he wants to do. Third, Odysseus' inconsistent use 
of moral terms is indicative of a moral cynicism that points 
in the end, to panourgia. Finally, it has been my contention 
that the son of Laertes is driven fundamentally by selfish 
goals and not the general good of the community. This is 
shown by the way in which the tragedian reveals that Odysseus 
is really after victory (in any circumstance) and the desire 
to be given the gift of honor from the Greeks that should be 
given to Philoctetes. I have indicated that Sophocles 
furnishes us with further evidence that Odysseus is not 
motivated by serving the needs of the community through 
Philoctetes' damning revelation that the son of Laertes 
refused to go to Troy and had to be tricked and forced to go. 
In all of these ways then Sophocles presents us with an 
example of impoverished and defective human agency. 
4.4 Aristotle On Cleverness, Practical Wisdom And Villainy 
In this section I shall set forth Aristotle's own very 
brief discussion of villainy (panourgia) in Nicomachean Ethics 
vr.12. Aristotle's discussion of villainy is placed within 
a larger analysis of the nature of cleverness and practical 
wisdom. The distinctions that Aristotle draws between these 
three things will help us to understand philosophically the 
nature of villainy. Through his philosophical analysis, 
Aristotle will help us to understand two things about the 
character of Odysseus: first, that he employs a potentially 
good trait (i.e. the ability to determine and execute the most 
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efficient means to a given end) in the service of wicked goals 
and second that villainy is the sort of thing that is an 
habitual disposition. According to Aristotle, then, there is 
a certain incorrigibility that is attached to the notion of 
panourgia. Both of these aspects of Odysseus' character are 
brought out, in fact, in the play but the medium of philo-
sophical discourse is more peculiarly suited to the analysis 
of these particular aspects of the character of Odysseus. 
At Nicomachean Ethics VI.12 Aristotle talks of moral 
virtue and practical wisdom in terms of means and ends. He 
asserts that virtue makes the target correct (he men gar arete 
ton skopon poiei orthon, EN 1144a7-8) and practical wisdom 
makes us use the right means (he de phronesis ta pros touton, 
EN 1144a8-9}. It is the presence of virtue, Aristotle says, 
which makes a person's choice right (EN 1144a20}, but it is 
part of a different capacity to determine the steps which must 
be taken in order to implement that choice (EN 1144a22). It 
is at this point that Aristotle introduces his notion of 
cleverness, simultaneously defining and distinguishing it from 
practical wisdom (phronesis) and villainy (panourgia). 
Cleverness (deinotes) is an indeterminate capacity (dunamis) 21 
to perform those steps which are conducive to a proposed 
target or goal and to attain that goal (haute d' esti toiaute 
hoste ta pros ton hupotethenta skopon sunteinonta dunasthai 
21 As opposed to a determinate disposition (hexis, cf. EN 
II.5) which is achieved through habituation. 
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~µta prattein kai tunchanein autou, EN 1144a24-26) . As 
indeterminate it is a capacity or ability of oppposites. 22 If 
the target is noble, cleverness deserves praise (epainete, EN 
1144a26), but if the target is worthless or base (phaulos, EN 
1144a26) then cleverness is utter villainy or criminality 
(panourgia, EN 1144a26). It is because cleverness and 
practical wisdom resemble each other (in that both are 
concerned with determining and implementing the most effective 
means for achieving chosen ends) that Aristotle says that the 
practically wise are called clever and knavish (deinous kai 
panourgous, EN 1144a27-28). 23 Practical wisdom is not this 
capacity which he terms cleverness but it is also not without 
this capacity (EN 1144a28-29). It is only when this "eye of 
the soul" (deinotes) is coupled with virtue that it becomes 
the determinate disposition of practical wisdom (he d' hexis 
to ommati touto ginetai tes psuches ouk aneu aretes, EN 
1144a29-30) . 24 If deinotes is, on the other hand, coupled with 
viciousness it becomes villainy or that willingness to do 
anything which is panourgia. In this way Aristotle argues 
that the end which is best, whatever that may be, appears only 
to the good person (epeide toionde to telos kai to ariston 
hotidepote on touto d' ei me to agatho ou phainetai, EN 
22see J. A. Stewart, Notes, 2:214. 
23Plato uses the term playfully in Meno 80b7. 
24see Pierre Aubenque, La Prudence Chez Aristote (Paris, 
Presses Universitaires de France, 1963), pp. 61-63. 
1144a32-34). 
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For it is she who, with the requisite moral 
virtues, is attracted to those ends which contribute to her 
own (and the wider community's) flourishing. Wickedness on 
the other hand, (mochtheria, EN 1144a35) twists and causes one 
to be utterly deceived about the first principles of action 
(diastrephei gar he mochtheria kai diapseudesthai poiei peri 
tas praktikas archas, EN 1144a34-36). In this way, Aristotle 
affirms that a character distorted by vice is incapable of 
rightly discerning and acting for his own good. Thus, 
according to Aristotle, it is impossible to be practically 
wise unless one is good. 
From Aristotle's discussion thus far we can see that 
villainy or criminality is a kind of cleverness (deinotes) 
gone bad. This conception of villainy (panourgia) is in 
accord with Sophocles' depiction of the character of Odysseus. 
One of the traits that is actually admirable in him as a 
character is precisely his ability to be able to determine the 
most effective means to attaining his goal. His focus on 
efficiency is well displayed in the scheme which he devises 
to obtain Philoctetes' bow. He displays then, in some sense, 
what Aristotle calls cleverness (deinotes) . But this ad-
mirable trait is invariably employed with a view to wicked 
ends and it is this which Aristotle (and Sophocles) term 
panourgia. Ultimately, Aristotle would understand Odysseus' 
practice of panourgia as a failure of moral virtue. His own 
wickedness distorts his perception concerning the fundamental 
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principles of action and so his admirable ability with respect 
to determining means to ends (what Aristotle calls the "eye 
of the soul" in EN 1144a30) is skewed and directed to ends of 
dubious moral rectitude. 
While cleverness is an indeterminate capacity which can 
be used for good or evil, Aristotle sees practical wisdom and 
villainy as a determinate disposition which has come into 
being through repeated use. 25 Stewart puts the matter well: 
Cleverness is the power of discovering and employing the 
means which lead to any end which happens to be in view, 
no account being taken, so far as the notion of deinotes 
is concerned, of the morality of the end. Deinotes, of 
course, operates largely in non-moral fields, where it 
undergoes no transformation: but in the moral field, when 
it is habitually enlisted in the cause of a good end, it 
becomes the hexis of phronesis; when habitually enlisted 
in the cause of a bad end, the hexis of panourgia. 26 
In this way then Aristotle sees villainy as a settled disposi-
tion (hexis) in which an individual characteristically employs 
his talent with a view to vicious ends. Sophocles does not 
25The notion that certain traits develop in a person 
through repeated action is, of course, in accord with 
Aristotle's general understanding of the nature of moral 
virtue. He states this most succintly in Nicomachean Ethics 
II.1 where he says: "The same holds true of the virtues: in 
our transactions with other men it is by action that some 
become just and others unjust, and it is by acting in the face 
of danger and by developing the habit of feeling fear or 
confidence that some become brave men and others cowards. The 
same applies to the appetites and feelings of anger: by 
reacting in one way or in another to given circumstances some 
people become self-controlled and gentle, and others self-
indulgent and short-tempered. In a word, characteristics 
(hexeis) develop from corresponding activities. For that 
reason, we must see to it that our activities are of a certain 
kind, since any variations in them will be reflected in our 
characteristics." (EN 1103b13-23, Ostwald, p. 34). 
26stewart, Notes, 2 : 1 o 1. 
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furnish us with a technical term such as Aristotle's hexis for 
signifying the perduring nature of Odysseus' vice. This is 
more part of the task of philosophy. But he confirms the 
incorrigible nature of panourgia in his drama through the 
character of Philoctetes. Sophocles calls attention to the 
fact that Odysseus has reached a settled disposition of moral 
viciousness when Philoctetes excuses Neoptolemus for his 
involvement in Odysseus' scheme and blames the young man's 
behavior on the nefarious influence of the son of Laertes 
(Phil. 961f., 984, 1369). Neoptolemus, he says, is unworthy 
of the likes of Odysseus (because of the former's moral 
superiority) and, since he did not know any better, he played 
the part of a kind of screen or front (problema, Phil. 1008) 
for Odysseus. Odysseus' wicked soul, he continues, was always 
peering through the recesses of the young man's mind in order 
to see how he could teach Neoptolemus to be clever at wicked-
ness (en kakois einai sophon, Phil. 1015). Thus, Sophocles 
shows us, through the character of Philoctetes, that he is 
aware of the distinction between a wicked act (which Neop-
tolemus has committed) and a warped disposition in which the 
individual is characteristically involved in deeds that are 
morally reprehensible. Sophocles shows us his understanding 
of the nature of moral virtue through his depiction of 
Philoctetes' sensitivity to the moral significance of the pain 
that the young man feels from being involved in Odysseus' 
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27 S' th' ' d ' scheme. ince is pain an remorse are present, Philoctetes 
cannot unqualifiedly label Neoptolemus wicked (kakos) the way 
that he does Odysseus and the Atreidae (Phil. 984, 1369). In 
his discussion of the nature of panourgia, then, Aristotle 
confirms the perduring nature of the character flaw of the 
villain (panourgos) by designating his moral condition with 
the term hexis. In this way, he confirms what Sophocles is 
saying about the character of Odysseus when the son of Laertes 
is called panourgos during the course of the drama. 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have maintained that the figure of 
Odysseus acts as a kind of anti-type and that, according to 
the ancient anthropology of Sophocles and Aristotle, there is 
a crucial place for the use of such examples in the positive 
formation of the moral agent. For the ancients, the witness-
ing of such a negative exemplar was viewed as an education in 
how one ought not to act and the kind of person that one ought 
not to become . I have also maintained that modern moral 
philosophy, stemming from Kant, has lost sight of the critical 
educational role that the exemplar plays in the moral educa-
tion of the individual. This is, indeed, something that the 
ancients have to teach us. 
I have argued in a number of ways that the character of 
Odysseus is basically that of a villain. I have explored his 
Vsee Blundell, "The Phusis of Neoptolemus," 141. 
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villainy mostly by way of an analysis of his refusal to accept 
responsibility for his own acts and his basic denial of the 
reality of choice. I have shown these things through an 
examination of his language (his consistent preference for dei 
over chre, his manipulation of moral terms) and through 
arguing that he is not motivated by a concern for the larger 
community in his pursuit of Philoctetes' bow, but for self-
aggrandizement. Sophocles not only has Odysseus be called a 
panourgos in the course of the drama but demonstrates an 
awareness of the etymological roots of the term in its 
application to the character of Odysseus. In this way, the 
tragedian confirms the argument which I have been attempting 
to make with respect to Odysseus, namely, that he is the sort 
of person who is willing to do or say anything in order to 
achieve his own goals. Aristotle contributes to this chapter 
through his further analysis and illumination of the meaning 
of panourgia in philosophical terms. Aristotle helps us to 
see that Odysseus has a potentially valuable ability (i.e., 
that of being capable of determining the most efficient means 
to a given end and attaining it), but that because of a 
fundamental flaw in his character his otherwise excellent 
capacity is vitiated by being put to the service of wicked 
ends. In his discussion of the nature of panourgia, Aristotle 
also furnishes us with the philosophical term hexis which well 
describes the settled state of Odysseus' character defect 
depicted in the drama. In this way Aristotle confirms the 
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incorrigible nature of the character of Odysseus whom the 
tragedian depicts as invariably employing his formidable 
powers with a view to wicked ends. We shall see then that we 
must look to the son of Achilles for an example of a richer 
and more authentic paradigm of what it means to make a choice, 
take responsibility for that choice and exercise authentic 
human agency. 
CHAPTER 5 
CHOICE AND RESPONSIBILITY IN SOPHOCLES AND ARISTOTLE: 
THE CHARACTER OF NEOPTOLEMUS 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we saw how the figure of 
Odysseus acted as a sort of anti-type, an example of inauthen-
tic human agency. In this chapter we turn to the character 
of Neoptolemus as a fine example of excellent human agency. 
It is in the character of Neoptolemus that we can see that 
many of the themes of Sophocles' and Aristotle's anthropology 
come together and are brought to fruition in the profound 
choice which the son of Achilles makes. Thus, through the 
figure of Neoptolemus, we witness excellent deliberation that 
is directed toward a good end; a mature individual who assumes 
personal responsibility for his acts; and the integration of 
reason and emotion that results in excellent choice. Thus, 
Neoptolemus achieves the harmonious integration of the various 
elements of his psyche that we have been arguing is an 
essential ingredient to the attainment of authentic human 
agency. 
Once again, the use of examples as a mode of moral 
education would be viewed by someone working in the Kantian 
tradition as of dubious worth. This is because of the 
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abstract nature of the Kantian conception of moral philosophy 
in which nothing empirical can contribute to an understanding 
of what our duty is. The demand for the sort of standard that 
admits of no exceptions is, it would seem to me, an unreason-
able one and does not take into account, as the ancient view 
clearly does, the contingent character of ethics. The 
ancients had a healthy sense that things in the human realm 
held only "for the most part" and that, in this way, it would 
be entirely appropriate to appeal to a particular individual 
as a standard for living the moral life. 
In addition, the Kantian conception of the moral agent 
would not see that the profound psychological integration that 
Neoptolemus achieves (and that is represented by Aristotle's 
prohairesis) would be of any significance with respect to his 
excellence as a moral agent. Kant shows his indifference to 
the moral significance of such integration in the way that he 
tends to accept the notion that reason and inclination are 
in conflict and that the latter will have to be overcome by 
the former in order that one's duty may be carried out. This 
is in marked contrast to the ideal of the well-integrated 
individual that we see in the ancient model. Thus, the 
ancient anthropology does more justice to the whole person by 
seeing such integration into an unconflicted whole as an 
excellence and understanding that the one who acts from this 
state has made a greater moral achievement than the one who 
must overcome himself. 
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As a corollary to this anthropology I have employed the 
poet to furnish us with the affective and immediate aspects 
of human experience, while the philosopher will provide us 
with a logos which will serve to explain and unify the various 
phenomena that the dramatist furnishes. Let us take a closer 
look at this before proceeding to our formal analysis. 
Sophocles situates the son of Achilles in the interest-
ing position at the mid-point between the character of 
Odysseus, who consistently uses the verb of external neces-
sity, dei, and the character of Philoctetes, who consistently 
employs the verb of internal necessity, chre. Under the 
influence of Odysseus, Neoptolemus at first shuns personal 
responsibility and employs some of the very same language 
which Odysseus does throughout the play (dei, verbal adjec-
tives of necessity), but, unlike Odysseus, he becomes painful-
ly aware of the incongruity that exists between this irrespon-
sibility and his own sense of personal integrity and justice. 
The great skill of the dramatist is revealed as Neoptolemus' 
moral awakening is signaled not only by how his actions change 
but also by the way that he rejects the characteristically 
Odyssean practice of hiding behind such vague abstractions as 
"necessity" and "expediency" or by denying personal respon-
sibility through a lame appeal to one's superiors. Sophocles 
powerfully depicts the way in which Neoptolemus' moral 
bewilderment forces him into a long and wrenching silence in 
which he painfully deliberates about what he is to do. This 
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deliberation results in a profound decision to undo the wrong 
which he now knows and feels that he did by obtaining Philoc-
tetes' bow by deception. His decision sets him at odds with 
his former "teacher" Odysseus, but he boldly opposes him armed 
with a new conception of what is just, wise and good (Phil. 
1244-1251). Neoptolemus will no longer countenance Odysseus' 
justice of expediency and irresponsibility but acts now with 
a tremendous sense of moral responsibility and in accordance 
with a conception of justice which respects the integrity of 
Philoctetes. Sophocles shows us furthermore that the son of 
Achilles achieves a new and powerful sense of his own moral 
identity through the making of his decision. His former 
hesitation and uncertainty are gone and he acts with a 
refreshing sense of urgency and boldness. Whereas formerly 
he was in emotional turmoil, we see that now he has become 
reconciled to himself and is no longer a victim of his own 
remorse. We witness a young man who is now self-assured and 
no longer bullied by the force of Odysseus' personality or 
rhetorical finesse. He has literally grown up on stage. 
It will be my contention in this chapter that Aris-
totle's concept of choice or deliberate decision (prohairesis) 
bears many resemblances to what Sophocles depicts through the 
character of Neoptolemus in his play. His searching analysis 
of the nature of prohairesis and its relationship to moral 
virtue will aid us in coming to a philosophical understanding 
of the choice which the character Neoptolemus makes. Most 
165 
notably in this connection we shall appreciate the role of 
deliberation, the moral maturity and responsibility that true 
decisions involve as well as how right decisions are motivated 
by emotion which is in harmony with reason (EN 1139a25f.). 
This latter is, for Aristotle and Sophocles, complete and 
authentic human agency. Neoptolemus struggles throughout much 
of the play to make a choice and to claim responsibility for 
both his choice and his moral identity. This is reflected in 
the emotional pain and shame that he feels for Philoctetes 
(Phil. 902-3) as well as in his struggle to employ the term 
chre, which, as we have argued above, is indicative of a 
person's choosing a certain course of action and identifying 
one's purposes with it as opposed to seeing a course of action 
as imposed upon one. By the close of the play Neoptolemus' 
earlier hesitancy is gone and Sophocles shows us that Neop-
tolemus' deliberate decision enables him to act boldly on 
behalf of justice and friendship in opposition to Odysseus' 
scheme of ethical expediency. 
5.2 Claiming Responsibility And The Pain Of Deliberation 
Sophocles graphically illustrates Neoptolemus' struggle 
to throw off the nefarious influence of Odysseus and to claim 
responsibility for his actions in the scene shortly after 
Philoctetes regains consciousness from his attack. It is here 
that he says that his usual way or manner (ethos) will "set 
him straight." Neoptolemus cries out in pain, "papai" and for 
the first time in the play uses chre, "I don't know which way 
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I should turn my faltering words" (ouk oid' hopoi chre taporon 
trepein epos, Phil. 897). He is on the verge of disclosing 
to Philoctetes the real story with regard to their destination 
and so is about to put an end to the use of deceit (dolos) in 
favor of employing persuasion (peitho). In short, he is 
attempting to take some measure of responsibility for what he 
intends to do with Philoctetes. But he is in terrible pain 
(tout' aniomai palai, Phil. 906, 913), is utterly ashamed of 
himself (aischros phanoumai, Phil. 906) and cannot determine 
which course of action to take (oh Zeu ti draso;, Phil. 908). 
At last he determines that he will no longer hide the truth 
from Philoctetes (ouden se krupso, Phil. 915) but he couches 
the entire revelation in characteristically Odyssean terms of 
external necessity: Philoctetes must sail to Troy (dei gar es 
Troian se plein, Phil. 915); a Great Necessity ordains that 
these things happen (polle kratei/ touton ananke, Phil. 921-
22). When Philoctetes demands his bow back from Neoptolemus 
with whom he has entrusted it, he is met with these harsh 
words: 
It is not possible to do so, for justice and expediency 
make me listen to those who are in power (all' ouch hoion 
te ton gar en telei kluein/ to t' endikon me kai to 
sumpheron poei, Phil. 925-6) . 1 
1It is interesting to see Neoptolemus using the language 
of Thrasymachus in Republic I in order to justify his actions. 
According to Thrasymachus, justice is whatever is expedient 
(to sumpheron) for the stronger. But Neoptolemus is clearly 
no Thrasymachus in character. Whatever he may say at this 
point is not at all in accord with what he is feeling. It 
seems to me that he is employing this kind of language as a 
kind of shield against the persistent feelings that he is 
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These appeals to necessity are as we have seen, characteristic 
of Odysseus and his way of describing moral situations. 
The present passage is interesting in the way that it 
echoes 385-388. We argued that the earlier passage represent-
ed Neoptolemus' covert attempt to excuse not Odysseus but 
himself from culpability in what he was doing. He says that 
he does not lay the blame so much upon Odysseus as those in 
power (hos taus en telei, Phil. 385) inasmuch as the entire 
polis is under their jurisdiction and thus, he concludes, the 
unruly (hoi akosmountes, Phil. 387) are wicked because of the 
instruction of their teachers. In this way Neoptolemus, under 
the guise of exonerating Odysseus, frees himself from respon-
sibility. Presently, we see Neoptolemus doing practically the 
same thing with the significant difference of being all but 
incapable of maintaining the lie. We can tell that this is 
so inasmuch as in the former passage Sophocles has Neoptolemus 
precede blithely from his lying tale to a covert justification 
of his action by means of exculpating Odysseus. In the 
present passage Sophocles precedes Neoptolemus' appeals to 
these Odyssean abstractions of necessity with a declaration 
of disgust at himself for having abandoned his nature in order 
to become engaged in a scheme which does violence to his moral 
identity (hapanta duschereia ten hautou phusin/hotan lipon tis 
having for Philoctetes which are interfering with his ability 
to carry out Odysseus' scheme. He is trying to maintain 
Odyssean "objectivity" even as his desire to maintain this 
position is faltering and will (eventually) prove to be 
untenable. 
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_gi:a ta me proseikota, Phil. 902-903) . In this way, the 
tragedian shows us that the son of Achilles is at the breaking 
point and his appeals to such Odyssean standards as necessity 
and expediency are a last ditch effort to avoid facing himself 
and, ultimately, the broken man whom he has betrayed (Phil. 
923-924). 
It is during Neoptolemus' painful silences that he is 
deliberating upon the fundamental change of purpose which he 
will make at the close of the play. Sophocles indicates this 
effectively through the way in which Neoptolemus' silences are 
punctuated with sudden exclamations of bewilderment as to what 
he should do (Phil. 908, 969,974). Neoptolemus is pondering 
over his course of action in a very complex situation and 
Sophocles shows us that this sort of soul searching evokes 
pain, confusion and silence. When Philoctetes begs 
Neoptolemus not to take away the bow which sustains him, he 
groans in despair because the son of Achilles will no longer 
speak to him but looks away as if the young man will never 
give it up (all' oude prosphonei m' eti/ all' hos metheson 
mepoth' hod' hora palin, fillil. 934-5, cf. also 950-1). 
Philoctetes imploringly commands Neoptolemus to become himself 
again (alla nun et' en sautou genou, Phil. 950) but, receiving 
no answer (ti phes; siopas, Phil. 951), sinks into despair 
(ouden eim' ho dusmoros, Phil. 951). The Chorus, too, is in 
a state of confusion (aporia) and asserts that everything, its 
sailing off or acceding to Philoctetes' pleas, is up to 
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Neoptolemus (en soi, Phil. 963). Neoptolemus is beginning to 
see that he can no longer continue to make empty appeals to 
Necessity (Phil. 921-922) or expediency (Phil. 926) in order 
to excuse himself from making a responsible decision. The 
simplistic, non-commital, amoral stance of the son of Laertes 
has become untenable. In one of the most moving lines of the 
play, Neoptolemus cries out ( in the grammatical form of 
unattainable wish) that he is so distressed with the situation 
he is in that he wishes he had never left his home in Scyros 
(oimoi ti draso; me pot' ophelon lipein/ ten Skuron houto tois 
parousin achthomai, Phil. 969-70} . In this way Sophocles 
points to the fact that Neoptolemus knows that he must make 
a fundamental decision and in his confusion and pain he 
expresses the nostalgic wish that he had never left Scyros, 
had morally speaking never been confronted with the need to 
make the sort of painful, adult decision that is part of being 
morally responsible. 2 Regarding the decision which he knows 
he must make very seriously, Neoptolemus utters the painful 
question, "What do we do men?" (ti dromen andres;, Phil. 974}, 
and then falls into silence for the next one hundred lines of 
the play, one of the most anguished and significant silences 
in all of Greek tragedy. 3 
2see Blundell, "The Phusis of Neoptolemus," 141. 
3see Kitto, Form and Meaning, pp. 123-124. Kitto makes 
the excellent suggestion that Neoptolemus should be placed at 
center stage with the bow in his hand for the hundred lines 
in which he is silent. By being placed strategically between 
Odysseus and Philoctetes like this, the pain of Neoptolemus' 
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The response of Philoctetes at this point in the play 
is interesting and instructive with regard to the issues of 
choice, responsibility and moral virtue. It may be the last 
thing that Neoptolemus should hear now (inasmuch as he is 
struggling to take personal responsibility for his actions), 
but Philoctetes does not blame the young man for what he has 
done, but blames Odysseus. Because of Neoptolemus' hesitancy 
and pain Philoctetes knows that the son of Achilles has not 
acted wickedly from a settled disposition. He is sensitive 
to the fact that the young man is still, as it were, in the 
process of formation and so retains faith in his fundamental 
goodness of character. He says to Neoptolemus: 
You are not wicked, but you seem to have come [here) 
having learned disgraceful things at the hands of wicked 
men. But now, having given shameful things to others to 
whom it belongs, sail away. (ouk ei kakos su pros kakon 
d' andron mathon/ eoikas hekein aischra. nun d' alloisi 
deus/ hoi' eikos ekplei, Phil. 971-973.) 
Though Philoctetes knows that Neoptolemus has done shameful 
things, he still affirms that the young man is unworthy of the 
likes of Odysseus (anaxion men sou, Phil. 1009). Similarly, 
he hesitates to curse the young man with destruction (oloio 
me po, .Phil- 961), as he does continually of Odysseus and the 
Atreidae, because he still retains the hope that Neoptolemus 
will change his mind and repent (gnomen metoiseis, Phil. 962, 
both notions are contained in this expression). 
By having Philoctetes distinguish a particular action 
deliberations, the urgency of making a choice and the pathos 
of his situation will be most effectively brought forth. 
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which an agent may perform from his general moral make-up 
Sophocles demonstrates a profound understanding of the nature 
of moral virtue. What he is pointing to here is the notion 
that the virtues are certain qualitative dispositions which 
cannot be destroyed (or even fully disclosed) through a single 
action but are developed and revealed through the kinds of 
choices, actions and commitments that an individual charac-
teristically makes. In this way, Philoctetes not only 
understands and legitimately excuses Neoptolemus' behavior, 
he focuses upon the significant choice which the son of 
Achilles has yet to make inasmuch as he points to the promise 
that has not yet been extinguished in the character of 
Neoptolemus by the wicked actions he has committed. 4 He 
understands that those actions have not yet taken up permanent 
residence in the soul of Neoptolemus. It is to that choice 
that we shall now turn. 
4Philoctetes, who has an adamantine sense of self, is 
completely in character by calling attention to the choice 
which the son of Achilles has yet to make. If Odysseus seeks 
to hide from himself and Neoptolemus is seeking to define 
himself, Philoctetes boldly asserts himself and the direction 
of his will, even when there are no options left to him. In 
complete opposition to Odysseus he almost always (excepting 
those times when it is not grammatically feasible) employs 
chre over dei. When he realizes that he has been duped by 
Neoptolemus and that the son of Achilles will not return his 
bow, he cries out, "What should I do?" (ti chre me dran;, 
Phil. 949) as if he still retained some sort of say in the 
matter. The most striking instance of his use of chre comes 
in his response to Odysseus at line 999. Odysseus has just 
told Philoctetes that he must (dei) capture Troy and raze it 
to the ground by force, and Philoctetes responds that he will 
never do so not even if he must (chre) suffer death (oudepote 
g' oud' en chre me pan pathein kakon). 
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5.3 Neoptolemus' Choice 
Although Sophocles never actually portrays Neoptolemus 
making his decision it is clear that he has made a profound 
choice when he returns to the stage with Odysseus. Odysseus 
refers to Neoptolemus deliberating about something new (mon 
ti bouleue neon;, Phil. 1229), but it is quite apparent that 
whatever deliberating there has been has already taken place. 
Neoptolemus has made a fundamental choice and this has come 
as a result of the lonely and agonizing deliberation which 
preceded his decision (Phil. 897, 906, 908, 913}. We sense, 
too, that something has happened to Neoptolemus. He is much 
more assured of himself. He knows his mind and his earlier 
hesitancy has vanished. Somehow, through the prior struggle 
and the deliberate decision which has issued forth from that 
struggle, the son of Achilles has achieved a certain coherence 
of character which he formerly lacked. In this final scene 
of the Philoctetes we witness both how Neoptolemus' decision 
has shaped who he is, or perhaps better, who he has become and 
we see how this very decision has put an end to the confusion 
and inner division that has plagued him ever since he en-
countered Philoctetes. Neoptolemus is no longer victimized 
by his own inner discord (Phil. 897, 902-903, 969-970, 1011-
1012} , but has, through the purposeful choice that he has 
resolved upon, brought about an inner reconciliation and 
concord where formerly, there was only strife and discord. 
The profundity and moral maturity of the choice that has 
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been made are brilliantly depicted by Sophocles through the 
evident reversal of role that has taken place between Odysseus 
and Neoptolemus. 5 It was formerly Odysseus who initiated 
action and utterly dominated the young man (Phil. 50-57, 77-
85, 96-99, 111), but now Neoptolemus holds the reins and 
Odysseus breathlessly tries to keep pace with him wondering 
anxiously what the son of Achilles will do next (Phil. 1222-
1223, 1229). Neoptolemus asserts that by returning the bow 
he will undo (luson, Phil. 1224) the unjust and disgraceful 
harm (Phil. 1234) that he has committed against Philoctetes 
(Phil. 1232). Odysseus, who is morally incapable of under-
standing Neoptolemus' motives, asks whether the young man is 
mocking him by saying these things (Phil. 1235). Neoptolemus 
elegantly responds, "Yes, if to speak the truth is mockery" 
(ei kertomesis esti talethe legein, Phil. 1236). Nowhere is 
the complete moral turn around6 of Neoptolemus more finely 
5see Kamerbeek, The Plays of Sophocles, p. 166. Kamer-
beek's comments on this passage (Phil. 1225-28, 1230-33) are 
relevant in showing how Sophocles heightens the sense of haste 
and moral urgency by his use of stichomythia: "Instance of 
syntactically closely knit stichomythia. Again 12 3 0-12 3 3 . 
Hamartia picks up exemarton, hen picks up hamartia and is 
internal accusative with pithomenos, here the omitted main 
verb in the first person is replaced by the second person in 
Odysseus' line 1227 with its object ergon poion, and in 
Neoptolemus' 1228 helon is predicative adjunct with either 
<exemarton> or (better) <epraxa ergon hon ou moi prepon>." 
6Note the powerful metaphorical resonance of Odysseus 
calling Neoptolemus' return to Philoctetes a "back-turning 
path" (palintropos keleuthon, Phil. 1222-1223). In this way 
Sophocles indicates that the path that the son of Achilles is 
taking is one in which he will attempt to undo the harm and 
error that he has committed by getting himself involved in 
Odysseus' scheme ( luson hos' exemarton en to prin chrono, 
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depicted than in the sureness and finesse of this simple 
response. Neoptolemus asserts that the truth has been spoken 
and the real story has finally come out (Phil. 1240). 7 The 
son of Achilles is now a man of bold words as well as bold 
action. When Odysseus threatens to prevent him with the force 
of the entire Achaean army, he taunts the son of Laertes 
(renowned, of course, for his cleverness) for the foolishness 
of his words (Phil. 1244) . Through the newly achieved 
discovery of his moral identity and the fundamental choice 
concomitant with that discovery Neoptolemus clearly sees that 
the claims of justice are more powerful than the clever and 
manipulative schemes of Odysseus (all' ei dikaia ton sophon 
kreisso tade, Phil. 1246). The kind of justice that Neop-
tolemus is appealing to here is clearly quite different from 
the sort of expediency which Odysseus earlier urged Neop-
tolemus to pursue by grasping for a "sweet portion of victory" 
(Phil. 81). With true justice on his side, that is, with a 
conception of justice which respects the dignity of persons, 
Neoptolemus proclaims that he does not fear Odysseus and the 
Greek army but is prepared for whatever the future may bring 
fhil. 1224). 
7Whereas formerly each time the "whole story" was said 
to be told or heard it was preface to a lie about to be said 
or one which had already been spoken (241, 389,620), now the 
real "whole story" comes out and it is the logos of Neop-
tolemus' discovery of his moral identity, his making repara-
tion to Philoctetes for his hamartia and his restoration to 
the latter's friendship. 
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The wisdom and justice that Neoptolemus has achieved 
through his suffering and fundamental decision is further 
shown by Sophocles in the way that Neoptolemus completely 
rejects the former use of deceit (dolos) and force (bia) and 
turns now to persuasion (peitho) in order to get Philoctetes 
to leave Lemnos and come to Troy. 9 When Neoptolemus seeks 
out Philoctetes to return his bow to him he goes bearing words 
which he demands that Philoctetes hear (logous d' akouson hous 
heko pheron, Phil. 1267). He claims that Philoctetes has 
become wild and intractable (egriosai, Phil. 1321) and so 
rejects and treats as an enemy anyone who may admonish him 
with even his own best interests in mind (ean te nouthete tis 
eunoia legon/stugeis polemion dusmene th' hehoumenos, Phil. 
1322-1323). 
Neoptolemus proceeds to explain to Philoctetes the 
substance of Helenos' prophecy including the crucial element 
8Neoptolemus' remark here, at 1254, esto to mellon, "Let 
come what may!" is a verbal clue to the moral discovery that 
has come in and through his struggle and subsequent choice. 
This phrase seems to be a kind of response to his earlier ito 
(Eb.il. 120) which he utters right at the crucial juncture of 
determining that he would, in fact, give himself over to 
Odysseus (Phil. 84) and get involved in his scheme to capture 
Philoctetes' bow through deceit. 
9The only time that Neoptolemus uses force with Philoc-
tetes is when he physically prevents the latter from killing 
Odysseus with one of his deadly arrows. Neoptolemus' profound 
sense of justice is illustrated in this scene when he tells 
Philoctetes that he prevented him from killing his mortal 
enemy (Phil. 1302-1303) because it would not be noble for 
either of them (all' out' emoi tout' estin oute soi kalon, 
Phil. 1304). 
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that has up till now been left out, namely, that Philoctetes 
is not only to win renown on the battlefields of Troy but is 
to be healed of his terrible illness (nosou bareias, Phil. 
1320) by the sons of Asclepius (Phil. 1333-1335). These 
prophecies were uttered by Helenos, Neoptolemus says, under 
pain of death (didos' hekon/kteinein heauton en tade pseusthe 
legon, Phil. 1341-1342). Philoctetes is clearly moved and at 
the same time distressed by Neoptolemus' sincere appeal. 
Sophocles indicates that Neoptolemus' discourse, informed by 
both wisdom and a sense of justice may in fact have won the 
suffering Philoctetes over if it had been employed from the 
very beginning. He cries out, "What shall I do?" in exactly 
the same way that Neoptolemus did earlier when he was in 
anguish and confusion (Phil. 1350). He wonders how he will 
be able to refuse to comply with the words of someone who has 
clearly offered his good will and friendship (Phil. 1350-
1351). Sophocles portrays the suffering hero on the very 
brink of yielding (all' eikatho det';, Phil. 1352) to Neop-
tolemus' arguments and then putting up an adamantine resis-
tance which Neoptolemus will be incapable of penetrating. 
Philoctetes asserts that Neoptolemus is trying to hand him 
over to his enemies (Phil. 1386) and kill him with his 
arguments (fhil. 1388). The son of Achilles knows now that 
arguments are futile and that Philoctetes must simply be left 
to live without the salvation (soteria, Phil. 1396) that could 
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be his. 10 Ph:i. loctetes appeals to Neoptolemus to fulfill the 
oath he made to him earlier and to take him to his home at 
oeta. Neoptolemus consents with the simple words, "If that 
is what you have decided, let us go" (ei dokei steichomen, 
Phil. 1402) . It is at this moment that Heracles appears. 
Neopto 1 emus shows himself in the end as willing to 
sacrifice personal martial glory (time) in order to remain 
true to himself and his suppliant-friend, Philoctetes (Phil. 
1397-1402}. Although he begins as a naive and impressionable 
youth who is ready to please even the unscrupulous Odysseus 
(Phil. 93-94) , Neoptolemus goes through the agony of a 
violated conscience (Phil. 902-903) and achieves his moral 
identity thro1Ugh a profound decision which reorients his moral 
horizons. Tht= son of Achilles has literally grown up on stage 
during the course of the play. 
5.4 Choice And Responsibility In Aristotle 
In this section I shall set forth a general account of 
Aristotle's conception of choice (prohairesis) in its relation 
to moral virtue in order to demonstrate the fundamental 
similarity between what the Stagirite calls prohairesis and 
the decision which Neoptolemus makes in the play. I shall 
10Again, Sophocles points to the disastrous effects of 
having used deceit instead of persuasion from the very 
beginning when we see that Neoptolemus is betrayed by the very 
lie which he told to Philoctetes earlier. Philoctetes asserts 
that he cannot understand how Neoptolemus could ask that he 
fight on behalf of those who robbed him of his father's 
ancestral gift of honor (hemas t' apeirgein hoi ge sou 
k.athubrisan/p.atros qeras sulontes, Phil. 1364-1365}. 
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focus upon choice, with a briefer discussion of responsi-
bility, because the former concept is more important within 
the scheme of Aristotle's moral thought and because Aristotle 
seems to view responsibility as a necessary corollary to his 
notion of choice. Furnishing a general account of Aristotle's 
conception of choice is something of a piece-meal undertaking 
inasmuch as Aristotle scatters his comments about choice 
throughout the Nicomachean Ethics (with one brief mention of 
choice in the Poetics). I shall attempt to bring the dis-
parate pieces of his theory together and show how they will 
furnish us with a philosophical understanding of the choice 
which the son of Achilles makes near the close of the play. 
In close connection with the concept of choice is the 
emotional and intellectual integration that Aristotle per-
ceives to be operative in the individual who deliberates, 
chooses and acts well. Thus I shall also discuss in this 
section the role that Aristotle assigns to practical wisdom 
in the achievement of this integration of the emotional with 
the rational half of the psyche. Again it is my contention 
that tragedian and philosopher are in fundamental agreement 
that such integration is necessary to excellent choice and the 
excellent employment of practical intelligence. 
The first thing to note about choice is that Aristotle 
views it as intimately connected with moral virtue. 11 He tells 
us in Nicomachean Ethics II.5 that the virtues are some kind 
11 see Sherman, The Fabric of Character, pp. 106-117. 
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of choice or do not exist without choice (hai d' aretai 
proaireseis tines e ouk aneu proaireseos, EN 1106a3-4, cf. 
also mi llllb5-6). In his comprehensive definition of arete 
in Book II.6 (EN 1106b36, cf. also EN 1139a22-23), he defines 
virtue as a hexis prohairetike, a determinate disposition to 
make deliberate choices or decisions. The ability to make 
informed and deliberate choices is then, for Aristotle, a sign 
of maturity and moral virtue. Making choices is an adult 
affair; it is not for children (EN llllbS-10). But this is 
predicated upon the prior admission that virtue or excellence 
as well as vice depend upon ourselves and that we are respon-
sible for the kind of persons that we are becoming through our 
actions. 12 Aristotle puts the matter this way: 
Virtue is in our power ( eph' hemin, EN 1113b6) and 
likewise vice. For where it is in our power to act, it 
is also in our power not to act, and where we can say 
"no," we can also say "yes." Therefore, if we have the 
power to act where it is noble to act, we also have the 
power not to act where not to act is base; and conversely, 
if we have the power not to act where inaction is noble, 
we also have the power to act where action is base. But 
if we have the power to act nobly or basely, and likewise 
the power not to act, and if such action or inaction 
constitutes our being good and evil, we must conclude that 
it depends on us whether we are decent or worthless 
individuals • . If we do not accept that, we must 
contradict the conclusions at which we have just arrived, 
and must deny that man is the source and begetter of his 
actions as a father is of his children. (EN 1113b6-19.) 13 
The person who chooses is fully aware that he is responsible 
12As we have already seen, this is precisely what the 
character of Odysseus implicitly denies, namely, that he is 
a responsible agent. 
13 Ostwald, p. 65. 
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for the characteristics (hexeis) which he is developing within 
himself as a result of his actions. He knows that he is, as 
Aristotle puts it, the source and begetter of his actions (cf. 
also EE 1223a2-19). 
The issue of personal responsibility is closely linked 
to another central aspect of making a choice for Aristotle and 
that is personally identifying oneself with what one has 
chosen. 14 Aristotle mentions this twice in his discussion of 
the nature of moral virtue at EN II.4 and VI.12. In both 
places he states that it is a critical part of what it means 
to be morally virtuous that we choose to act the way that we 
do and choose that course of action for its own intrinsic 
nobility (houtos hos eoiken esti to pos echonta prattein 
hekasta host' einai agathon lego d' hoion dia proairesin kai 
auton heneka ton prattomenon, EN 1144a17-20) . 15 Thus choice, 
for Aristotle, involves the presence of moral virtue inasmuch 
as it implies centrally a morally responsible agent who claims 
responsibility for who she is becoming through the actions 
which she performs as well as someone who personally iden-
tifies herself with the actions or endeavors which she 
chooses. In this way then character, as Aristotle tells us, 
14This is especially important with respect to under-
standing what an agent's real motive or intention is. It is 
because of this personal identification of the agent with the 
the action chosen that Aristotle says that choice is a more 
reliable criterion for judging character than actions are (fili 
llllb6). 
15see Stewart, Notes, 2:224-225. 
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is revealed by the choices we make (estin de ethos men to 
toiouton ho deloi ten proairesin, Poetics, 1450b8-9) and is, 
in turn, formed and further articulated by those very choices 
(EN 1112al-3). 
Since choice entails determining the course of action 
which will best promote one's own (and the community's) 
flourishing as well as taking full responsibility for that 
which has been chosen it involves some form of reflective 
deliberation antecedent to the making of such a decision. 
Hence Aristotle states that choice is the result of preceding 
deliberation (to probebouleumenon, EN 1112al5, literally, "the 
having been deliberated upon beforehand" from the perfect 
passive participle). While choice is the result of preceding 
deliberation, deliberation is not the only factor, but also 
desire ( orexis bouleutike, EN 1113a9) . 16 As such it "is on 
the borderline between the intellectual and passional, 
partaking of both natures: it can be described as either 
desiderative deliberation or deliberative desire. 1117 Aristotle 
states this again in a different form in Nicomachean Ethics 
VI.2 where he states that choice is either desiring intellect 
or intellectual desire (dio e orektikos nous he proairesis e 
orexis dianoetike, EN 1139b4-5). In choices that are good, 
reason must be true and desire correct (dei dia tauta men ton 
16see H. H. Joachim, The Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 101. 
17see Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness, pp. 307-308. 
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te logon alethe einai kai ten orexin orthen eiper he proair-
esis spoudaia, EN 1139a23-25); that is, reason must affirm and 
desire pursue the same things. 18 Good choices then arise 
within the person of whom the emotional and desiderati ve 
elements are in harmony with the rational part of his psyche. 
This is, in effect, what Aristotle was getting at when he 
stated in Nicomachean Ethics I. 13 that, for the virtuous 
person, all things speak with the same voice as that of reason 
(panta gar homophonei to logo, EN 1102b28). Let us take a 
more detailed look at Aristotle's conception of the role of 
reason in the achievement of virtue in order that we may come 
to a better understanding of the kind of integration of the 
emotional and desiderative elements with the rational that are 
part of choosing, feeling and acting in accordance with 
virtue. 
5.5 Practical Reason, Emotion And Action In Aristotle 
When Aristotle takes up the definition of virtue in its 
genus at Nicomachean Ethics II.5, he proposes three different 
things present in the soul as possible candidates: emotions 
(pathe), capacities (dunameis) and characteristics (hexeis). 
By emotions he means such things as anger, fear, confidence, 
envy, joy and so on (EN 1105b22). A capacity Aristotle 
defines as that by which we are said to be affected by such 
emotions as listed above, i.e., the potentiality to feel anger 
18see Stewart, Notes, 2:24-25. 
or fear or joy (EN 1105b23-24). 
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Characteristics are the 
condition, either good or bad, in which we are in relation to 
our emotions (kath' has pros ta pathe echomen eu e kakos, EN 
1105b25-26). Aristotle rejects the raw emotion as a candidate 
for virtue because a person is neither praised nor blamed, he 
says, for expressing fear or anger pure and simple (ho haplos 
orgizomenos, EN 1105b33-1106al), but only for expressing such 
emotions in a certain way (all' ho pos, EN 1106al). Further-
more, he says, in the case of the emotions we are said to be 
moved (kata men ta pathe kineisthai legometha, EN 1106a4-5), 
but with respect to our virtues and vices we are not said to 
be moved but to be disposed in a certain way (ou kineisthai 
alla diakeisthai pos, EN 1106a6). Aristotle also rejects the 
capacity to feel emotions as a candidate for virtue because 
he asserts again that we are neither praised nor blamed for 
our capacity to feel certain emotions but only for a certain 
developed disposition with respect to our emotional life (EN 
1106a6-9). He states, furthermore, that our capacities have 
been given to us by nature and that we do not develop by 
nature into good or bad people but only through moral educa-
tion. In this way then Aristotle is left with virtue being 
a characteristic (hexis), namely, a certain determinate 
disposition with respect to one's emotional life. 19 Now that 
he has defined virtue in general terms as a qualitative 
disposition with respect to our emotions (and actions), 
19Ibid., 1: 187-188. 
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Aristotle proceeds to specify what sort of characteristic this 
is. It is here that we shall see more clearly how reason 
conditions and directs emotional response. 
When Aristotle stated earlier that we are praised and 
blamed for expressing emotion in a certain way (EN 1106al) and 
that virtues and vices are being disposed in a certain way 
with respect to our emotions (EN 1106a6), he provided an 
important clue as to the specific kind of characteristic a 
virtue is. We are disposed poorly toward the emotion of anger 
if we express this feeling either too violently or too timidly 
in accordance with the situation (ei men sphodros e aneimenos 
kakos echomen, EN 1105b27). We are disposed well with respect 
to anger if we respond with appropriate intensity given both 
the context of the situation and our own temperamental makeup 
(EN 1105b27-28). The latter point is what it means to achieve 
the relative mean with respect to emotion (to de meson zetei 
kai touth haireitai meson de ou to tou pragmatos alla to pros 
hemas, EN 1106b6-7). Thus Aristotle says that it is possible 
to experience fear, confidence, anger and many other kinds of 
emotions in an inappropriate fashion given both the context 
and our temperament, but to experience all this: 
. at the right time, toward the right objects, toward 
the right people, for the right reason, and in the right 
manner--that is the median and the best course, the course 
that is a mark of virtue. (EN 1106b21-24.) 20 
Thus virtue, according to Aristotle, is a determinate disposi-
20 Ostwald, p. 43. 
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tion to feel (and to act) in such a way as is fitting to the 
situation given both the context and our own temperament 
(hitting the relative mean, EN 1107al). This excellent 
expression of feeling and action is determined by reason or 
in whatever way the practically wise person would determine 
it (horismene logo kai ho an ho phronimos horiseien, EN 
1107al-2). In this way then we can see that there is an 
intimate connection between the role of reason and the 
achieving of the relative mean in feeling and action. 
Thus, Aristotle holds that the emotional and desidera-
tive part of the soul requires the assistance and guidance of 
reason in order that feelings and desires may be expressed 
appropriately and the good carried out excellently in the 
ever-varying situations of human life. 21 It is the role of 
practical wisdom (phronesis or orthos logos) to perceive the 
salient features of a given situation and to determine the 
appropriate emotional response as well as the most fitting 
action given the context and the individual's temperamental 
21 see Yves Simon, The Definition of Moral Virtue (New 
York, Fordham University Press, 1986), pp. 96-98. Simon sees 
that it is the special capacity of practical wisdom to 
determine the appropriate course of action no matter how 
unprecedented the circumstances or unique the situation. 
Neoptolemus' deliberate decision to oppose Odysseus and 
return Philoctetes' bow and his election to persuade Philoc-
tetes to come to Troy (having finally rejected the use of 
deceit and violence) can be seen as an excellent exercising 
of his practical intelligence inasmuch as he is acting and 
feeling in accordance with virtue in what is surely for him 
a unique and unprecedented circumstance. 
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makeup. 22 
Aristotle further emphasizes the centrality of the role 
of practical wisdom in the attainment of moral virtue in 
Nicomachean Ethics VI.13. In the previous chapter he shows 
that without moral virtue practical wisdom would be nothing 
more than a "certain cunning capacity for linking means to any 
end rather than to those ends which are genuine goods for 
man."B In this chapter he shows what would happen to moral 
virtue if it lacked the assistance of this "eye of the soul," 
practical wisdom (EN 1144a29-30). And just as in the previous 
chapter he compared practical wisdom to the "cunning capacity" 
of cleverness (deinotes, EN 1144a24-25), so also in this 
chapter he compares natural virtue to virtue in the full 
sense. 24 Aristotle states that various kinds of character 
inhere in all of us in a certain way by nature (huparchein 
phusei pos, EN 1144b4-5). Thus, we have a certain tendency 
to be just, temperate and courageous from birth (euthus ek 
genetes, EN 1144b6). Still he insists, we seek something 
more, that is, the good in a more authoritative sense and the 
22see Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness, pp. 290-317. 
~acintyre, After Virtue, p. 154. 
24The overall scheme of both chapters is to show the 
interdependence of the two, namely, how practical wisdom 
requires the virtues in order to be itself and not the 
counterfeit form of practical wisdom which Aristotle names 
cleverness. Similarly, virtue in the full and authoritative 
(kurios) sense requires practical wisdom in order to be itself 
and not the mere unanchored proclivity toward appropriate 
action and passion which he terms natural virtue. 
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possession of these character traits in another way (all' 
homos zetoumen heteron ti to kurios agathon kai ta toiauta 
allon tropon huparchein, EN 1144b6-8). Aristotle notes that 
children and beasts have these natural qualities but without 
intelligence they can be harmful (all' aneu nou blaberai 
phainontai ousai, EN 1144b9). Thus natural virtue without the 
assistance of practical wisdom is like a powerful body which 
because it moves without sight is bound to be tripped up and 
to come down with a mighty fall because of its lack of vision 
(hosper somati ischuro aneu opseos kinoumeno sumbainei 
sphallesthai ischuros dia to me echein opsin houto kai 
entautha, EN 1144b10-12) . 25 The presence of intelligence, 
however, makes all the difference with respect to action and 
transforms the natural characteristic into that virtue in the 
full and authoritative sense which it formerly only resembled 
( EN 114 4 b 13 -14 ) . 26 In this way then Aristotle argues most 
25It is interesting to note here Aristotle's use of the 
verb sphallo, a term regularly used of wrestlers who attempt 
to throw each other down by tripping. Anyone who has wrestled 
knows that success is not only a matter of innate strength but 
requires excellent judgment as to when and how to pursue and 
avoid (to put it in Aristotelian terms). Failure to develop 
and exercise this kind of perception will inevitably end in 
a serious fall. 
26see MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 154: "As we transform 
our initial naturally given dispositions into virtues of 
character, we do so by gradually coming to exercise those 
dispositions kata ton orthon logon. The exercise of intell-
igence is what makes the crucial difference between a natural 
disposition of a certain kind and the corresponding virtue." 
My position with regard to the relationship of practical 
wisdom to moral virtue is in agreement with MacIntyre (cited 
above), Richard Sorabji, "Aristotle on the Role of Intellect 
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explicitly that complete virtue is not possible without the 
assistance of practical wisdom (houto kai epi tau ethikou duo 
esti to men arete phusike to d' he kuria kai touton he kuria 
ou ginetai aneu phroneseos, EN 1144b15-17). Practical wisdom 
is thus a kind of practical seeing or sight without which we 
cannot hit the median in feelings and action in any consistent 
or reliable sort of way. It is only in cooperation with this 
"eye of the soul" that the moral virtues will be exercised in 
an effective way. 
5.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have seen that the figure of Neop-
in Virtue" in Essays On Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Amelie 
Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, University of 
California Press, 1980) pp. 210-218 and Stewart, Notes, 2:107-
110 who are all in agreement that moral virtue in the complete 
sense cannot be achieved without the assistance of practical 
wisdom. The position here defended is in opposition to the 
view of Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion, pp. 70-75, who 
holds that certain virtues (in the full sense) can be attained 
without the vision which practical wisdom provides. Forten-
baugh rests his case (too heavily it seems to me) upon the 
consideration of a peculiar case with respect to the virtue 
of courage. He argues that it is Aristotle's position that 
excellent (i.e. courageous) response to sudden dangers does 
not require deliberation but can be referred wholly to the 
"stochastic perfection" of the "alogical half of the soul." 
It seems to me that Fortenbaugh underestimates the interdepen-
dence of practical wisdom and moral virtue which Aristotle 
sees as ultimately enmeshed or co-implicated in each other 
(cf. especially filf VI.12 and 13). Furthermore, it seems to 
me that it is possible to deny that every action needs to be 
immediately preceded by deliberation without asserting that 
such an action stems wholly from the excellence of the 
alogical half of the soul. MacIntyre suggests that rational 
action (e.g., courageous response to sudden dangers) may be 
based upon "long previous deliberation." See MacIntyre, Whose 
Justice, p. 135. 
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tolemus achieves authentic human agency through assuming 
mature responsibility for his own actions and making a choice 
which gives evidence of excellent deliberation and the 
attainment of psychic harmony. In this way, it has been my 
contention that the character of Neoptolemus is an excellent 
expression of the ancient anthropology which we have been 
exploring. We not only see operative all of the various 
elements of the human psyche which the ancients saw as part 
of the moral agent but we see how they can constitute a 
harmonious whole as they are exercised by the virtuous person. 
I have also noted the way in which modern moral philosophy in 
the Kantian tradition disparages the employment of examples 
as a form of moral education and devalues the moral sig-
nificance of the achievement of such psychological integration 
in action. Again, this I would say is due to its wrongheaded 
predeliction for the abstract over the concrete and its 
truncated conception of the moral agent in which the sig-
nificance of the other elements of the psyche (besides reason) 
to the formation of the moral agent are ignored. 
Though the poet and the philosopher are in fundamental 
agreement with respect to their conception of the moral person 
each employs his own particular medium for exploring this 
issue in a way that enriches the other's insights. This is 
a corollary of the thesis that I have been developing. They 
see the same truths but as refracted through two different 
lenses, the one through poetry and the other through philo-
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sophy. The philosopher furnishes us with a technical 
vocabulary through which he describes the process and the 
components of decision-making. In addition, he furnishes us 
(in his discussion of choice) with a nuanced and subtle moral 
psychology in which excellent choice is seen as grounded in 
the complete integration of the emotional and desiderative 
elements of the soul with the rational part. This uncon-
flicted and integrated psyche is, for Aristotle, characteris-
tic of moral virtue in general. It is this person whose 
emotions and desires are most in accord with the dictates of 
reason. While Aristotle, as a philosopher, furnishes us with 
an analysis of these topics, Sophocles, the poet, shows us 
through the medium of character what making a choice and 
taking responsibility for that decision might look and feel 
like. In this way the poet does not give us analysis but a 
moving portrayal of the phenomena. One of the things which 
the poet makes very clear is that the process of deliberation 
and the actual making of a choice is (or at least can be) a 
very painful process. This is something which Aristotle does 
not sufficiently emphasize and which may be the peculiar part 
of a tragic poet to reveal. Sophocles' powerful portrayal of 
the character of Neoptolemus shows us a young man who is in 
the throes of agony as a result of trying to discern what to 
do and to embrace his decision. Both philosopher and traged-
ian are in close agreement that the emotions and reason are 
not fundamentally at odds with each other but are capable of 
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working together in harmony with a view to achieving the good. 
But the poet is peculiarly suited to show the power of this 
thesis inasmuch he portrays a character who suffers internal 
discord and then achieves a remarkable resolution in and 
through the choice that he makes. In this way we witness both 
the confusion and paralysis of Neoptolemus' psychic civil war 
and the boldness and wisdom of words and deeds that stem from 
a man who has now become profoundly at one with himself. 
Sophocles shows us what excellent and mature human agency is 
all about through the depiction of his character Neoptolemus. 
When we look to the character of Neoptolemus we can fully 
understand why Aristotle asserts that the making of a choice 
is not for children but is an adult affair. 
CHAPTER 6 
FRIENDSHIP AND THE MORAL LIFE IN SOPHOCLES AND ARISTOTLE 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I shall argue that Sophocles and 
Aristotle share a fundamental sense that the moral life is not 
something that can be achieved alone. Both poet and 
philosopher show us that the life of virtue is not a solitary 
enterprise but involves the presence of friendships that are 
based upon shared values and a mutual sympathy and care for 
the friend for his own sake. The ancients viewed friendship 
as an essential part of ethics because they were fundamentally 
pre-occupied with the issue of character and understood that 
the sort of person one would become is closely connected with 
those with whom one associated. They clearly appreciated the 
way in which friends are both an expression of one's character 
and have a formative influence upon one's character. Since 
the question of character was viewed as intimately connected 
with the issue of happiness, the ancients rightly understood 
friends to be an important element in whether one led a 
fulfilled or frustrated life. 
Modern moral philosophy stemming from Kant, on the other 
hand, shows scant appreciation of the social character of an 
individual's growth into personhood. This is so because of 
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Kant's pre-occupation with establishing the moral autonomy of 
the person and the illegitimacy of being governed by any other 
principle in the fulfillment of one's duty. Given this focus 
upon autonomy as the only viable mode of acting morally it is 
no wonder that Kant has so little room for the vital role of 
the other in his conception of moral philosophy. It would 
seem to me that the ancients would have viewed this as a 
peculiarly abstract and untenable position that simply ignores 
the very real way in which friends have a formative influence 
upon who we are and the quality of the lives that we lead. 
Sophocles will present his case for the centrality of 
what I shall call friendship of character in his presentation 
of the perilous and uncertain course of the relationship 
between Neoptolemus and Philoctetes. In this regard, the poet 
employs Philoctetes' bow as the central symbol which mirrors 
the state of their relationship. At the very beginning of the 
play, Sophocles shows us the shallow nature of Neoptolemus' 
stance toward the suffering hero when the young man's interest 
in Philoctetes is nothing more than a means to the end of 
getting his bow. He is, of course, at this time under the 
guidance and tutelage of the wily Odysseus. By means of 
deceit, the son of Achilles enters into a friendship with 
Philoctetes and is even entrusted with the sacred bow which 
he received from Heracles. 
It is evident, however, that the basis of their friend-
ship is a sham and is doomed to be exposed and break apart. 
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The basis of this relationship must be changed and placed upon 
a foundation of mutual trust if it is ever to bear fruit. 
This is precisely what Sophocles shows us in the course of the 
play. Through his compassion and friendship for Philoctetes 
the son of Achilles determines, heroically, to return the bow 
which he stole from his friend. As a result, he earns for 
himself the opposition of Odysseus and the potential wrath of 
the entire Greek army. By having the son of Achilles return 
the bow to its rightful owner Sophocles now makes it possible 
for a true and genuine friendship to be established between 
Philoctetes and Neoptolemus. Neoptolemus' use of persuasion 
instead of deceit in his attempts to convince Philoctetes to 
go to Troy and fight on behalf of the Greeks signifies that 
the son of Achilles is attempting to initiate a different kind 
of relationship with Philoctetes, one that will be based upon 
openness and mutual respect. But Philoctetes' suspicions and 
(most especially) his hatred of the Greeks has not subsided 
and thus Sophocles appeals to a friend whose words the broken 
hero will find irresistable: that friend is none other than 
Heracles. 
Through the epiphany of Heracles, Sophocles ratifies the 
friendship between Philoctetes and Neoptolemus by showing that 
they are to share a common destiny. In Heracles the relation-
ship between the bow as the symbol of the friendship between 
Philoctetes and Neoptolemus comes full circle and is referred 
back to its origin in the act of friendship for which Philoc-
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tetes first received the bow from the hero. It is through the 
theophany of Heracles that Sophocles shows us that true 
friendship must be based upon mutual trust and understanding 
and that such a friendship, alone, can serve as the basis of 
the heroic destiny which Neoptolemus and Philoctetes will 
share. Thus, the openness and friendship that was begun by 
Neoptolemus is sanctioned by the god-friend Heracles. And it 
is in this way that the tragedian indicates that true friend-
ship is that which is based upon a love of and a concern for 
the character of the beloved. This kind of friendship can 
have nothing to do with the deceit, secrecy and treachery 
which Neoptolemus practiced upon Philoctetes. The god comes 
to show that it is only in friendship that is founded upon 
fidelity to and a genuine concern for the other that great 
things can be accomplished. 
Aristotle, also, deeply shares a sense of the centrality 
of friendship in living the good life. He holds that friend-
ship is most necessary to life and that no one could bear to 
live without friends even if she had all other external goods. 
Of the three different kinds of friendship discussed (based 
on use, pleasure or good character), Aristotle repeatedly 
stresses the importance of friendship based upon love of the 
other's character as critical to a flourishing life. It is 
this form of friendship that Aristotle understands to be the 
central case or instance of what it means to be a friend. 
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Here, friendship becomes a "moral enterprise111 inasmuch as it 
is only in this kind of relationship that the character of the 
other is the ground of the friendship and continuous activity 
in accordance with virtue is the fruit and sustenance of the 
friends' love for each other. Aristotle holds, in fact, that 
we cannot become good without these kinds of friendships in 
our lives and that we cannot hope to achieve any adequate 
understanding of ourselves without this highest and best kind 
of relationship. 
Once again, we shall see that it is the great strength 
and peculiar contribution of the poet to furnish a dramatic 
presentation of the theme which is under discussion. He shows 
us characters who are in a particular relationship with each 
other and how that relationship is shattered by the revelation 
of Neoptolemus' deceit and then re-established upon founda-
tions where authentic friendship may truly flourish. Sopho-
cles shows us how Neoptolemus originally treats Philoctetes 
as a mere means to another end, but then, when his friendship 
with the son of Poeas has become authentic, how he is willing 
to sacrifice everything for the sake of his friend. Sophocles 
further exalts friendship when Philoctetes' intransigence to 
the appeals of his human friend, Neoptolemus, gives way to the 
words of his divine friend, Heracles. 
In this way, Sophocles furnishes us with the phenomena, 
1see Paul J. Wadell, C.P. Friendship and the Moral Life 
(Notre Dame, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), 
p. 62. 
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that is, what friendship may look like and feel like in the 
concrete. Aristotle, on the other hand, furnishes us with a 
detailed, analytical discussion of the nature and character 
of friendship. It is precisely for this kind of analysis, 
this furnishing of a logos for the phenomena, that we turn to 
the words of a philosopher. Hence, Aristotle discusses the 
various kinds of friendship and their different bases. He 
states explicitly why the friendship of character is superior 
and enumerates the various contributions to human flourishing 
which this kind of friendship, alone, can furnish. Both poet 
and philosopher illuminate the reality of friendship in their 
respective ways and so they each have a claim upon our 
attention. Let us turn then to a consideration of Sophocles' 
treatment of friendship. 
6.2 Neoptolemus. Philoctetes and Friendship 
In one of the opening scenes of the play, Sophocles 
shows us how, under the tutelage of Odysseus, the son of 
Achilles is led to focus on the bow of Heracles and to ignore 
its owner: 
OD: It's not right to have scruples about something when 
you do it for profit (kerdos) 
NE: But what profit (kerdos) is it to me that Philoctetes 
come to Troy? 
OD: The bow alone (mona) will take Troy. 
NE: Wasn't I the one who was to sack the city, as it was 
said? 
OD: Neither you without the bow nor the bow without you. 
NE: Well then, if that's the case, it must be hunted down 
(therate', Phil. 111-116.) 
In this brief exchange we can see that Odysseus leads Neop-
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tolemus to believe that it is the possession of the bow alone 
which will be sufficient to capture Troy. Odysseus instructs 
the son of Achilles to focus on the thing to be captured and 
to disregard how it is captured and the person to whom it 
belongs. Implicit in this instruction is the message that 
Neoptolemus is not to enter into any real relationship with 
Philoctetes but is simply to treat him as a means of obtaining 
that alone without which the fall of Troy cannot take place. 
Odysseus' obsession with the bow to the exclusion of the man 
is, of course, in direct opposition with the prophecy of 
Helenos. This is, indeed, strange (though not out of line 
with his character) inasmuch as he claims to be the servant 
of Zeus and to be doing nothing but carrying out his will 
(Phil. 989-990) . 
The prophecy of Helenos, in this drama, is somewhat 
enigmatic. Correct discernment of its import comes gradually 
and is only revealed in its fullness with the theophany of 
Heracles. 2 One thing, however, that comes forth clearly from 
2This is the case, I would argue, not only because of 
the enigmatic nature of the prophecy itself but because of 
Odysseus' misguided focus on the bow to the exclusion of the 
man. It is precisely this focus on the object to be obtained 
and its concomitant denial of the personhood of Philoctetes 
that, at the very beginning of the play, leads him to argue 
in favor of the use of deceit (Phil. 100-109). If the only 
important thing is the bow then the man who owns it must be 
treated as a means to it and manipulated in such a way that 
it is yielded up. 
It seems to me, furthermore, that Odysseus' pre-occupa-
tion with an object to the exclusion of the personal is a part 
of his general moral and personal make-up in the play. We 
have already seen this to be the case in the way that he shuns 
personal responsibility for his own actions and defers to 
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the prophecy is that the bow alone is not sufficient to bring 
about the fall of Troy. The bow and the man, alone, will be 
sufficient and the latter must come willingly, by persuasion. 
In both passages of the play where the prophecy is related at 
any length Philoctetes, not the bow, is the focus of atten-
tion. According to the merchant, Helenos prophesied that 
unless Philoctetes were persuaded by argument (ei me tonde 
peisantes logo, Phil. 612) to leave Lemnos and come to Troy 
that the citadel of that great city would never fall to the 
Greeks. Neoptolemus confirms (and expands) the account of the 
merchant when he states that Philoctetes will never receive 
relief from his terrible illness until he willingly (hekon, 
Phil. 1332) goes to the plains of Troy and meets up with the 
sons of Asclepius. There he will receive healing and will go 
on, with his bow, to win martial glory on the battlefield in 
the eyes of all the Greeks (Phil. 1334-1335). 
Under the guidance of Odysseus, Neoptolemus, at first, 
initiates a friendship with the son of Poeas that is nothing 
but a sham inasmuch as it is based upon lies and deception 
motivated by the "profit" which he mentions above (kerdos, 
Phil. 112). The elaborate deceit which the son of Achilles 
practices upon Philoctetes is solely aimed at getting the 
latter's bow and ignores the relational aspect of the prophecy 
of Helenos. The prophecy mentioned the necessity of Philoc-
certain vague and impersonal necessities to which he must 
submit without thought or question (see above, 4.2). 
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tetes' willing compliance which, in turn, implies some kind 
of friendly relationship that is based upon openness, respect 
and trust. Deceit and then force will both be tried and found 
wanting during the course of the drama. It is only the son 
of Achilles' use of persuasion that will be seen to be in line 
with the sort of respect for Philoctetes which the prophecy 
implies. Neoptolemus will only gradually come to understand 
the real import of Helenos' prophecy and the grounds of an 
authentic friendship. Sophocles traces this development by 
means of the central symbol of the bow, which mirrors the 
relationship of Philoctetes and Neoptolemus. 3 
At the mid-point of the play Sophocles focuses our 
attention on the bow as that which represents the character 
of the friendship between Philoctetes and Neoptolemus. In 
this section the tragedian shows us that the friendship 
between the two is, as it were, ratified by the son of Poeas 
who allows Neoptolemus first to touch the bow and then 
actually entrusts the young man with it as the broken hero 
suffers one of his attacks of excruciating pain. Sophocles 
never tires of showing us, in this section, the incongruity 
of what is said about their friendship and the actual state 
of affairs that exists between these two men. 
When Neoptolemus asks if it is permissible (themis, 
Phil. 661) for him to touch Philoctetes' bow the son of Poeas 
generously responds: 
3see Blundell, Helping Friends, pp. 204-205. 
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You speak holy things. It is permissible for you, child. 
For you alone have given me the chance to see this light 
of the sun, my homeland at Oeta, my old father, my 
friends. You alone, though I was in the power of my 
enemies, stood me up over them. Be confident! You may 
touch it and give it back, boasting that you alone of 
mortals touched it because of your virtue. For even I 
myself acquired it by helping someone (Phil. 662-670.) 
Neoptolemus answers: 
I am not distressed that I have met you and taken you as 
my friend. For whoever knows how to do a good turn after 
receiving one (eu dran eu pathon epistatai) would become 
a friend better than any possession (Phil. 671-673.) 
In this scene Sophocles shows us that Philoctetes formally 
confirms Neoptolemus as his friend through the outward ritual 
of permitting the son of Achilles to handle his bow. He 
grants this friendship to Neoptolemus because of the latter's 
promise to deliver Philoctetes from his fate on Lemnos and on 
account of a shared sense of the importance of virtue and 
friendship which the bow itself symbolizes. Philoctetes 
refers to the way that friendship and virtuous action come 
together, symbolically, in the bow when he says that he, too, 
acquired the bow by doing a good deed. He is, of course, 
referring to lighting the funeral pyre of Heracles when the 
hero was suffering on his death bed. At the time no one who 
was present was willing to step forward and perform such an 
awesome deed. Philoctetes, alone, mustered sufficient courage 
to oblige Heracles and end his sufferings. By calling 
attention to Heracles in this instance Philoctetes is drawing 
a parallel between the friendship that exists between him and 
Heracles and the friendship that he is now enjoying with 
Neoptolemus. 
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Both sets of friendships arose out of the 
performance of a noble deed. 
Once again, Sophocles shows himself to be a master of 
irony in Neoptolemus' response to the ritual sealing of his 
friendship with Philoctetes. The son of Achilles states that 
he has no cause to regret (ouk achthomai, Phil. 671) having 
met up with Philoctetes and taking him as a friend when barely 
one hundred and fifty lines later he will say that he has been 
greatly distressed and has been suffering over Philoctetes' 
terrible fate for a long time (Phil. 806). More significant-
ly, however, we see that Sophocles has Neoptolemus accept 
Philoctetes' offer of friendship with an accompanying moral 
maxim that he is in the very process of violating. 4 It is in 
this way that the tragedian reminds us, within this scene of 
apparent trust and friendship, that the relationship of 
Neoptolemus and Philoctetes has, in reality, been established 
upon the shaky ground of deception and distrust. Neoptolemus' 
little maxim expresses praise for Philoctetes as a friend 
inasmuch as he "knows how to do a good turn" (allow Neop-
tolemus to handle his bow) after he has received one (the 
promise of Neoptolemus' help in getting home). As such a 
friend Neoptolemus asserts that Philoctetes is "worth more 
than any possession." Again, the devastating irony here is 
that even as he praises Philoctetes as a friend who is worth 
more than any possession, it is precisely ( and only) what 
4see Blundell, Helping Friends, p. 204 
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Philoctetes possesses that is the real ground at that moment 
of Neoptolemus' interest in Philoctetes as a friend. 5 In this 
way, Sophocles shows how the bow operates as a complex symbol 
which mirrors the state of the relationship of Philoctetes and 
Neoptolemus. In this case, it is a sign of reciprocal 
friendship and trust that conceals the betrayal which is 
festering at the heart of their relationship. Sophocles will 
show us that it is this betrayal and deceit that must be 
revealed and removed in order that the friendship of Neop-
tolemus and Philoctetes may be placed on the firm footing of 
genuine trust and concern for the other, the only basis upon 
which their friendship will be capable of bearing any fruit. 
Sophocles again points to the ambiguity of the rela-
tionship between Philoctetes and Neoptolemus in the scene 
where Philoctetes entrusts Neoptolemus with his bow while he 
is overcome with sleep. As Philoctetes is handing the bow 
over to the son of Achilles he utters the ominous words: 
Here it is, child, take it! But avert the envy of the gods 
(ton phthonon de proskuson) lest you, too, have great 
sufferings as both I and the one who acquired it before 
me have had. (Phil. 776-778.) 
Neoptolemus is in a most unhappy situation here. As in the 
previous scene, he is being allowed by Philoctetes to handle 
the bow. The significant difference here is that its owner 
5If I am not going too far with the irony, there even 
appears to be a kind of ironic play upon Philoctetes' name in 
this passage. Neoptolemus says that Philoctetes (the roots 
of whose name are philos and ktaomai or ktema, literally, 
"love of possessing") will be a friend better than any 
possession (ktematos kreisson philos, Phil. 673). 
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is going to be unconscious and so this act on the part of 
Philoctetes demonstrates even greater trust in Neoptolemus. 
Philoctetes' words, however, can only make Neoptolemus uneasy 
because he knows that he is only being permitted to handle the 
bow on the grounds of his supposed friendship for Philoctetes. 
And yet it is under the very inauspicious conditions of 
receiving the bow through deceit that Philoctetes utters his 
prayer that misfortune not come to Neoptolemus because of the 
gods' envy. Sophocles is, thus, showing us the true status 
of the friendship between Philoctetes and Neoptolemus through 
the symbol of the bow. Through the prophecy of Helenos we 
know that the war at Troy cannot be won without Philoctetes 
and his bow. We know, furthermore, that the bow was given to 
the son of Poeas by Heracles as a token of appreciation and 
friendship for Philoctetes' act of kindness when the great 
hero lay vulnerable and on his death bed. This time it is 
Philoctetes who is about to be rendered unconscious and 
vulnerable from his terrible wound. He, like Heracles, will 
entrust another with the bow which was originally given out 
of love and need. By drawing an implicit parallel between 
these two scenes Sophocles points both to the way in which the 
bow symbolizes one friend's need of another as well as the 
authenticity of the first friendship in poignant contrast with 
the second. The tragedian, thus, shows that the bow signifies 
the two men's need of each other as well as the necessity that 
their friendship be based upon a genuine foundation if it is 
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ever to lead to the heroic destiny about which Helenos 
prophesied. 6 
Sophocles shows us that the false basis of the relation-
ship between Neoptolemus and Philoctetes must be revealed in 
order that their friendship may come to be established upon 
a more genuine foundation. Thus we witness the breakdown of 
their relationship when Neoptolemus confesses that Philoctetes 
is to set sail for Troy and not Oeta (Phil. 915). In this 
scene Philoctetes tellingly addresses Neoptolemus with the icy 
word, "stranger" (oh xene, Phil. 923). 7 Betrayed by the only 
friend he thought he had, Philoctetes turns to "dialogue" with 
the landscape (Phil. 936-940) during which time he addresses 
the bow that has been forced from his hands as his only true 
friend (oh toxon philon oh philon/cheiron ekbebiasmenon, Phil. 
1128-1129). There is a touch of irony here inasmuch as 
Philoctetes addresses as his only friend the very thing which 
has made of Neoptolemus a faux ami. 
The son of Achilles is utterly anguished and confused 
by the pain which he has caused Philoctetes and falls into a 
long silence (fhil. 974-1074). It is through this powerfully 
dramatic silence of Neoptolemus that Sophocles marks the 
crucial transition that the son of Achilles makes from being 
a liar to a truth-teller, from practicing deceit (dolos) to 
6see Blundell, Helping Friends, p. 205. 
7see P. E. Easterling, "Character in Sophocles," Greece 
and Rome, 24 (1977) 129. 
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the employment of persuasion (peitho). 8 When he reappears 
with Odysseus at line 1222 Sophocles shows us that he has not 
only chosen a new course of action (as I have argued above in 
section 5.3) but that he has also made a fundamental decision 
with respect to whom he will befriend. Neoptolemus rejects 
the tutelage and friendship of Odysseus and now seeks to 
establish a friendship with Philoctetes upon a more genuine 
foundation. 9 
Neoptolemus does everything in his power to communicate 
his willingness to repair the damage that he has done and to 
be a true friend to Philoctetes. He begins by asking for 
forgiveness from the son of Poeas (Phil. 1270). He then, 
straightway, shows his good will by bidding Philoctetes to 
stretch forth his right hand and be master of his bow (Phil. 
1292}. Deceit and violence have been tried and found wanting. 
Persuasion, the only mode of approach actually in line with 
the prophecy of Helenos (Phil. 612) is, at last, employed. 
Persuasion is, furthermore, the only way that is in accord 
with the openness and care for Philoctetes as a person that 
8see R. G. A. Buxton, Persuasion in Greek Tragedy: A 
Study of Peitho (Cambridge, New York, Cambridge University 
Press, 1982), pp. 122-123. 
9The tragedian is, furthermore, indicating that a 
significant moral discovery about oneself is often attended 
by a re-evaluation of the kind of person that one is capable 
of befriending or, as in this case, of continuing to call 
one's friend. We are shown that Neoptolemus' choice of a 
radically different conception of justice from that of 
Odysseus' expediency involves also a new conception of whom 
he can call his friend. 
is the mark of genuine friendship. 
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Sophocles indicates 
Philoctetes' acceptance of Neoptolemus' overtures of friend-
ship when he resumes calling the young man "friend" and 
"child" {Phil. 1290, 1295, 1301, 1310), but it remains to be 
seen whether Neoptolemus' friendly employment of persuasion 
will bring Philoctetes to Troy. 
What, in fact, Sophocles presents to us is something of 
a reversal of our expectations. Neoptolemus tries mightily 
to persuade Philoctetes to go to Troy but, in the end, is 
persuaded by Philoctetes to take him to his home at Oeta 
{Phil. 1402). Philoctetes' persuasion of Neoptolemus has come 
as a result of each hearing the other out in a spirit of 
mutual respect and concern for the genuine good of the other. 10 
Neoptolemus' sympathetic response to and persuasion by the 
words of his friend, in a sense, prefigure Philoctetes' own 
sympathetic response to the persuasive words of his divine 
friend, Heracles. 
Sophocles makes it known from the outset that Heracles 
intervenes not only as a god but also as a friend. He 
addresses Philoctetes with the endearing epithet of "child" 
(pai Poiantos, Phil. 1410) which Philoctetes himself has 
employed throughout the play with Neoptolemus. Through this 
10see Buxton, Persuasion in Greek Tragedy, p. 124. The 
author rightly points out the contrasting parallel between 
Neoptolemus' use of the hortatory subjunctive when inviting 
Philoctetes to leave Lemnos under false pretences {Phil. 526, 
645) and his use of the same verbal formula when he acquiesces 
to Philoctetes' wishes through truthful and friendly exchange. 
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same address the tragedian makes explicit the parallel 
between the friendship of Philoctetes and Neoptolemus and that 
of Heracles and Philoctetes. Philoctetes had referred to this 
parallel, implicitly, in two previous passages (Phil. 670, 
778). In addition, Heracles says that he has left his 
heavenly seat for Philoctetes' own sake (ten sen d' heko 
charin ouranias hedras prolipon, Phil. 1413-1414). He informs 
Philoctetes that his sufferings have not been in vain but will 
earn for him a glorious life (ek ton ponon tond' euklea 
thesthai bion, Phil. 1422) just as his own labors have 
resulted in the possession of immortal excellence (hosous 
ponesas kai diexelthon ponous/athanaton areten eschon, Phil. 
1420}. The condition upon which such a reknowned life rests, 
however, is his friendship with the son of Achilles (Phil. 
1423) . Heracles makes the interwoven destinies of Philoctetes 
and Neoptolemus explicit in the following lines: 
For neither will you, Philoctetes, be strong enough to 
take the plains of Troy without this young man here nor 
will he be strong enough without you. But you are to 
watch over each other as two grazing lions (Phil. 1434-
143 7.) 
These lines are striking not only for the way in which they 
speak of the new friends' common destiny but also for the way 
in which they parallel and respond to Odysseus' earlier words 
regarding the importance of the bow. Odysseus had earlier 
said to Neoptolemus that the bow and the bow alone was 
necessary to take Troy (out' an su keinon choris out' ekeina 
sou, Phil. 115). His emphasis, as we stated, was solely upon 
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the object to be obtained in complete disregard for the person 
who owned the bow and how he might be related (as the prophecy 
of Helenos indicated) to the destiny of the Greeks fighting 
at Troy. Heracles corrects Odysseus11 by replacing the pursuit 
of some object to be obtained with a relationship to be 
sustained, that is, the friendship of Philoctetes and Neop-
tolemus. It is no longer to be an object, the bow, that will 
be the basis of heroic action but a friendship founded upon 
mutual trust, openness and understanding. 12 Thus, through the 
theophany of the god-friend, Heracles, Sophocles makes it 
explicit that heroic and virtuous activity requires the 
existence of deep and lasting friendships that are based upon 
openness and fidelity to the person of the beloved. This is, 
perhaps, the ultimate meaning of the prophecy of Helenos. 13 
Neoptolemus is slow to understand this, but Sophocles shows 
us that as he grows in moral maturity in the course of the 
play he comes to understand the meaning of the bow in its 
connection to genuine friendship and the divine friend who 
gave it to Philoctetes. This is confirmed and fully revealed 
by the intervention of Heracles who shows that it is in and 
through philia that salvation lies (Phil. 1396). 
Having discussed the position of the tragedian on this 
11 Note the striking, exact parallel of both oute . 
oute clauses at Phil. 115 and 1434-1435. 
12see Christopher Gill, "Bow, Oracle, and Epiphany in 
Sophocles' Philoctetes," Greece and Rome, 27 (1980) 144. 
13Ibid., 143-144. 
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topic it is now time to turn to the reflections of the 
philosopher. 
6.3 Aristotle on Friendship and the Moral Life 
Just as the tragedian argues that heroic activity is 
based upon the sort of friendship that is founded upon love 
and care for the person of the beloved, so also the philo-
sopher holds that friendships of character are a necessary 
part of a flourishing human life. Aristotle does not furnish 
us with the sort of dramatic development of a particular rela-
tionship as the tragedian presents. What he, as a philo-
sopher, furnishes is a logos of the phenomena of friendship. 
In the previous section I argued that the character of 
Neoptolemus makes a certain transition in his relationship 
with Philoctetes. He goes from pursuing a relationship with 
the son of Poeas for the sake of what he can get from him to 
befriending Philoctetes for who he is. It is the latter sort 
of relationship, I argued, that Sophocles is proposing as 
normative with respect to the true meaning of friendship as 
well as the necessary prerequisite to heroic virtue. In his 
logos of friendship Aristotle also furnishes us with several 
different manifestations of friendship (one of which is based 
upon something that one wants from one's friend) and he, too, 
holds that the central case of friendship is precisely this 
love of the other for the sake of who he is rather than for 
what one can get from him. It is only in the experience of 
this kind of friendship, according to Aristotle, that human 
life may be said to be complete. 
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Let us turn to a closer 
analysis of Aristotle's discussion of friendship. 
According to Aristotle friendship is some kind of virtue 
or involves virtue (arete tis e met' aretes, EN 1155a2) . 14 It 
is, furthermore, most necessary to human life (anankaiotaton 
eis ton bion, EN 1155a2-3) inasmuch as no one, he says, would 
choose to live without friends even if he had all other good 
things in life (EN 1155a5-6). This, as we shall see, is most 
especially true with respect to friendships that are based 
upon the character of the beloved. 
According to Aristotle, there are three different kinds 
of friendship that are differentiated by the motive upon which 
their affection is based (hoi de philountes allelous boulontai 
tagatha allelois taute he philousin, EN 1156a9-10). Friends, 
Aristotle says, can have affection for each other that is 
based upon mutual usefulness, pleasure or good character. 
Friends motivated by utility or pleasure do not love each 
other for themselves (ou kath' hautous philousin, EN 1156all) 
but for some other good. (all' he givetai ti autois par' 
allelon agathon, EN 1156all-12). Aristotle states that these 
two kinds are friendships only incidentally (kata sumbebekos 
te de hai philiai hautai eisin, EN 1156a16-17) because the 
14A friendship that is based upon virtue must, by 
definition, involve choice (fil! 1106a3-4, 1106b36, llllb5-6, 
1139a22-23). But as we shall see, Aristotle will reserve the 
element of choice to only the central case of friendship, 
namely, that which is based upon character. We shall discuss 
this later in the section. 
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ground of the relationship is not the friend himself but some 
use or pleasure which the other may provide (fili 1156a17 _ 18 ). 
These sorts of friendships, according to Aristotle, are most 
easily dissolved (eudialutoi, EN 1156a19) when the partners 
do not maintain the same stance toward each other. For, as 
soon as they are no longer useful or pleasant to each other, 
they cease to be friends (EN 1156a20-21). By recognizing the 
incidental nature of the friendships that are based upon 
usefulness or pleasure Aristotle by no means seeks to deni-
grate them. They are both in line with Aristotle's broad 
definition of friendship as a reciprocal stance of good will 
of which both parties are aware (dei ara eunoein allelois kai 
boulesthai tagatha me lanthanontas, EN 1156a3-4) . It is 
simply that these kinds of relationships are not represen-
tative of all that friendship can be. 15 In order to know the 
full reality of friendship in all of its possibilities we need 
to look to the friendship of character. 
Aristotle states that this form of friendship is perfect 
or the most fully realized (teleia, EN 1156b7) inasmuch as it 
is the sort of friendship which exists between those who are 
15Aristotle does, at one point, demean the value of use-
based friendship when he says that it is "characteristic of 
petty traffickers" (he de dia to chresimon agoraion, EN 
1158a21). Given the context of this particular discussion of 
the three types of friendship it appears that Aristotle is 
directing his derisive remarks not at the nature of this sort 
of friendship itself (though it is, admittedly, limited) but 
toward those who are incapable of forming a relationship with 
another except with something useful to be obtained as its 
basis (cf. also EN 1157a19-20). 
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good and alike in virtue. Friends in this kind of relation-
ship wish for each other's good inasmuch as they are good 
(ekeinou heneka, EN 1156b10) and their goodness is something 
intrinsic not incidental to their character (agathoi d'eisi 
kath' hautous, EN 1156b9) . 16 In other words, the foundation 
upon which the friendship exists is not something external to 
who the beloved is (such as usefulness or pleasure) but is the 
beloved herself inasmuch as she is the instantiation of moral 
16see John M. Cooper, "Aristotle on Friendship," in Essays 
on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley, 
California, University of California Press, 1980), pp. 303-
3 08. I agree with Cooper's interpretation that friendship 
based upon character is said to be perfect inasmuch as it 
takes place between those who are good without this implying 
that only those who are perfectly good or "moral heroes" are 
capable of having such friendships. While I find this to be 
true it seems to me that this is understood as part of 
Aristotle's general conception of friendship (and happiness) 
and goes without saying. Aristotle maintains that friendship 
is a characteristic or lasting disposition (hexis) that must, 
like any other virtue, be continually brought into actualiza-
tion in order to be maintained and to flourish. Thus, 
Aristotle asserts that if distance or absence of greeting 
(aprosegoria) interrupts the activity of friendship for too 
long, the friendship will be dissolved ( EN 1157b5-13) . Again, 
friendship, like courage or justice, must be continually 
practiced in order to remain in existence and grow. The 
Stagirite states, repeatedly, that happiness, too, is an 
activity (EH 1169b31-32). The point here is that since 
friendship must repeatedly be brought into actualization it 
is not to be understood as static and hence it does not 
preclude the notion of development even within the friendship 
that Aristotle characterizes as perfect (that which is based 
upon character or the good). In this way Cooper's point, while 
valid, becomes superfluous inasmuch as Aristotle's dynamic and 
developmental conception of friendship already implies that 
those who have this kind of friendship with each other are 
not, in fact, moral paragons. 
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goodness. 17 According to Aristotle, this sort of friendship 
is the most lasting (EN 1156bll} precisely because it is 
founded upon the beloved herself rather than upon incidental 
considerations. In addition, it is only this kind of friend-
17see Paul J. Wadell, C.P., Friendship and the Moral Life 
(Notre Dame, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 1989) 
p. 63. Wadell correctly emphasizes that, for Aristotle, the 
focus in friendship of character is the person of the beloved 
not solely her qualities, "The bond in character friendship 
is a love for virtue, but this is no impersonal, abstract 
good; rather, it is an embodied good, a good friends see taken 
to heart and enfleshed in the life of another. What attracts 
us to our friends is exactly how the good has taken root in 
them." Cf. Ferdinand Schoeman, "Aristotle on the Good of 
Friendship," Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 63, (1985) 
273-274. Schoeman considers Aristotle's treatment of when and 
whether friendships should be dissolved. He accuses Aristotle 
of typically conflating persons with their moral qualities 
when the Stagirite maintains that we cannot have affection for 
a friend who has become wicked because only the good and never 
evil can be an object of affection. Thus, Schoeman asserts 
that Aristotle's discussion of friendship is inadequate 
because it "mischaracterises loyalty to a person as involving 
a commitment to that person's motivating principles." 
I do not think, first of all, that the term, "character" 
can be used interchangeably (as Schoeman employs it) with the 
term, "motivating principles." When Aristotle talks about 
character it seems to me that he means, pretty much, what we 
mean when we talk about an individual's personality or 
personality traits. This would include the individual's 
motivating principles but is a more inclusive notion than the 
other, more abstract, term. In this way, when Aristotle 
advises us to break off a friendship on the ground that our 
friend has become wicked it is not because of something as 
impersonal as their motivating principles (although this would 
be part of it) but because of who our friend has become as a 
person. In fact, Aristotle's position is more tolerant than 
this. If our friend has fallen into wicked ways he says that 
we ought to come to his aid and try to straighten him out (EN 
1165bl9} but that if he becomes incurably wicked (aniatois, 
.filf 1165bl8}, and it is evident that it is impossible to save 
him, then and only then is it necessary to sever our ties with 
him. Thus, loyalty to a friend or the severing of ties is, 
for Aristotle, grounded in who the person is and not in 
qualities considered in abstraction from the one in whom they 
may inhere. 
215 
ship that is proof against slander (kai mone de he ton agathon 
philia adiabletos estin, EN 1157a20-21). Here, friends have 
tried and tested each other over a long period of time (EN 
1157a22). They know and trust each other and hence are not 
likely to believe the words of simply anyone who attempts to 
undermine their friend's character. Friendship of character 
is, furthermore, the most complete in that it includes or 
takes up into itself the other two kinds of friendship. Thus, 
every such friend will also, according to Aristotle, be a 
useful and pleasurable companion. Finally, Aristotle main-
tains that it is only the friendship of character that 
transcends the (often) petty, contractual nature of the other 
two types of relationships. 
Friendships based upon pleasure and (most especially) 
usefulness tend to be quid pro quo arrangements in which what 
is given and received is clearly defined and carefully 
scrutinized by both parties (EN 1162b26-28). The material 
advantage that accrues to the recipient serves as the measure 
of what is given in these kinds of relationships (EN 1163a16-
17). Friendship of character, however, is not founded upon 
such fixed conditions (EN 1162b31) and thus it is not the 
material advantage to the recipient which serves as the 
measure of what is given but the moral purpose or choice of 
the giver (metro d' eoiken he tou drasantos proairesis, EN 
1163a22). This is so, as Aristotle states, because the 
governing factor for virtue and character lies in moral choice 
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(tes aretes gar kai tou ethous en te proairesei to kurion, EN 
1163a22-23). It is important to note, then, that Aristotle 
holds that it is friendship of character alone which has 
within it the element of choice so crucial to the definition 
of moral virtue. Here, friendship arises not so much as a 
result of external circumstances but from the choice of 
friends who love each other for their character and "how the 
good has taken root in them. 1118 Thus far we have discussed 
the three different kinds of friendship and the superiority 
of the friendship of character to relationships that are only 
pleasurable or useful. 
reasons why Aristotle 
We have also explored a number of 
accords friendship of character a 
central place in his schema. It is now time to turn to a 
consideration of Aristotle's position with respect to 
friendship and happiness in order to see that the philosopher 
fundamentally understands human flourishing to be a community 
affair. 
Aristotle addresses the question of whether a happy 
person will need friends at EN IX.9. He asserts that it is 
said that the happy or blessed person (tois makariois, EN 
1169b4-5) will not need friends since she already has all the 
good things of life (huparchein gar autois tagatha, EN 
1169b5). Those who are happy, it is argued, are self-suffi-
cient and have no need of anyone or anything else (autarkeis 
oun ontas oudenos prosdeisthai, EN 1169b5-6). In this view 
18wadell, Friendship and the Moral Life, p. 63. 
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we only need a friend, who is another self (heteron auton, EN 
1169b6-7) , to provide those things which we are unable to 
furnish for ourselves and it is for this reason, Aristotle 
states, that there is the verse, "When fortune gives favor-
ably, what need is there of friends?" On the other hand, it 
would be strange (atopos, EN 1169b8), the Stagirite argues, 
to accord all good things to a happy person while excluding 
friends, who are thought to be the greatest of external goods 
(EN 1169b9-10). It would, furthermore, be strange (atopon, 
EN 1169b16) to make a happy person live his life as a loner 
and in isolation, for Aristotle asserts that a human being is, 
by nature, political and social (literally, "naturally lives 
with others," suzen pephukos, EN 1169b18-19). This passage 
echoes Aristotle's earlier discussion of self-sufficiency and 
happiness in Nicomachean Ethics I where he states: 
The perfect and most complete good seems to be self-
sufficient. But by self-sufficient we do not mean for an 
individual who is living a solitary existence by himself 
but for someone who lives with his parents, children, wife 
and, in general, with friends and fellow citizens since 
a human being is, by nature, a political being (EN 1097b8-
ll.) 19 
In this way it is quite clear that Aristotle does not under-
stand the self-sufficiency that is part of human happiness as 
a non-relational sort of autonomy but as one implying life 
within a community. 20 
Aristotle asserts that those who argue that the happy 
19 Ostwald, p. 15. 
20see Sherman, The Fabric of Character, p. 128. 
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person will not require friends speak the truth after a 
fashion (pe aletheuousin, EN 1169b23) inasmuch as most people 
(hoi polloi, EN 1169b23) understand by friends those who are 
useful. It is certainly true that a happy person will not 
need friends of this sort since he already has the good things 
of life. Nor, according to Aristotle, will he need a friend 
for the pleasantness of his companionship since his own life 
is already quite complete with respect to pleasure. It is in 
this way that those who think that a happy person does not 
require useful or pleasant friends argue that he does not need 
any friends at all. 
While it is true that a happy person does not need the 
sort of friendships that are based upon usefulness or plea-
sure,21 it is not at all true that he will not need any friends 
whatsoever. Aristotle affirms that a happy person will need 
friends of character and he links this, directly, with the 
happy person's very ability to achieve (and maintain) his 
happiness. First of all, Aristotle recapitulates his previous 
discussion and states that happiness is an activity (EN 
1169b29, cf. also 1098a8, 16, 1098b31-1099a7) and that the 
activity of a good person is in itself both good and pleasant 
21 When I say that a happy person does not need friendships 
based upon utility or pleasure I mean that they are not 
sufficient for happiness. These sorts of friendships are, most 
certainly, necessary to the happy person's life (in terms of 
the goods of pleasure and use) but they will never be suffi-
cient for happiness. The only kind of friendship, according 
to Aristotle, that is both necessary and sufficient to a 
flourishing life is the friendship of character. 
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(tou d'agathou he energeia spoudaia kai hedeia kath' hauten, 
.fil! 1169b31-32, cf. also 1099al4-15, 21). This implies that 
a happy person's life ought to be both active and pleasant. 
Aristotle asserts, therefore, that a happy person will need 
friends because a solitary existence is difficult (chalepos, 
EN 1170a5) and it will not be easy for him to be continuously 
active outside of the company of friends (ou gar radion kath' 
hauton energein sunechos meth'heteron de kai pros allous raon, 
EN ll 70a5-6). Furthermore, because such friends delight in 
virtuous activity and are displeased with vice they can be 
said to form a kind of school of virtue from their life 
together (EN 1170all-12). Each friend is able to encourage 
and give pleasure to the other through the excellence of his 
own actions. For, according to Aristotle, it is part of the 
moral purpose or choice (prohaireitai, EN 1170a2-3) of a happy 
person to contemplate (theorein, EN 1170a2) actions which are 
good and are the sort of actions that he may want to call his 
own. Thus, friends will delight in observing each other's 
excellent actions (~ ll 70a2-4) . 22 Paul Wadell puts the matter 
very well: 
This is where the connection between friendship and 
eudaimonia is made. Eudaimonia is life lived according 
to virtue, but to live according to virtue is to live in 
the company of friends. Friendship is a practical 
implication of what the moral life requires. Aristotle 
22Aristotle further supports his position with regard to 
the pleasant and educative function of contemplating our 
friends' actions with the psychologically acute statement that 
we are better able to observe our neighbors than ourselves and 
their actions better than our own (EN 1169b33-35). 
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has already told us that eudaimonia describes the complete 
and fulsome life, and he has identified eudaimonia as the 
life of virtue, the ongoing growth of a person in good-
ness. Now Aristotle inquires into what training in virtue 
involves, and sees it centered in friendship. He bases 
this conclusion on his earlier argument that 'happiness 
is some kind of activity,' specifically the activity of 
virtue, and now suggests that since the 'activity of a 
good man' is the doing of good with and for others, 'it 
follows that a supremely happy man will need friends of 
this kind.' In other words, eudaimonia is life con-
stituted by virtue friendships. 23 
Aristotle emphasizes the intimacy of the bond that 
exists in friendships based on character when he asserts that 
the stance or attitude of a friend in this sort of relation-
ship is the same toward his friend as toward himself (EN 
1170b5-6). This is so inasmuch as Aristotle is so bold as to 
say that the friend is another self (heteros gar autos ho 
philos estin, EN 1170b6-7). Because the friend is understood 
to be another self, Aristotle claims that the friend's 
existence and flourishing is affirmed to be just as choicewor-
thy (or nearly so)~ as one's own existence and flourishing 
(kathaper oun to auton einai haireton estin hekasto houto kai 
to ton philon e paraplesios, EN 1170b7-8). Consequently, a 
fFiend in this kind of relationship must make his friend's 
existence a part of his own consciousness (sunaisthanesthai 
ara dei kai tou philou hoti esti, EN ll 70b10-11) . This, 
23wadell, Friendship and the Moral Life, p. 64. 
24The quibble, I suspect, is due to Aristotle's position 
that self-love is the basis and condition of love of another. 
Thus, he qualifies somewhat his simple assertion that the 
friend's existence is just as choiceworthy as one's own 
existence. 
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Aristotle asserts, can only come about by living together with 
one's friend and by sharing each other's words and thoughts 
(touto de ginoit' an en to suzen kai koinonein logon kai 
dianoias, EN 1170bll-12) . 25 Because a character friend's 
existence and flourishing is almost as desirable to a happy 
person as his own fulsome life, it follows that the happy 
individual will need morally good friends (EN 1170b18-19). 
In this way, Aristotle affirms the indispensability of life 
with others as a condition of the ongoing pursuit of a 
virtuous and flourishing existence. 
6.4 Conclusion 
We have seen, in this chapter, that both tragedian and 
philosopher hold the view that friendship is an indispensable 
part of living well. I have argued, furthermore, that 
Sophocles and Aristotle do not uphold simply any kind of 
association or relationship (e.g. an alliance of expediency) 
as a necessary element in living the good life but only the 
sort of relationship in which one's friend is loved for who 
he is and one wishes his good for his own sake. This is the 
case for the ancients because we have seen that they under-
stand that the issue of personal character is intimately bound 
up with the kinds of people with whom one shares one's life. 
25see Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, p. 358 for an 
interesting discussion of how "living together" is not meant 
to be interpreted as merely "regular social visiting" but a 
more robust life of daily, shared activity in the spheres of 
work and play. 
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Friends are, then, closely connected with one's happiness 
precisely because they are instrumental in the formation of 
one's character. It is in this way that the ancients fully 
appreciated the social character of growth in the moral life. 
Modern moral philosophy in the Kantian tradition, on the other 
hand, has proved deficient in its lack of appreciation for the 
social nature of becoming a moral person. I have argued that 
this is the case because of its pre-occupation with 
establishing the autonomy of the willing subject in such a way 
that eclipses the possibility of others' having a vital role 
to play in the formation of the moral person. By contrast, 
the ancients fully appreciated the way in which lasting 
friendships based upon love of a friend's character can play 
a decisive role in the formation of one's character and in 
living the good life. 
Sophocles shows us this in dramatic form in the way that 
Neoptolemus moves beyond his former relationship with Philoc-
tetes where the latter was simply a means to the end of 
obtaining the bow. The tragedian reveals, both through 
Neoptolemus' own insights and the final revelation of Hera-
cles, that true friendship must be based upon mutual trust, 
openness and care for the other. It is only this kind of 
friendship, Sophocles is saying, that can be the basis of 
heroic action. 
Aristotle, for his part, furnishes a logos of that which 
is presented dramatically by the tragedian. The philosopher, 
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also, presents to us inferior kinds of friendships (such as 
those of pleasure and of utility) and shows us that these 
sorts of relationships are inferior because they are not 
grounded upon love of the person for who he is but upon some 
kind of incidental consideration. The central case of 
friendship for the philosopher is that in which the person is 
loved for who he is and the good is wished for him for his 
own sake. Aristotle argues that it is only in this sort of 
friendship that we find a stable and reliable ground for the 
pursuit of the virtuous life. This is so since it is only in 
friendships founded upon character that we seek the good 
together and make each other good. 26 
In this way both philosopher and tragedian affirm, each 
in his own way, that the life of virtue (or heroic action) is 
not a solitary affair but is founded upon and mediated by the 
sort of friends who help us to sustain virtuous activity and 
who guide us in the living of the best life because they 
exemplify, as our "other selves," the kind of life that we 
ourselves would want to live. 
26see Wadell, Friendship and the Moral Life, p.66. 
CONCLUSION 
Our study in the moral anthropology of Sophocles and 
Aristotle has proved to be richly rewarding. It has been my 
position that the poet and the philosopher hold a fundamental-
ly similar conception of the nature of the moral person and 
the good life and that this understanding of ethics is, in 
many respects, superior to more recent developments in moral 
philosophy, especially those in the Kantian tradition. First, 
we have seen how the ancients show a great appreciation of the 
concrete character of ethics. They fully understand that the 
point of ethics is not to construct a moral theory or to 
formulate a decision-procedure (as is characteristic of the 
abstractions of modern moral philosophy) but to become a 
particular kind of person and to live a particular kind of 
life. In this way we see that they are fundamentally pre-
occupied with the question of character and what constitutes 
its excellence. 
The question of character is, as they see it, related 
to the prior question of human nature and the relationship 
that such a nature has to the development of the virtues. 
once again we can see that they begin with the concrete and 
develop their understanding of what constitutes the moral 
person from their consideration of the phenomena. Sophocles 
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and Aristotle understand that a human being is a complex of 
reason, emotions and desires and that these three stand in 
need of some kind of organization and integration if psychic 
health, virtue and human fulfillment is to be achieved. It 
is their position that such an integration of these elements 
of the psyche is not given to us by nature and that education 
is necessary in order that excellent organization of these 
elements can be realized. 
Once again, it has been my position that this ancient 
anthropology is superior to more recent developments in the 
Kantian tradition because of its taking into account the whole 
person: the rational, emotional and desiderative elements. 
Moral philosophy after Kant shows little interest in the role 
that the emotions and desires play or in the significance that 
their integration with reason may have in the formation of the 
moral agent. In the ancient conception of the person the 
emotions are not hopelessly irrational drives that must be 
suppressed or overcome by reason (as in Kant) but are, 
instead, highly educable, semi-rational impulses capable of 
b~ing aligned with the rational part in such a way that 
excellent moral agency results. In this way the ancients not 
only realize the important place that the emotions have in the 
moral development of the person but they also appreciate the 
central role that achieving psychological harmony plays with 
respect to authentic human agency. Moral philosophy in the 
Kantian tradition not only does not take the emotions serious-
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ly as having a part to play in the constitution of the moral 
person but it is positively hostile to them. We can see this 
in the way that Kant tends to view reason and inclination as 
opposed and how reason needs to overcome inclination in order 
that one's duty may be carried out. In this way, too, we can 
see that this model for moral agency is consonant with the 
notion of inner conflict as an unavoidable condition of human 
agency as opposed to the possibility of integration which we 
find in the ancient model. It has been my contention that the 
ancient model is preferable because of the way in which the 
entire person is taken into account and because inner harmony 
among the various parts of the psyche is preferable to 
psychological civil war. We have, in fact, seen in the play 
that Neoptolemus is incapable of acting authentically so long 
as he is in this conflicted state and achieves excellent moral 
agency when the strife that has been raging within him has 
been resolved. The recognition of nature's insufficiency for 
virtue and the need for a teacher points to the ancients' 
recognition of the social character of growth in the moral 
life. This is demonstrated, too, in the privileged place that 
they accord friendship. Sophocles and Aristotle both show a 
profound appreciation of the role that others play in our 
becoming moral persons. They fully understand that becoming 
a moral person is a process that is mediated through our 
relationship with friends and teachers who act as moral guides 
or examples throughout our lives. The social character of 
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moral education is not sufficiently appreciated at all by 
moral philosophy in the tradition of Kant and this is so , as 
we have suggested, because of its pre-occupation with securing 
the rational autonomy of the agent. In this conception of 
morals there is an unfortunate disparagement of the role that 
moral examples play because they tend to viewed as a sort of 
illegitimate form of heteronomy in which the ground for the 
determination of the agent's will is no longer the moral law 
alone. This is unfortunate since it seeks for too rigid a 
standard and hence rejects the very real role that others can 
play in our lives as moral guides and exemplars. The legiti-
macy of the use of moral examples, both good and bad, in the 
formation of the moral agent was the basis of our considera-
tion of the characters of Odysseus and Neoptolemus as both 
anti-type and authentic agent, respectively. 
As a corollary and secondary theme of this thesis I have 
maintained that the employment of philosophy and literature 
is appropriate to this fuller anthropology which realizes the 
importance of both the emotional and rational aspects of moral 
personhood. As we have seen, the ancients viewed ethics as 
an eminently practical and concrete affair and they also 
appreciated the central role that the emotions play in the 
formation of the moral agent. Correlative to this, I have 
employed the poetry of Sophocles' drama because poetry excels 
in the presentation of the concrete and particular situation 
as well as for its emotionally evocative power. Through the 
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medium of the poet we are presented with a particular, 
emotionally-charged situation in which we, too, as viewers are 
summoned to feel with and for the characters on the stage. 
We have especially witnessed this in the moving and dramatic 
way that Sophocles portrays Neoptolemus going through the 
agonies of deliberation in which he attempts to resolve his 
moral dilemma. Because of poetry's peculiar powers to portray 
the particular and to evoke the emotions it seems to me to be 
entirely appropriate to employ it as representative of one 
side of the ancient anthropology that we are attempting to 
flesh out. 
We have employed the philosopher, on the other hand, as 
representative of the rational element of our anthropology 
not, of course, because he does not recognize the role of the 
emotions, but because the strengths that are especially 
peculiar to philosophy are those of analysis and explanation. 
We have, in addition, turned to the philosopher in order to 
furnish us with a more unified picture of the disparate 
phenomena that are given by the poet. In this way we have 
looked to the philosopher for a logos that both explains and 
provides a more synthetic whole. We have seen this analytic 
rigor operative in the way that Aristotle has furnished us 
with certain moral concepts or terms which help to give a 
rational account of the phenomena which the tragedian has 
presented in his drama. Thus, Aristotle's discussion of the 
nature of panourgia ( in conjunction with his analysis of 
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cleverness and practical wisdom) has furnished us with a logos 
of the character of Odysseus. By means of Aristotle's 
analysis we have come to understand that Odysseus' potentially 
admirable ability of efficiently linking means to ends 
(deinotes) is vitiated by his wicked character into the 
willingness to do or say anything to achieve any end that is 
characteristic of criminality (panourgia). In this way we 
gain insight into the nature of Odysseus' wickedness because 
we now understand that his viciousness distorts his perception 
of the fundamental principles of action such that his ad-
mirable ability is skewed and directed to ends of dubious 
moral rectitude. 
Aristotle's term prohairesis has also proved to be of 
enormous benefit in both helping us to understand the nature 
of the choice which Neoptolemus makes in the play and furnish-
ing a unified account of the disparate phenomena that are a 
part of this complex moral act. Through the notion of 
prohairesis we are capable of understanding Neoptolemus' act 
as constituted by four things: (1) deliberation (2) maturity 
(3) responsibility (4) integration of the emotional with the 
rational. Thus, we see that Neoptolemus first goes through 
the agonies of deliberation, after which he comes to a mature 
decision in which he ceases to eschew personal responsibility 
for his actions. It is through this very decision, further-
more, that he achieves an integration of his emotions with his 
reason as is evidenced by the fact that his hesitation and 
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self-doubt is gone and he now acts with bold resolution. 
Again, we can see here that Aristotle's term helps to unify 
and explain the phenomena which is presented by the dramatist. 
We have seen the excellence of philosophy operative in 
the way in which Aristotle furnishes an account of the nature 
of emotional response. Sophocles furnishes us a phenomenal 
account of the emotions through the characters of his drama. 
It is here that we see that Neoptolemus' emotions lead him to 
question the justice of his actions. Aristotle, for his part, 
provides us with an explanation, a rational account of the 
nature of emotional response that helps us to see why Neop-
tolemus' emotions are able to do what they do in the play. 
Thus, through Aristotle's analysis of the relationship of 
reason and emotional response in terms of efficient causality, 
we come to understand the cognitive character of the emotions. 
Through his analysis of the emotions of shame, compassion and 
righteous indignation we are able, furthermore, to see that 
this very cognitive component of emotional response is capable 
of orienting the individual to the good that is to be done for 
himself or for another. In this way, we are enabled better 
to understand how the emotions operate in the character of 
Neoptolemus as he attempts to understand what he is to do. 
APPENDIX 
THE EDUCATIVE ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS 
AND THE EXPERIENCE OF TRAGIC CATHARSIS 
We have already seen how compassion, shame and various 
other emotions played a central role in the moral education of 
the character of Neoptolemus. We saw also the various ways in 
which the Sophoclean and Aristotelian conceptions of the role 
of the emotions in moral discernment are in fundamental 
agreement. Both philosopher and tragedian do not see the 
emotions and reason as at odds with each other but as capable 
of successful integration and able to supplement each other's 
vision of the good. In this section I wish simply to amplify 
the way in which Aristotle supports and develops the 
Sophoclean position regarding the cognitive role of the 
emotions in moral judgment by a consideration of the role of 
the emotions in relation to katharsis in the Poetics and 
Politics. 
In his Poetics Aristotle states that there are two things 
responsible for (aitiai, Poetics 1448b4) the origin of poetry 
as a whole and that both of these things are natural causes 
(phusikai, Poetics 1448b5). The first cause is that represen-
tation is connatural to human beings from childhood inasmuch 
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as human beings are the most prone towards representation of 
all other animals (ton allon zoon hoti mimetikotaton esti, 
Poetics 1448b7). It is in this way, Aristotle says, that we 
learn our first lessons. The second thing responsible for the 
origin of poetry is that everyone not only engages in repre-
sentation but delights in it (to chairein tois mimemasi 
pantas, Poetics 1448b9). Aristotle says the reason we delight 
in representation is that it is pleasurable to discern the 
likeness (eikonas, Poetics 1448bll) that exists between the 
thing itself and the thing represented (manthanein kai 
sullogizesthai ti hekaston hoion hoti houtos ekeinos, Poetics 
1448b16-17). An indication of this is that things which we 
would normally view in themselves with pain, we delight in 
when they have been represented with the greatest exactitude 
and care (ha gar auta luperos horomen touton tas eikonas tas 
malista ekribomenas chairomen theorountes, Poetics 1448bl0-
11). We delight in representations, then, because we take 
pleasure in learning (manthanein ou monon tois philosophois 
hediston alla kai tois allois homoios, Poetics 1448b13-14 ) . 
Thus, viewing representations (whether they be through drama 
or music, through painting or sculpture) is an intellectual 
process and entails some kind of sensitive judgment on the 
part of the viewer because it involves an apprehension of the 
connection between reality and representation. This under-
standing of representational art as an intellectual process 
that involves judgment is built right into Aristotle's notion 
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of plot. 
According to Aristotle, plot or plot-structure (muthos) 
is the soul of tragedy (Poetics 1450a39-bl) . It is the 
business of the poet whose field of representation is human 
agents and actions (Poetics 1448al, 1448a27-28) to compose a 
plot where events happen from necessity or probability, 
because of each other rather than merely after one another 
(Poetics 1452a5, 1452a20-21). In this way, then, it is up to 
the poet so to arrange the events of his plot that the 
intelligible structure of the story is made manifest to the 
audience. This is why, for Aristotle, poetry is more serious 
and more philosophical than history (Poetics 1451b5ff.). The 
historian relates only the things that have happened. He is 
not necessarily concerned to persuade an audience of the 
intelligibility of the events that have occurred as simply to 
present those events. The poet, on the other hand, must show 
the intelligible nexus of the events that make up his story 
(according to probability or necessity) if he is to evoke a 
sympathetic response from his audience. The poet, then, is 
not concerned so much with what happens (ta genomena, Poetics 
as with what could happen (hoia an genoito, Poetics 1451b5). 
In this way, unlike the historian who deals with particulars, 
the poet is dealing with types of events or types of charac-
ters that are universal to human experience. As Aristotle 
puts it, poetry speaks of universals, history of particulars 
(Poetics 1451b7-8). 
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Poetry, then, speaks in terms of "literary universals"' 
wherein the nature of human experience is revealed (through 
action and character) by means of representation. The 
excellence of these literary universals, however, is precisely 
their ability to arouse the peculiarly tragic emotions of 
compassion and terror (Poetics 1449b27-28, 1452bl). It is the 
feeling of these two emotions that comprises the particular 
pleasure that is characteristic of the experience of tragedy 
(Poetics 1453b10-12). Other kinds of painful emotions can be 
evoked but these are not peculiar to tragedy and will not 
elicit catharsis, the central element to the experience of 
tragedy for Aristotle (Poetics 1449b29). (Aristotle appears, 
in fact, to link the experience of catharsis with the feeling 
of these two peculiarly tragic emotions, cf. Politics, 
1342a7ff.) . For example, it is possible for a poet to 
represent on stage the change from good to bad fortune of good 
and decent men (tous epieikeis andras, Poetics 1452b34), but 
this, Aristotle says, will not elicit terror and compassion 
because it is revolting (miaron, Poetics 1452b36) . 2 
It is the job of the poet, then, to construct the sort 
1See Norman Gulley, "Aristotle on the Purposes of Litera-
ture," in Articles on Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, (New 
York, st. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 171. 
2Richard Janko (Aristotle on Comedy, London, Duckworth, 
1984, 142) perceptively points out the relevant opposition of 
this word, miaron (which literally means "polluted," 
"unclean"), to the word that signifies one of the central 
experiences of excellent tragedy (for Aristotle) as 
"cleansing" or "purifying," namely, catharsis. 
235 
of plot which elicits these peculiarly tragic emotions. The 
evocation of compassion and terror (leading, in turn, to 
catharsis) is the test case of whether the tragic poet has 
successfully composed an excellent tragedy. These particular 
emotions can be predictably aroused by the excellent tragic 
poet because of Aristotle's implicit belief in the inherent 
connection of emotional response to the cognitive process of 
understanding the play. 3 If the poet has composed well, 
according to Aristotle, compassion and terror will be appro-
priate responses to the events depicted on the stage. In this 
way we see that Aristotle's poetic theory supports his ethical 
theory because in both we see him acknowledging the inter-
connection between the rational and emotional spheres. The 
excellent and successful poet will engage us both intel-
lectually and (perhaps especially) emotionally by calling 
forth from us terror and compassion toward the events depicted 
on stage, emotions which will inevitably lead to the emotional 
and psychological release that is catharsis. These emotions 
are not irrational or unpredictable impulses but are an intel-
ligent response to a well-structured plot (according to 
probability or necessity) in which events are so arranged and 
characters so depicted as intelligibly to evince terror and 
compassion: 
To feel an emotion consequent on the representation of an 
action that contains the object of that emotion, the 
3Aristotle is not talking about the understanding of a 
literary critic but that of the audience. 
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fearful and pitiable for instance, is not to feel it 
simply, but to see, at the same time, those objects in 
their causes, to see how they follow, in all likelihood or 
of necessity, from certain actions that precede them. It 
is also, and this is important, to feel the emotion about 
the causes. In the case of tragedy, for instance, the 
causes of things pitiable and fearful are themselves made 
to appear pitiable and fearful, for what makes the tragic 
action, when constructed best, so pitiable and fearful, is 
that the fearful and pitiable things are shown arising out 
of something unexpected and apparently harmless, and to 
someone who is like us, neither extremely bad nor 
extremely good. The fearfulness of the consequences is 
thrown back onto the cause, so that that too becomes 
fearful, and all the more so the more vividly this is 
done. 4 
In this way then we can see how Aristotle maintains the 
centrality of emotional response in the understanding of 
tragic drama. It is time now to turn to a consideration of 
the educational role that the emotions of compassion and 
terror have (those emotions which Aristotle sees as peculiar 
to tragedy) with respect to the experience of catharsis. 
It is not my purpose in this discussion to give anything 
on the order of a history of the interpretation of Aristotle's 
intentions in his use of the term catharsis. That would 
require a book unto itself. Suffice it to say that this 
particular interpretation of the term and its meaning is 
controversial and is so of necessity because of the scantiness 
and inconclusiveness of the evidence. It does, however, seem 
to me that this interpretation does the most justice to what 
Aristotle was getting at in his discussion of the meaning and 
function of catharsis in the experience of tragedy. 
4Peter Simpson, "Aristotle on Poetry and Imitation," 
Hermes, 116 (1988) 289. 
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Former interpretations (mostly in the nineteenth century) 
of the meaning of catharsis focused on the medical aspects of 
the term and favored a conception of catharsis as a kind of 
physiological and psychological purgation. 5 A growing number 
of recent commentators, however, have been challenging the 
purgation model of catharsis as inconsistent with Aristotle's 
conception of the necessary and beneficial role of the 
emotions in living the good life. 6 Catharsis is, surely, some 
kind of purgation or relieving of an excess but it is not the 
total sort of evacuation that former commentators have made it 
out to be. These more recent commentators argue that the 
educative function of catharsis has largely been neglected in 
a consideration of the meaning of this term. 
As we have already seen, Aristotle maintains that moral 
virtue is comprised as much by what we feel when we act as by 
our action itself. The pleasure or pain that we we feel in 
accompaniment with our actions is a sign (semeion, EN 1104b4) 
5See Stephen Halliwell, Aristotle's Poetics (London, 
Duckworth, 1986), pp. 184-201; Richard Janko, Aristotle on 
Comedy (London, Duckworth, 1984), pp. 136-51. 
6See Humphrey House, Aristotle's Poetics (Westport, 
Connecticut, Greenwood Press, Publishers 1956), pp. 108-11; 
Carnes Lord, Education and Culture in the Political Thought of 
Aristotle (Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1982), 
pp. 135-38, 152, 159, 164; Kathy Eden, Poetic and Legal 
Fiction in the Aristotelian Tradition (Princeton, New Jersey, 
Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 25-61; Richard Janke, 
Poetics I with Tractatus Coislinianus (Indianapolis and 
Cambridge, Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 141-42; 
Norman Gulley, "Aristotle on the Purposes of Literature," in 
Articles on Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, (New York, St. 
Martin's Press, 1978), p. 171, pp. 175-76. 
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of the state of our character-disposition; correct education 
(orthe paideia, EN 1104bl3) is delighting in and being pained 
at those things which we ought to be; a person is not good or 
just if he does not take delight in noble or just actions (EN 
1099al7-20). In addition to his assertions on the importance 
of feeling correctly with respect to good character, Aristotle 
explicitly repudiates the notion that virtue consists in some 
kind of "exorcism" of the emotions. 
In a very significant passage (for our purposes) in 
Nicomachean Ethics II.3 Aristotle says that some define the 
virtues as a kind of absence of feeling and quietude 
(apatheias tinas kai eremias, EN 1104b24-25), 7 because many 
people become morally worthless (phauloi, EN 1104b21) as a 
result of dealing poorly with pleasure and pain. But this is 
an incorrect definition of virtue (ouk eu de [horizontai], EN 
1104b25), Aristotle says, because those who define it in this 
way speak without making the due qualifications of time, 
place, manner and all the other modes and manners in which 
feeling will be appropriately expressed. Virtue does not 
consist in exorcism of the emotions but in the proper integra-
tion of emotional response to the various circumstances and 
situations that we find ourselves in. In this way, then, it 
would be utterly unlike Aristotle to argue that the purpose of 
the experience of tragic catharsis is the complete purgation 
7The second term, eremias, has its etymological roots in 
the Greek word for 'desert,' eremos. 
of the emotions. 8 
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In what follows I shall explain how 
catharsis is both a partial purgation and the vehicle by which 
the audience appreciates tragedy emotionally (through compas-
sion and terror) and is educated in and through the experience 
of those emotions. 
We have already seen that, for Aristotle, the experience 
of tragedy is both a cognitive and an emotional one. The 
origins of poetry are our natural propensity to learn in and 
through representation as well as the delight we take in 
understanding that "this is that" (hoti houtos ekeinos, 
Poetics 1448bl 7) by means of representations. But the purpose 
of tragic representation is the arousal of compassion and 
terror as an appropriate emotional response to what is 
witnessed on the stage. It is the particular task of the 
tragic poet to furnish the audience the pleasure that is 
8See Lord, Education and Culture, pp. 136-37. Lord 
quotes the testimony of both Seneca and Cicero on the Aristo-
telian position with respect to the emotions. Seneca writes: 
"Aristotle stands as a defender of anger and forbids it to be 
cut out of us" (stat Aristoteles defensor irae et vetat illam 
nobis exsecari); "Aristotle says that certain passions can 
serve as arms if one uses them well" (Aristoteles ai t affectus 
guosdam si guis illis bene utatur pro armis esse) (On Anger 
III. 3. 1, I. 17 .1) . Cicero says, "the Peripatetics say that 
those perturbations which we think should be eliminated are 
not only natural but provided by nature to be useful, and they 
say that the other sorts of passions are useful as well. Pity 
is useful for getting us to render assistance and alleviate 
the misfortunes that men suffer undeservedly; if one were to 
remove fear, all carefulness in life, which is greatest among 
those who fear the laws, the magistrates, poverty, ignominy, 
death, or pain, would be eliminated. In arguing thus they 
admit that these passions need to be pruned back, but assert 
that they neither can nor need be uprooted entirely, and 
suppose that in almost all things a mean is best" (Tusculan 
Disputations IV. 19-20). 
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peculiar to tragedy, namely, catharsis of compassion and 
terror (ten apo eleou kai phobou dia mimeseos dei hedonen 
paraskeuazein ton poieten, Poetics 1453b12-3). This is done, 
however, by an appeal to the emotions as cognitive because, as 
we have seen, the experience of the downfall of the good man 
is rejected as inappropriate to the arousal of compassion and 
terror because it will only stir up feelings of revulsion (to 
miaron, Poetics 1452b36). 
The experience of tragedy, we shall argue then, brings 
about the alignment of our emotions with the moral and 
aesthetic judgments that we make about the world because the 
experience of catharsis validates the tragic poet's plot as 
worthily and properly eliciting the experience of catharsis 
through the emotions of compassion and terror. The successful 
tragic poet will then evoke both a cognitive and emotional 
response from his audience by representing through his plot-
structure the sorts of generalizations universal to the human 
condition that call for a response of compassion and terror. 9 
This confirmation of feeling appropriately through 
tragic catharsis will educate the viewer of the play to 
understand what it means to feel and act appropriately in 
actual life situations. Aristotle states this explicitly at 
Politics 1340a23f. In this passage, Aristotle holds that 
those who have been habituated to feel pain and delight with 
9See Peter Simpson, "Aristotle on Poetry and Imitation," 
Hermes, 116 (1988) 289-290. 
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respect to things that are like the true or actual case are 
close to being in the same state with regard to the actual 
case itself (ho d'en tois homoiois ethismos tou lupeisthai kai 
chairein eggus esti to pros ten aletheian ton auton echein 
tropon, Politics 1340a23-25). He says that if a person 
delights in looking upon (theomenos, from theaomai, used often 
of the spectator in a theatre) the image (eikona, Politics 
1340a26} of someone for no other reason than the form itself 
(ten morphen auten, Politics 1340a27} of the one represented, 
then that person will, of necessity, experience pleasure at 
the actual sight of the person whose image he took delight in 
(anankaion touto kai auten ekeinen ten theorian hou ten eikona 
theorei hedeian einai, Poli tics 1340a27-9) . In this way, 
then, we see how the experience of tragedy is a form of moral 
education. When we become habituated to feeling emotions 
appropriately with regard to representations (and again it is 
the task of the poet to confirm the intelligibility of our 
emotional response through the evocation of that pleasure 
which is peculiar to tragedy), then we are well on our way to 
feeling emotions appropriately in real life situations. It 
is, as Aristotle says, precisely this feeling delight and pain 
at what we ought which constitutes correct education (orthe 
paideia, fili 1104b14). 
Through the experience of catharsis our feelings are not 
only "worked through and made comprehensible, 1110 they are also 
10see Janko, Poetics I, p. 142. 
regulated. 
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The experience of catharsis is, after all, some 
kind of release or relieving of the emotions. Aristotle calls 
it a "lightening" of the emotions (perhaps from pent-up 
emotional tensions that have no place for release?) that is 
accompanied by pleasure (kouphizesthai meth' hedones, Poli tics 
1342a15). Tragedy provides the place for the release of 
emotional tensions which will regulate our emotions in such a 
way that we are more apt to achieve the mean in the expression 
of our feelings in actual life situations. In a fascinating 
passage of his Tractatus Coislinianus 11 (section III, cf. also 
section IX), Aristotle says that tragedy takes away some of 
the terrifying emotions of the soul (huphairei ta phobera 
pathemata tes psuches) through compassion and terror and that 
it aims to have a due proportion of terror (surnmetrian thelei 
echein tou phobou). This conception of the due measure or 
proportion of emotional expression accords well with 
Aristotle's conception of virtue as lying in a mean 
disposition (mesotes) of emotion (and action) in Nicomachean 
Ethics II and IV. In this way, then, we can see that Aris-
totle sees the emotions as intimately involved in the process 
of understanding tragedy as well as being, in turn, educated 
by it. The emotions (as we have been arguing is the case for 
both Aristotle and Sophocles) are not at odds with reason but 
confirm (and even assist) reason in its moral judgments about 
11Argued by Janko to be a kind of summary of Aristotle's 
lost treatise on comedy. 
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the world. The tragic poet, if he is to be successful, must 
structure his plot and develop his characters in such a way 
that compassion and terror are intelligible responses to the 
events depicted on stage. These emotions, if appropriately 
aroused will lead to what Aristotle argues is the peculiar 
pleasure of tragedy, namely, catharsis. 
catharsis is both an aligning of the 
The experience of 
emotions with the 
judgments of reason as well as a release of emotional tension 
that will make us better able to hit the mean in the expres-
sion of our feelings in real life situations. Thus, Aristotle 
and Sophocles confirm one another in their assessment of the 
central role that the emotions play in living the good life. 
our emotions are not in opposition to reason but are capable 
of being integrated with reason because of their cognitive 
component. This excellent dove-tailing of the powers of 
reason and emotion with respect to moral discernment is 
correct education (orthe paideia). 
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